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ABSTRACT
This thesis argues that while Indonesia and the United States are not the
closest of allies, new approaches to the way both countries formulate foreign
policy will lead to a stronger firendship. A summary of U.S.-Indonesian relations
is placed within the context of Indonesian history, so as to provide an appropriate
vantage point from which to view future developments. The national goals of
each country are examined next, with the belief that any improvement in bilateral
relations will naturally stem from the common interests of the two countries.
Where differences are noted, it is often a case of similar underlying objectives
driving incongruent policies. It is in these areas that modern approaches to
American foreign policy will reap the largest rewards.
This thesis contends that from the political, economic, and security points
of view, both the United States and Indonesia have much to gain from an
improved relationship. The domestic and foreign policies of the two countries
can be furthered simultaneously; first, Indonesia must soften its anti-colonial
rhetoric, and the United States must take post-Cold War approaches to formulate
post-Cold War foreign policy.
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The collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of the
East-West conflict which dominated American strategic thinking
for the past forty years. The emphasis of that conflict for
the United States was the protection of its borders, institu-
tions, and its way of life against the perceived threats of
communism and communist countries. As the Twentieth Century
draws to a close, America must combine ideology, economics,
and security, into a plan for a comprehensive security. The
security horizon must expand beyond the containment of the
Soviet Union to the building of a New World Order. The search
for new security strategies compels the United States to re-
examine its relations with various countries in all regions of
the world. Since Indonesia is arguably the most important
nation in Southeast Asia, this thesis explores the current
U. S . -Indonesian relationship, with suggestions for policy
changes designed to meet America's post-Cold War needs.
A cursory examination of relevant Indonesian history and
political culture gives the reader an understanding of the
underlying beliefs, values, and experiences of the country and
its people--vital if the United States is to negotiate
responsibly and successfully with Indonesia. A parallel
background of U. S . -Indonesian relations traces the issues
vm
between the two governments, and the atitudes toward each
other that developed while the issues were being negotiated.
With that background, the current national goals of both
Indonesia and the United States are examined. In many cases,
the United States and indonesia have shared common interests
and objectives; these are the pillars on which to base a
bilateral relationship. At other times, the goals of the two
countries were similar, but their strategies differed, usually
because of conceptual frameworks or different national
experiences. Some new approaches are recommended, in the hope
of achieving mutually beneficial policies in the interest of
regional stability and peace.
In conclusion, it is noted that there are circumstances
which place the United States in opposition to Indonesia.
Given that these circumstances are not likely to fade in the
near future, the political leaders of both sides must "agree
to disagree" for the sake of an overall improved relationship.
There is no conflict so deep that it should be allowed to push





I. INTRODUCTION- -FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS: HISTORY AND
CULTURE OF INDONESIA
The motto of the Republic of Indonesia, "Unity in
Diversity, " goes far toward describing at once the goals and
problems of this Southeast Asian country. With over three-
hundred ethnic divisions and subdivisions, over 13,000
islands, and more area in water between the islands than in
landmass itself, Indonesia's task of national development is
rivalled in complexity by few countries today. Yet to speak
of an "Indonesia" is no misnomer; the government is widely
supported by the diverse populace and pursues a singular
foreign policy aimed largely at enhancing the unity of the
country. Blessed (or cursed) with a plentiful variety of
natural resources, and containing the world's fourth largest
population, Indonesia has the foundation on which to build a
world power. To do so the leadership needs to maximize the
unity while minimizing the negative effects of the diversity.
By means of introduction, this chapter will explore part
of the history of the East Indies, focusing on the early
sustained contacts with outside civilizations and the effects
of these contacts on the indigenous cultures. That history
will then be translated into the modern political culture of
Indonesia, which is necessary to understand current domestic
and foreign policy-making procedures. A closer look at the
Indonesian-American relationship's history will provide the
reader with a starting point from which to examine the current
status and possible future course of that relationship. This
examination of Indonesian history, and especially its history
vis a vis the United States, is of vital importance for the
efforts of reconciling the national interests of the two
countries to provide a basis for improving Indonesian
relations with the United States.
A. HISTORY
The islands of the East Indies--Java, Sumatra, Borneo and
Celebes being the most prominent --were in earlier times a
series of kingdoms having little contact with each other (save
limited trade and occasional expansionist ventures) and even
less with the outside world. The society was hierarchical in
structure, centered around the king who had consolidated his
authority by conquering all challengers, or the village chief
who claimed inherited closeness to the local spirits.
Animistic practices predominated, and the organization of
ceremonies dedicated to the village deities was a fundamental
responsibility of the socio-political leader.
Indian traders following the monsoon patterns made contact
with the indigenous people of Sumatra and Java as they
attempted to forge the Sunda and Malacca Straits en route to
the Chinese markets. They brought their Hindu-Buddhist faiths
with them, and soon their beliefs permeated the East Indies.
The ease with which the new faiths were accepted was
characteristic of the indigenous Malays, Sumatrans, and
Javanese. Their cultures were traditionally more tolerant of
"outsiders," sought harmony over dispute, and preferred to
combine foreign beliefs with their own rather than discard
either in total
.
Particularly for Hinduism, its belief in a strict social
hierarchy blended in with the socially rigid nature of the
kingdom societies. The kings of "Hindu-ized" states thus
claimed to be the reincarnations of Hindu gods, thereby
increasing the legitimacy of their rule. Furthermore, the
multitude of deities in the Indian religions meant that the
indigenous village deities needed not be discarded; they were
worshipped as before, along with the "new" gods.
One of the greatest Indonesian dynasties, Srivijaya,
became a center for Hindu and Buddhist adherents between the
seventh and tenth centuries A.D., the first golden era of
Indonesia. Srivijaya controlled much of Sumatra and the
western half of Java, as well as the lower Malay Peninsula.
As the control of the dynasty spread from the coasts to the
inland agricultural areas, so too did the Hindu-Buddhist
influence. The emphasis on the structured society with the
king at the focal point was thus amplified. Amplified also
was the fusion of new and old faiths, evidenced by the
continued belief in mysticism--a trait reserved for the
priests and kings.
Srivijaya became not only a religious center but an
artistic and scientific one as well. The construction of
great temples to Hindu and Buddhist gods, the most famous
being the temple at Borobudur, is evidence of both the
relative advancement of these early Indonesian kingdoms and
the strength of their religious devotion.
Rivals to the Srivijaya empire grew in power as trade
shifted to the outer islands for the spices they contained.
Not only could these spices be traded for rice to feed the
local population, they were also in large demand from India to
Italy. The spice trade shifted importance from Sumatra to the
Java Sea, and a series of dynasties came to control wealth and
prestige surpassing that of the great Srivijaya Dynasty. The
most far-reaching of these, which commanded tribute from every
major part of the archipelago and ushered in the second golden
age of Indonesia, was the Majapahit Dynasty, centered on Java,
which controlled the archipelago in the 13th and 14th
centuries
.
Like Srivijaya, Majapahit became the cultural and
scholarly center of Southeast Asia. Engineering tasks such as
bridges and canals were accomplished to foster the
agricultural development on Java, Borneo, and other fertile
islands. Resting on the crossroads of the budding but
lucrative trade between India and mainland China, Majapahit
shared in the art, scientific discoveries, and cultures of
both worlds. Majapahit also solidified more than any of
Srivijaya's rivals the dominance of Javanese culture over that
of Sumatra.
The decline of the Majapahit Empire is synonymous with the
spread of Islam. The empire's fall was hastened by the
religious conflict between followers of Islam who came from
India and non-followers; meanwhile the spread of Islam was
facilitated by the power struggles which accompanied the
decline of the Majapahit Empire.
As with Hinduism and Buddhism, Islam came to Indonesia
with the new traders, this time from India and the Arabian
Peninsula. The new religion had something to offer everyone.
For the king, Islam offered more power. No longer was an
extensive cast of priests needed to perform complex rituals.
The king now stood alone at the top of the social and
religious hierarchy; if that king also obtained the title of
sultan, his combined religious and political authority was
substantial. Also, the pilgrimage to Mecca could be afforded
by the king but few others; the title of haji added to his
importance among the people. The mystical view of the king as
special messenger to the Supreme Being was restored, even
though such a notion was not consistent with orthodox Islamic
teaching.
For the commoner, Islam offered a sense of equality.
Praying five times per day and fasting at Ramadan were things
every follower could do, not just the king. The Islamic
notion of a personal relationship with Allah which depended on
one's own actions also held appeal. Finally, Islam offered
the simplicity of one all-powerful god.
The traders who brought Islam came at first seeking spices
and passage through the Straits of Malacca, so it is natural
that the first Islamic strongholds were on Sumatra. The
people of both northern and southern Sumatra were largely
involved in commerce and trade and were thus in regular
contact with strict adherents of the Islamic faith who, after
all, travelled to Indonesia from the religion's heartland.
While it difficult at best to trace the spread of Islam to
Java and the outer islands, the religion did permeate
Indonesia thoroughly though in varying degrees. In contrast
to Sumatra, the people of Java had developed a society based
largely on agriculture and centered around villages vs. cities
or trading centers. Thus the Islam which reached the Javanese
peasant was watered down and became another layer of religion
placed on top of--but not in place of--animism, Hinduism, and
Buddhism. Dependent on the land, neither peasant nor ruler
would risk offending any god who might affect its fertility.
Also, the fighting witnessed between rival Muslim villages
as to which was the more faithful follower seemed distasteful
to the Javanese and contrary to their peaceful and
accommodating nature.
Overall, however, the positive aspects of the new faith
(listed in the discussion on Sumatra) held true for Java and
the rest of Indonesia. Islam spread throughout the
archipelago because of conversion from within and without.
Muslim sultans, empowered by the wealth of the spice trade,
brought an end to the great Majapahit Dynasty and opened the
way for Islamic expansion into all of Indonesia. Islam was
the predominant faith at the beginning of the European era.
The Portuguese were the first European power to establish
permanent contact with the archipelago, travelling across the
Indian Ocean in the early 16th century in search of a water
route to China. They found it; they also discovered that
whoever controlled Malacca controlled the trade, and so they
captured Malacca in 1511.
The competition of European countries for overseas
colonies expanded into Southeast Asia, and within a century
the Dutch ousted the Portuguese from Malacca and began their
dominance of Indonesia. While the character of their
colonization has been well documented, a few aspects deserve
to be expanded here because of their relevance to modern
Indonesian government
.
When the Dutch arrived, they found Java to be the cultural
and political center of the islands. Accordingly, they
established their capital at Jakarta as a way to control
access to the main spice islands, control of which they had
wrestled from the Portuguese. This cemented the importance of
Java over the other islands. The Dutch came to dominate all
of the landmass and much of the culture of Indonesia, and they
did it from Java! The life of nearly every Indonesian was
dictated from Java. The Javanese were generally more
receptive toward these Christian foreigners than were their
strict Muslim counterparts on Sumatra and elsewhere.
At first the Netherlands East India Company was content to
rely on local kings to rule their lands, so long as they paid
the Company with the fruits of their agricultural labor in
exchange for protection from rival kingdoms. As control of
the islands shifted to the Government of Holland, however,
Dutch governors occupied the top rungs of the political ladder
and eclipsed the power of the kings.
The alternate route to social prominence for the
Indonesian became the new civil service. Those who joined its
ranks were educated mainly in schools set up by the Dutch. In
these schools and in the civil service they gained knowledge
of western science and culture, but more importantly they
gained experience in government. When the Dutch occupation
finally drew to a close, it was these Dutch-trained and
educated, mainly Javanese Indonesians who possessed expertise
in running a government and who were called on to lead the
independence struggle.
Traditional Javanese society's disregard for a merchant
class posed a problem for the Dutch, who needed to establish
a trading network. The Dutch found their answer in the ethnic
Chinese who had come to Indonesia seeking wealth from the
trade industry. Generally more work-oriented than the easy-
going Javanese, the Chinese were better suited for working
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with the Dutch. Also, these Chinese had been traders and
merchants in their former homeland, therefore they already
knew the business.
While this solution worked for the Dutch, it did not work
for the Indonesians. The wealth derived from trade far
surpassed what could be obtained through agriculture. Thus
the ethnic Chinese soon controlled wealth disproportionate to
their population. Moreover, when the Chinese used their
trading wealth and business shrewdness to turn traditional
Indonesian farmers into tenants on their own ancestral lands,
the seeds of ethnic rivalry were planted.
The treatment of Indonesians by the Dutch varied in
harshness. At its apex under the Cultivation System peasants
were forced to dedicate large portions of their land to grow
cash crops such as coffee; this diversion of resources away
from rice production led to widespread famines. Under the
Ethical Policy native Indonesians were allowed to practice
medicine and law, and their tax burdens were somewhat reduced.
Throughout the Dutch occupation, however, the Indonesians
were subjugated to the Dutch, second-class citizens in their
own country (or third class, since the ethnic Chinese were
generally better off) . The Dutch exploited their East Indies
to recover from damages in Holland caused by two world wars.
The islands were even controlled for them by the British
pending their return after World War II. Throughout most of
Indonesia's struggle for independence the United States
reluctantly perceived that maintenance of the Dutch position
in Indonesia was vital to the former's security in Europe.
The Dutch rule was the last period of Indonesian history
prior to their independence. Though certainly not a golden
era, its understanding is as important for defining modern
Indonesia as is the periods of the great Srivijaya and
Majapahit dynasties. As with most countries, the current
political culture cannot be fully appreciated without placing
it in its historical context. That is the subject of the next
section
.
B. INDONESIAN POLITICAL CULTURE
Two concepts are fundamental to understanding modern
Indonesian politics: the first is the prevalent position of
the Javanese in society; second is the view of world actors as
colonial or "neo-colonial " powers, still trying to further
their own interests at the expense of less capable nations.
To understand the nature of Indonesian politics is to
understand the role of Java. It was Javanese culture that
dominated the islands when the Europeans found them; it was
this culture the Dutch thought of as indigenous and thus to
them it was "Indonesian culture." Finally, it is to a large
extent the Javanese traditions and mindset that predominate
Indonesian politics today.
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The most obvious explanation for Javanese dominance in
politics is their dominance in the citizenry. Though the
island is smaller than Sumatra and Borneo, Java is home to
more than 60 percent of the Indonesian population and hosts
one of the highest population densities in the world. Java is
host to the nation's capital, Jakarta (which was taken from
the Dutch after independence and renamed from Batavia) , which
is also the financial, business, and social capital. As was
explained earlier, the Dutch development of Java as the focal
island increased its prominence over Sumatra--despite its
great pepper fields and trading centers, Borneo--despite the
lumber supply provided by its tropical rainforest, and Ternate
and Tidor--despite the wealth their spices provided for the
Dutch treasury. After three-hundred years of colonial rule,
only Java was equipped to accommodate the budding republic's
political demands.
Deeper reasons exist, however, for the prominent position
of Java, and those stem from the Javanese culture itself. One
aspect of that culture is the willingness and ability to
assimilate aspects of foreign societies into their own. The
Javanese were traditionally more content to absorb foreign
villagers and their ideas into their own culture than to
reject these offhand. This trait has already been discussed
in reference to the Javanese absorption of first Indian and
then Arabic religions. It was also true of their treatment of
Western culture. While the Sumatrans reacted coldly to the
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arrival of the Europeans, the Javanese accepted these
outsiders on more favorable terms.
This reveals another important Javanese trait, the
preference of compromise over conflict. Because of their
easy-going nature, Javanese chose to settle their disputes not
by battle but by a meeting of village leaders. These leaders
held long deliberations until opposing views were meshed into
one view, the result of compromise by all sides. This one
view was then presented to the villagers as the choice of all
leaders involved. There was no dissenting opinion offered to
the public, no alternate course to be followed.
This favoring of compromise is ever present in Indonesian
government today. The President's cabinet examines policy
questions and searches for answers acceptable to all
concerned. There is no vote taken, no majority rule which
overrides the opinion of the minority. Decisions offered to
the President are the result of compromise and consensus.
This Javanese trait is best demonstrated by the idea that
majority rule only starts problems; it does not solve them.
This is one explanation why Javanese culture facilitates,
if not dominates, Indonesian politics. It is certainly easier
to formulate government policy when concerned parties are
willing to give and take. It is likewise easier to formulate
and conduct foreign policy when the ideas of other nations are
accepted and reviewed rather than rejected out of hand as
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coming from "foreigners." The great leader Sukarno 1 accepted
that Indonesia could in no way isolate itself from the world
and hope to accomplish its goal of modernization; Sukarno was
Javanese
.
Another Javanese trait is gotong-rojong . Roughly
translated, it means helping one another. 2 In the
agricultural villages of Java, members cooperated to build the
roads and canals, repair each other's property after natural
disaster, and did what was necessary to keep the village
prosperous—without seeking compensation. The village was the
source of a Javanese person's social identity. Indeed one of
the stiffest punishments was banishment from the village, and
it was reserved for robbery, murder, and other crimes deemed
threatening to the village life.
This idea of gotong-rojong facilitates the establishment
of the collective as the principal economic unit. Labor and
resources are pooled, and the results are shared by all
contributors. Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution (still in
effect) states, "The economy shall be organized as a common
endeavor based upon the principles of the family
(i.e., village) system." 3 The fostering of cooperation eases
Indonesians, especially Javanese, have traditionally used
only a surname. This is the habit of Sukarno and Suharto.
2Howard Palfrey Jones, Indonesia: the Possible Dream (New
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1971), 9.
3 The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, art. 33.
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tensions brought on by ethnic differences, crowded cities, and
poverty.
Gotong-rojong also contributes to a modern phenomenon.
Village men leave for the cities just long enough to acquire
sufficient wealth with which to return to the village and
support the family. For these workers, their village is still
the predominant social structure. This temporary work force
has adversely affected city-based industries who depend on a
stable work force, one which plans to remain in place for a
number of years.
The political culture of Indonesia is determined by more
than Javanese cultural traits. The absolute control over the
islands wielded by the Dutch for three centuries, followed by
three years of Japanese domination for the purpose of feeding
a war machine, followed again by the exploitation of the
natural resources to rebuild a war-ravaged Holland has left a
bitter taste of anti-colonialism in the mouths of the
Indonesians
.
Their experience has left the Indonesian government
suspect of all foreign powers who deal with it. For forty
years Indonesia looked at the People's Republic of China
mainly as a source of subversion; this also fostered animosity
toward ethnic Chinese living on Indonesia, who were seen as a
potential threat which could be stirred to revolt by
directions from the mainland. The Soviet Union enjoyed no
better position once they established permanent bases in
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Vietnam. Those bases personified the threatening and
expansive nature of that communist country. Modern Russia is
less of a threat now because of its massive internal problems,
but a watchful Indonesian eye is kept on it.
The non-communist world fairs no better in the eyes of
Indonesia. Europeans are regarded as the traditional
colonists who sacrificed the development of nations throughout
Africa and Asia to increase their own wealth and prestige.
The United States and Japan join the European community as
neo-colonials, still seeking to subjugate the best interests
of Indonesia to suit their own goals. That leaves few world
powers who are not suspect
.
This distrust often drives Indonesia's foreign policy.
Though in need of large amounts of foreign aid and capital
investment, Indonesia takes the high road in bilateral
negotiations. While conventional wisdom states that beggars
cannot be choosers, Indonesia has negotiated significant loans
under tremendously favorable conditions. Indonesia has also
been known to refuse loans or grants which contain "too many
strings .
"
Colonial, or neo-colonial , domination fosters a fear in
Indonesia of not being able to control events in its own
backyard, namely Southeast Asia, let alone the rest of the
world. This in turn drives Indonesia's reliance on
international organizations to assist it in achieving the
country's foreign policy goals. The United Nations (UN) , the
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Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) --of which Indonesia was a co-
founder, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) are the primary organizations through which Indonesia
tries to expand its role on the world stage.
Modern society certainly influences the Indonesian
political culture. Perhaps the most dominant is the role of
Islam in today's Indonesia. While 90 percent of the
population professes Islam as its religion, the number of
santri--or closer adherents to traditional Islamic
fundamentals--is growing. Whereas the abangan- -nominal , or
less strict adherents--are content to leave religion out of
politics, the santri generally are not. Their increasing
strength translates into increasing clout.
Standing generally opposed to the santri is the ABRI
(Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Indonesian Armed
Forces) . This is not because the ABRI, dominated by the army
in size and importance, contains no Muslims. Rather it is
because the growing power of the santri comes at the expense
of the ABRI. The ABRI sees the santri as a threat to its own
social prominence and therefore often reacts harshly (or
overreacts) to santri demonstrations.
One aspect which has been a target of santri attacks is
the ABRI ' s dwi fungsi, or dual role. Not only is the military
charged with maintaining security from internal and external
threats, it also controls some of the larger state-owned
businesses in Indonesia. The government justifies dwi fungsi
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by maintaining that the resources of Indonesia belong to all
its inhabitants; therefor the military as defenders of all
Indonesians are in the best position to oversee industries
which use those resources. The ABRI is a dominant social and
political force.
Every aspect of Indonesian political culture is contained
in some form within the official government doctrine of
Pancasila. This official ideology contains five overriding
considerations within which context all government actions are
to be undertaken. First espoused by Sukarno during the latter
stage of Japanese occupation, Pancasila was embraced by
Suharto during his transition to power in 1965-66. The five
elements of Pancasila are: nationalism, internationalism,
democracy, social justice, and belief in one God. 4
Nationalism in the Pancasila context means unity of all
Indonesians toward achieving the betterment of the country as
a whole. It espouses ethnic and religious tolerance,
something deemed necessary in a country as diverse as
Indonesia
.
Sukarno's internationalism has often been translated as
humanitarianism and calls for fair treatment and equal
consideration of all nations; it is the Indonesian view of how
government-to-government dialogue should occur.
4George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in
Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952), 123-125.
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Democracy in Pancasila more accurately refers to a
representative government which determines national policy by
consensus. Any religious and social differences are to be
settled through compromise in discussions which take place
within a representative legislature.
Social justice is a plea for economic equality, or at
least a minimizing of the wealth gap between rich and poor.
It calls for the government to control national resources so
they can be exploited for the good of all, and it disdains the
idea of an economic elite class. Social justice expounds on
the gotong-rojong principle on a nationwide scale.
Finally, belief in one God is a compromise to the strict
adherents of Islam. While professing that the god referred to
is Allah, neither the Pancasila nor the constitution provide
for Indonesia to be an Islamic state. The right of the people
to worship as they choose is maintained. 5
Pancasila is a vital part of today's Indonesia. In 1982
President Suharto decreed that all sanctioned political
parties had to accept the Pancasila as their official
ideology. Suharto believes that contained within its
principles are the tools for national development, the
foremost tool being the formation of a tighter union.
The historical background explains the current Indonesian
political institutions and aims. That the Dutch could have
5ibid
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stayed in Indonesia for three-hundred years and not affected
the indigenous culture is an improbable notion, and so the
societal effects of Dutch colonial rule are superimposed on
the rich historical tradition of Srivijaya and Majapahit. The
characteristics of modern Indonesia stem from its colorful
history.
C. HISTORY OF INDONESIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS
The history of U. S . -Indonesian relations begins well
before the Southeast Asian archipelago expelled the Dutch in
1949. Americans, themselves colonial "masters" in the
Philippines, were already familiar with the rubber, pepper,
and coffee fields of the Netherlands East Indies; industry
giants Standard Oil and Goodyear Tire Company led the way.
Yet when those Southeast Asian islands felt that nationalist
surge which swept across the colonies of the world's empires
following World War I, when it came time for Indonesia to make
its stand for sovereignty, the United States struggle against
its British colonial master came to mind.
What the Indonesian nationalists Sukarno and Mohammed
Hatta believed was the beginning of the end of their colonial
status began with the German invasion of Poland in 1939.
After nine months of posturing on both sides of the Maginot
Line, the floodgates opened and Hitler moved his army against
the European lowlands of Belgium, Luxembourg, and Holland.
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The Dutch army collapsed under the onslaught of Hitler's
blitzkrieg in May 1940. Still, the Dutch government in exile
(in Britain) managed to maintain for the time being their
control over their East Indian colonies. In July 1941, the
Dutch restricted oil exports to Japan 6
,
joining with the
American and British governments' strategy to remove Japan's
economic capacity to wage war in the Pacific.
Cut off from key sources of oil and strategic metals, the
Japanese knew that their efforts in China would end in
failure. On the other hand, Japanese expansion into the South
China Sea and especially into the East Indies would 1)
remove those strategic minerals from Allied inventories, and
2) expand the war to a point unsustainable by the already-
taxed British and American militaries.
With economic reasons at the core, the Japanese attacked
Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. While the Americans were
still reeling, Japan took over the Sumatran oil fields in
February 1942; Java's capital, Batavia, fell the following
month. The swiftness with which the Dutch colonial masters
were removed from power in Indonesia—and by Asians, not by
other white Europeans— shocked the Indonesian nationalists and
caused much of the population to lower its estimation of Dutch
invincibility.
6Saburo Ienaga, The Pacific War: World War Two and the
Japanese, 1931-1945 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978) 31.
20
By the beginning of 1945, the Pacific war was clearly
going well for the Americans. In June the U.S. received the
surrender of Okinawa, effectively severing sea lines of
communication between the Japanese main islands and its
Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere, which included the East Indies.
This seemed favorable for Indonesian leaders Sukarno and Hatta
who believed that the war's end would usher in Indonesia's
independence.
The Second World War had far reaching effects on
Indonesia's nationalists. First, the war left the Netherlands
in shambles, its population depleted and its industrial base
destroyed. Its armies in the colonies were in the same sad
shape as those of the Dutch homeland—exhausted, deflated, and
focused on restoring some life to itself.
Furthermore, Indonesia had been captured by Japan in 1942.
Three years later, and two days after the Japanese surrendered
to the Allies, the independent government of Indonesia was
announced, but it was independence from Japan! The two
primary rulers, Sukarno and Hatta, had cooperated with
Japanese occupying forces as a way to facilitate Indonesia's
eventual independence. 7 That made them both "collaborators"
in the eyes of Allied leaders and undermined their
government's legitimacy in the minds of the West.
7Frederica M. Bunge, ed., Indonesia: A Country Study
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1983), 38.
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Another effect of World War II posed a more immediate
question for the U.S. concerning Indonesia: with the Dutch
armed forces in no shape to reassert control over the entire
archi-pelago, would it be American soldiers who fought against
Indonesian nationalists? Would this not fly in the face of
the wartime proclamations? This problem, too, convinced
Sukarno and Hatta that the U.S. would recognize their demand
for independence and would comply with Indonesian wishes.
In response to this predicament, the U.S. took the
position which would serve to characterize American-Indonesian
relations to this day: cautious neutrality. In August of
1945, after the surrender of Japan, Allied control of
Indonesia was transferred from Gen. Douglas MacArthur's
Southwest Pacific Area Command (SWPA) to the Southeast Asian
Command (SEAC) under British Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten.
This transfer essentially made the restoration of order--and
presumably the restoration of Dutch control--in Indonesia a
British problem vice an American one.
When Indonesia proclaimed its independence on August 17,
1945, it expected recognition from the United States. The
reality it found was American recognition of the role of the
archipelago in the future of any independent Netherlands . The
Netherlands generated one-sixth of its national wealth from
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the plantations and oil wells in the East Indies. 6 With its
home industries devastated by Axis bombing, the Dutch needed
the output of its colonies more than ever before.
As the aggressive nature of the Soviet Union manifested
itself in post-war Eastern Europe, fear grew in the U.S. over
Soviet preying on the weakened countries of Western Europe.
Certainly the U.S. did not want to see any more countries
taken into the communist camp, and the most widely accepted
way to prevent that was to ensure the economic stability of
threatened countries. Dutch control of Indonesia was an
accepted way to shore up that nation's economy until its home
industries could recover.
The United States retained this neutral posture to the
best of its diplomatic abilities during the four-year armed
struggle against the Dutch (1945-1949). It was clear to
Indonesians, however, that American neutrality was tainted.
Although Americans did not take part in any Dutch military
actions, the "U.S." logo on Dutch military supplies was
clearly visible to the Indonesian nationalists (until
President Truman ordered it removed)
.
As the armed conflict dragged into its fourth year,
however, the appearance of neutrality became less convincing.
8J.B.D. Derkin and J. Tinbergen, "An Evaluation of the
Economic Significance of the Netherlands East Indies for the
Netherlands, " in Colonialism and Cold War: the United States and
the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945-1949 , Robert J.
McMahon (Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press, 1981), 39.
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The Marshall Plan funds, originally disbursed to bolster
European economies, were apparently funding the Dutch
aggression, to the tune of nearly one-million dollars per
day! 9 In fact, U.S. aid to the Dutch for 1948 early equalled
the total cost of the Dutch activities in Indonesia. When
discovered and reported by the American press, this situation
proved politically if not morally unacceptable.
The following year, the Truman administration stepped up
behind-the-scenes pressure to seek a peaceful settlement to
the Indonesian crisis. The U.S. set up the Good Offices
Committee under U.N. auspices to examine the Dutch-Indonesian
matter. American representative to the committee, Frank P.
Graham, drafted up some proposals he felt would accommodate
both sides and convinced the U.S. State Department to urge
their acceptance by the Dutch (under threat of cancelling
recovery funds).
The result was the Renville Agreement, named for the ship
it was signed on in 1948, and it called for 1) acceptance of
the Republic of Indonesia into the United States of
Indonesia (USI ) , U.N. control over areas taken over in the
Dutch armed actions, and the Republic's representation in the




became the sponsor or supporter of numerous measures ordering
the Dutch to cease hostilities.
Finally the U.S. used its biggest gun: Marshall Plan
money. Secretary of State Dean Acheson made it plain to the
Netherlands government that no money would flow to them in
1950 unless a settlement was reached. On December 27, 1949,
the Dutch transferred sovereignty to an independent Indonesian
state.
The U.S. had it both ways; it supported the Netherlands
and put its economy back on stable ground. It also, though
later rather than sooner, became the premier advocate for an
independent Indonesia.
The next incident in U. S . -Indonesian relations stemmed
from the incomplete settlement between Holland and Indonesia
over terms of independence. The future of Irian Jaya, or
Western New Guinea (depending on who was speaking of the land
of the Papuans) was a bone of contention between the former
colony and her former master. The problem stemmed from the
reluctance of the Dutch government to leave Irian Jaya, still
wishing to retain some link to a colonial past which had
increased its prominence on the world stage. The Dutch did
not wish to see Irian Jaya incorporated into Sukarno's unified
Indonesian nation, so Holland advocated an independent Western
New Guinea whose leaders would be chosen by the Papuans, who
occupied that half of the island.
25
Not only did the Indonesians consider Irian Jaya a member
of their country, they deeply resented the Dutch arrogance in
maintaining a presence there. The Indonesian government
presented sound arguments for incorporation: Irian Jaya shared
the same continental shelf with Java, it was a part of the
Dutch East Indies and therefore was now part of the Republic
of Indonesia, and its exclusion would adversely affect
Indonesia's territorial integrity.
This dispute led in 1954 to the dissolution of any
remainder of a Dutch commonwealth. Diplomatic ties between
the two parties were severed, and Indonesia called in its
military to "rescue" the Papuans from Dutch control. The
Dutch fought tenaciously, claiming that the Papuans asked them
to assure the island's independence.
As for the U.S., Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was
not convinced by the arguments of either side. The United
Nations failed to reach a solution in 1958, and shortly
thereafter Indonesia presented a request to the U.S. for $700
million in arms shipments. Dulles wanted the U.S. to maintain
absolute neutrality in this Dutch-Indonesian conflict, and he
certainly did not wish to supply either side with the means
for escalating the violence in the region. But Indonesia had
been receiving U.S. aid since its independence, and to stop
now would almost certainly be construed by Sukarno (who
already was beginning his embrace of the Soviet Union) as
American partiality toward its European ally.
26
In the suiraner of 1958 the U.S. agreed to complete the arms
sale noting, "the Government of Indonesia may use such
equipment, materials, and services as may be made available
hereunder to maintain its internal security." 11
After years of fighting, the Indonesians and Dutch found
themselves again at the United Nations to resolve their
territorial dispute, and again the United States played a
prominent role. Secretary-General U Thant asked former U.S.
Ambassador to the U.N. (and later Ambassador to Indonesia)
Ellsworth Bunker to mediate until an agreement was reached.
The Bunker Proposal was accepted by both sides in 1962. It
called for a United Nations delegation to replace the Dutch
administration on Irian Jaya . This U.N. administration was
to last between one and two years. After the first full year,
Indonesian administrators would replace the United Nations
workers. The final determination of the region would be
decided in Papuan elections scheduled for 1969.
Although the Bunker Proposal was accepted, Sukarno was
upset that the United States, itself a former colony, did not
intervene more favorably on the Indonesian side. Accepting
that the interests of the Americans resided in Europe first,
and fearing the Chinese communists and their influence in
Southeast Asia, Sukarno began courting Moscow more openly.
"Arthur M. Schlessinger, Jr., and Russel Buhite, ed., The
Dynamics of World Power: a Documentary History of United States
Foreign Policy, 1945-1975, Volume IV, The Far East (New York:
Chelsea House Publishers, 1973), 690.
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Two agreements, in 1957 and I960, provided $350 million in
loans and aid to Indonesia. This concerned the U.S. State
Department enough.
What added fuel to Dulles' fire were Sukarno's proclaimed
policy of neutralism in the East-West conflict and his efforts
in the Non-Aligned movement. Dulles could accept a nation's
neutrality (he claimed) , in which a nation shared the ideology
of America but was prevented for other reasons from openly
allying with America. He flatly refused to accept the
Indonesian claim that the United States' ideology--at least in
practice--was no better or worse than that of the communists!
Perhaps the United States did not fully appreciate
Indonesia's position in the world at the start of the 1960 's.
In the previous twenty years, Indonesia had been through
invasion and occupation at the hands of the Japanese, military
inter-vention at the hands of the Dutch, and separatist
movements such as those in the Sumatran Islands. Now, the
nation was trying to raise itself from the ashes--as the
Americans did in 1781--while basked in the world spotlight.
As former Ambassador to Indonesia Howard Jones said,
"Indonesia had to shape its own destiny--not
American, Russian, or Chinese, but uniquely
Indonesian— in the Twentieth Century, with the
rapid communications enabling the entire world
to watch them. They were afforded little
chance for isolationism." 12
12Speech by F. Howard Jones, U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, to
Dr. Radin Subandrio, Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 13
August 1958.
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The Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) had already been
subdued in a 1948 revolt, so despite Sukarno's recent leanings
it is likely that he was courting the Soviets to check the
Chinese, not the Americans. In fact, Indonesia continued to
request—and receive--U. S . aid of various types throughout the
first half of the 1960's.
The ideological battle between capitalism and communism
was different for Indonesia. To that nation, and to many
others in Southeast Asia, capitalism revived memories of
foreign domination and mercantilism, the economic Darwinism
which found Indonesia as one of the weak. What Sukarno
claimed was neither capitalism nor communism, but nationalism.
That explained the intolerance of separatist movements, the
nationalization of foreign-owned industries, and the adoption
of pancasilla as a banner for pan-Indonesianism. That also
explained Indonesia's hosting of the Bandung Conference in
1957, which was the ideological start of the Non-Aligned
Movement. Former Ambassador Jones accepted this and asked the
U.S. to show patience and to continue aid to Indonesia; it
did.
Unfortunately, that patience was stretched by Sukarno's
eccentricity in his 1964 "Crush Malaysia" campaign. In 1963
the British relinquished sovereignty to the Federation of
Malaysian States on friendly terms which included British
rights to permanent military bases in the states. Sukarno was
insulted that Malaysia failed to advise Indonesia about this
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even though the two countries shared a common border on
Borneo. 13
Claiming that Malaysia was a puppet state of continued
British imperialism, Sukarno, now backed by the PKI, launched
his program of Konfrontasi. This put an end to the infant
organization, Maphilindo. Created in 1963 between Indonesia,
Malaysia, and the Philippines, Maphilindo was to be a union of
Malay people and the first homegrown attempt to form a union
of Southeast Asian nations. Indonesia's foreign minister,
Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, said of Maphilindo' s collapse just one
month after its incorporation, "...the survival of a regional
body will always flounder in the face of territorial disputes
among its members, and their unwillingness to keep such issues
away from the confines of the organization." 14 In 1964
Indonesian troops were air-dropped into Malaysian territory
and also fought in Borneo.
The United States Congress disapproved of Indonesia's
expansionist actions and backed their feelings by refusing aid
of any kind for Indonesia for 1965. President Johnson ordered
the Peace Corps to cease their Indonesian operations in 1965
nMalcolm Caldwell, The Modern World: Indonesia, ed. C.H.C.
Blount, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 97.
14
"Indonesia, ASEAN and Peace in Southeast Asia," Prof. Dr.
Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, Kaleidoscope International Vol 9 #1 (1984),
43.
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as well. American leaders left little doubt that they could no
longer tolerate the actions of Sukarno.
A definite shift was seen in Sukarno's ideological
leanings. Professing that the world was divided not between
communism and capitalism but between rich and poor or light-
skin and dark-skin, Sukarno now testified that Communist China
was the leader of the Newly Emerging Forces (NEFO) ; of course,
there was a place at the head table for Sukarno in the
leadership of the NEFO. Given the increased involvement of
the U.S. in South Vietnam and the policy of containment in
Southeast Asia, Sukarno's threats heightened America's somber
mood.
Earlier it was stated that Sukarno wished not capitalism
nor communism but nationalism. In the 1960 's this became less
true of Sukarno but more true of the Indonesian population.
Hatred existed traditionally toward the large Chinese minority
in Indonesia; Sukarno's cuddling up to Beijing sparked fear
that Chinese in and out of Indonesia would unite to the
purpose of seizing control of the archipelago.
It was not long before these fears were realized. In mid-
1965, Chinese Premier Zhou En-lai offered to supply arms to a
new branch of the Indonesian military, a peasant militia.
This ignited opposition in the rest of the armed forces who
already viewed increased PKI presence in their ranks with
trepidation.
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A group of armed rebels personally close to Sukarno, and
allegedly with backing from Beijing, staged an unsuccessful
coup attempt on September 30, 1965. In the attack, five top
generals were executed. Sukarno, though not directly involved
in the attack, immediately became suspect because he issued no
condemnation of the coup or the execution of the generals.
Though significant gains were made initially by the
rebels, the Commander of the Strategic Reserve Command,
General Suharto, overturned the coup and quickly killed those
responsible. This sparked an ant i -communist purge which
claimed 200,000 PKI members and supporters and left Sukarno
with no power base. He was stripped of all presidential
powers in 1967, and Suharto became the second President of
Indonesia. Sukarno died in 1970.
The U.S. breathed a sigh of relief at this turn of events.
Throughout the year the U.S. Ambassador, Marshall Green, had
seen a sky-rocketing of anti-U.S. sentiment fostered by the
Sukarno government. At the height of the anti-U.S. rhetoric,
the U.S. Information Agency had to close all libraries to
prevent further sacking and burning. Yet despite the fact
that U.S. interests would be better served with the demise of
Sukarno, the U.S. reaction was typical—cautious neutrality.
Neither Ambassador Green nor other American government
officials wished to speculate on the lifespan of the
Indonesian Army's success. If the U.S. backed the eventual
losers in this affair, the American position in Indonesia
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would be worse than before the coup. This reaction suited the
Indonesian Army and Suharto just fine. They, too, believed
their popular support would be diminished by American
involvement in strictly Indonesian affairs. Green steered his
staff to the lowest profile they had enjoyed in years.
Political commentators Evans and Novak praised Green saying,
"Keeping Washington quiet and unmeddling in a struggle of this
magnitude was the greatest diplomatic feat since World War
II." 15 Green described his efforts (or lack, thereof) as "the
skill of a surfboard rider who comes to shore unscathed; we
did not create the waves, or control them, we simply rode
them. " 16
Once the outcome was decided and Suharto was seen in firm
control of the country, U. S . -Indonesian relations improved
dramatically. With its own Southeast Asian affair turning
into a quagmire, the United States hailed Suharto's success as
a nationalist victory and a major setback to any international
communist movement. Within two years of establishing control
Suharto severed relations with China. Suharto also announced
the end to Konfrontasi and his desires to form a cohesive body
from among the Southeast Asian states. In 1966 Indonesia
rejoined the United Nations and the International Monetary
15Washington Post (Washington, D.C.), 21 December 1965
16Marshall Green, Indonesia: Crisis and Transformation, 1965-
1968, (Washington, D.C.: The Compass Press, 1990), 64.
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Fund; in that same year the U.S. Congress voted to resume aid
to Indonesia.
Suharto decided that his country had played in the
international spotlight long enough. It was now time to
restore his nation's economy, devastated by Sukarno's
militaristic policies. The United States was never far out of
mind, though. The group of economic advisors entrusted by
Suharto were known as "the Berkeley Mafia" because they had
received their education ten years earlier at the University
of California. Also, the U.S. and Japan formed a consortium
called the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) to
coordinate international aid and loans to the country; the
U.S. share of this group's output was one-third.
Now assured that the United States had little to fear of
Indonesia becoming a communist domino, the Johnson
administration accepted the formation of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN, in 1967. The original
signatories of the Bangkok Declaration were Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines; the latter
two were members of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization
(SEATO) organized by the United States. ASEAN was not
intended to supplant SEATO nor to place ASEAN members in the
Western camp. Rather, ASEAN was designed to provide a
framework for cooperation on matters of economic, cultural,
and social concern in the region. The Bangkok Declaration
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announcing the formation of ASEAN agreed on the following
basic principles:
1. commitment to regional solidarity,
2. the need of members to contribute to regional peace and
prosperity,
3. opposition to external interference in national and
regional affairs
4. commitment to ideals of freedom and social justice
5. mutual accommodation, tolerance, and understanding. 17
The United States accepted ASEAN as a diplomatic alliance,
vice a military or economic one, and believed it posed no
threat to SEATO or U.S. involvement in Vietnam (American
airstrikes were still carried out against Vietnam from bases
in Thailand, Laos, and the Philippines).
The Bangkok Declaration meshed well with President Richard
Nixon's policy of burden sharing as expressed in his Guam
speech. While the U.S. still supplied its one-third share of
IGGI funds, Indonesian accomplishments grew: Foreign Minister
Adam Malik was elected President of the United Nations General
Assembly, Indonesia staged its first free elections in sixteen
years (which Suharto easily won) , and the inflation rate was
halved over a one-year period. President Nixon granted
substantial military aid, noting that the bulk of the requests
17Purbo S. Suwando, "Geopolitics in Southeast Asia: an
Indonesian View, " in Geopolitics of Security in the Greater Pacific
Basin, (International Security Council, 1988), 113.
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were for trucks and ships to carry internal security troops to
the various regions and islands, and for supplies needed to
build bridges and improve Indonesia's infrastructure. To
demonstrate his pleasure with the country, President Nixon
flew to Jakarta to witness the kick-off of Suharto's first
five-year economic plan, Repelita I, in 1969.
The American acceptance of ASEAN and of Indonesia proved
rewarding to the U.S. Indonesia refused to participate in the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil
embargo of 1974. Certainly Indonesia benefitted from the
revenues of increased exports (as they would again during the
1990 Kuwait crisis); unfortunately they were caught up in
Congressional reaction toward OPEC members and witnessed a
reduction in U.S. aid.
The next opportunity to gauge U. S . -Indonesian relations
came with the 1975 Indonesian invasion and subsequent
incorporation of East Timor into the republic. According to
the Jakarta government, a twenty-eight member assembly
composed of Timorese tribal leaders and elected officials
voted for full incorporation of East Timor into the Republic
of Indonesia.
The United States first involved itself in the matter when
it voted against a proposed U.N. General Assembly resolution
(31/53, acted on 1 December 1976) which rejected the
incorporation. The Deputy Legal Advisor for the U.S., George
H. Aldrich, felt that the U.S. had no means to confirm nor
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deny the validity of the Timorese assembly vote. Also, the
incorporation was a fait accompli; in all likelihood the U.N.
would have to commit security forces to reverse the outcome.
The U.S. did not see any good coming from that scenario.
Finally, neither the Ford nor Carter administrations perceived
the Indonesian incorporation of East Timor as a threat to any
U.S. national interest.
The announced American stand on the issue was this: the
U.S. accepted the incorporation of East Timor, but did not
recognize that a valid act of self-determination ever took
place. The best way to help the Timorese now was through
working closely with the government of Indonesia and local
Timorese governments. At the end of the Carter administration
the U.S. was responsible for a majority of all foreign aid to
the East Timorese, through contributions to the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Catholic Relief
Services, aiding roughly fifty percent of the Timorese
population. 18
Basically the 1970 's saw Indonesia turned inward toward
restoring its economy, while the United States, still sore
from its involvement in Vietnam, treaded cautiously in
Southeast Asia. Two events in the late 1970 's altered the
aloof relationship between the two countries. The first was
the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978, and the
™U.S. Department of State Dispatch, November 1982, 29
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subsequent Chinese invasion of and Vietnam. The second event
was the increased Soviet presence in Vietnam, especially at
Cam Ranh Bay
.
Indonesia addressed concern for the Cambodia question
through the framework of ASEAN; every ASEAN member feared any
expansion of the conflict to other parts of the region, just
as they feared the role China had assumed for itself as
guarantor of the regional status quo. Thus ASEAN and
especially Indonesia worked throughout the 1980 's to determine
a peaceful settlement to the Cambodian process. ASEAN' s ideal
solution was
"
. . .a neutral [Cambodia] posing no threat to its neighbors
would come into being under a freely elected indigenous
government, which at the same time see Vietnamese
political influence at play, albeit without Vietnamese
military presence." 19
The cease-fire arrangement finally agreed upon was largely a
product of Indonesian efforts.
As for the increased regional presence of the Soviet
Union, it should be accepted that Vietnam was using the
Soviets in the same manner Sukarno did in the 1950 's, i.e., as
a check on the regional influence of Communist China. Even
so, it was recognized by the ASEAN members that Soviet power
projection from Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang (the former American
19Sarasin Viraphol, "Political Development in Thailand and the
Kampuchea Problem," in The ASEAN Success Story: Social, Economic,
and Political Dimensions, ed. Linda G. Martin (Honolulu: University
of Hawaii Press, for the East-West Center, 1987), 186.
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base) extended well into the equatorial Pacific and in wartime
could serve to sever ASEAN states from crucial suppliers and
defenders
.
In response to this increased threat, Indonesia requested
and received an increase in American Foreign Military Sales
(FMS) , which were used to upgrade their anti-troop and anti-
ship capabilities. Loans were arranged for the purchase of
U.S. -made F-16 fighter planes, hardly a weapon for ensuring
internal security. When the Indonesian Armed Forces, which
had for so long bore the brunt of tight economic policies,
realized the potential for fighting again for their national
survival, the United States offered them the means for
improvement and demonstrated American commitment to the anti-
communism (or at least to the neutralism) they professed.
The Reagan and Bush administrations based their relations
with Indonesia on three pillars: shared strategic perceptions
and interests in Southeast Asia, including regional stability;
multibillion dollar trade and investment relations; and
political dialogue (in a bilateral and/or multilateral
context) aimed at the problems of Cambodia (and the associated
Indochinese refugee problem) and human rights issues 20 . The
increase in FMS addressed above was offered as a solution to
the first pillar.
20U.S. Department of State Dispatch, May 1983, 42
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The second pillar is represented by the fact that thirteen
percent of Indonesia's trade is with the U.S.; moreover, the
Indonesians enjoy a four-and-one-half billion dollar trade
surplus with the United States. Favorable export agreements
on textiles add to the revenue generated by oil and natural
gas production.
The third pillar, human rights, remained a non-issue
throughout much of the 1980' s, with an occasional
interruption. Growing displeasure with the perceived (and
real) corruption of Suharto's children, demands for political
reform, and occasional racial tension led to periodic
demonstrations, which were almost invariably put down by the
police and which resulted in numerous injuries and
imprisonment for demonstrators.
In November of 1991, however, the human rights issue was
thrust into the forefront. According to two American
journalists who were on the scene--and suffered physically for
it--Indonesian troops opened fire with automatic weapons on a
group of peaceful demonstrators in Dili, the capital of East
Timor. The demonstration was to commemorate the death two
weeks earlier of a local dissident as he took refuge in a
Catholic church. The calling in of the troops was probably
due to the sheer size of the demonstration, estimated to be
several thousand people strong. The killing of the civilians
(fifty by official count, two-hundred by private reports) was
clearly a misuse of force. The official Indonesian commission
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which investigated the incident determined that excessive
force was used. Along with his personal apologies to the
victims' families, Suharto offered the sacking of the regional
and provincial military generals as well as an overall shake-
up in the leadership of the armed forces.
The U.S. response was mixed. The Bush administration
joined the world in condemning the soldiers' actions. They
did, however, accept the findings of the Indonesian commission
and lauded Suharto for his efforts after the event. The U.S.
chose not to follow the Dutch lead to cut all aid to Indonesia
for 1992. Although the issue was raised in Congress, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Kenneth Quinn, testified:
"[Some] urge that we cut U.S. security or economic
assistance to Indonesia. Such a course, in our view,
would not produce the desired results which we all seek
and could have negative consequences: for U. S . -Indonesian
relations; for our limited influence in Indonesia; and,
most importantly, for the people of East Timor.
Also, to cut off programs such as International
MilitaryEducation and Training, which help to promote
democratic values and respect for human rights, would not
foster such goals but rather would markedly reduce our
influence and role as an interlocutor." 21
Judging from Indonesian reaction to the Dutch decision,
Quinn' s point was accurate. Indonesia chastised the Prime
Minister of Holland, Ruud Lubbers, for his "reckless use of
2i U.S. Department of State Dispatch, March 1992, 215
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their development aid as an instrument of intimidation." 22
Indonesia then cancelled the 1992 IGGI meeting. Indonesia's
message was clear: we are still the crossroads between oceans,
and we are still rich in natural resources and economic
potential. Help us, and share in the prosperity; cross us and
watch from the sidelines. The Bush administration chose the
former.
Despite the East Timor issue, U. S . -Indonesian relations
today are generally cordial. The United States accepts that
they exercise little influence over Indonesian policies. Many
of those policies if not favorable are not harmful to U.S.
regional interests. ASEAN remains a organization of non-
communist states, and Indonesia remains the association's
largest member. The Non-Aligned movement, which Indonesia
will chair from 1992 to 1995, presents little interference to
American actions in Southeast Asia, at least in the 1993
political scene.
Perhaps the biggest indicators of future U. S . -Indonesian
relations are the collapse of the Soviet Union coupled with
the withdrawal of the U.S. from the Philippines. The balance
of power in Southeast Asia may be shifting, with China and
India jockeying for position, and questions of Japan's role
being posed by officials on both sides of the Pacific.
Thailand has already entered negotiations with the U.S. to
22 The Economist, 4 April 1992.
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retain an American presence in the region, as have Singapore
and other ASEAN nations.
Whatever the course for Indonesian-American relations in
the 1990' s and beyond, that course will undoubtedly be
determined in context of each side's national interests.
Those interests define the foreign policies each country




II. INDONESIA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE UNITED STATES
A. GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA
Before examining the national policy of Indonesia, it is
necessary to determine how that policy is formulated and
enacted. Particularly, this section will explain the set-up
of the Indonesian government, according to their constitution.
More importantly, the extra-governmental institutions and
practices explain more fully how Indonesia's leaders govern
the country and determine its policy.
According to Indonesia's constitution, adopted in 1945,
the legislative assembly is the highest government organ, and
so one could choose to begin an examination of the Indonesian
government with the legislative branch. For purposes of
analyzing the policy-making power in Indonesia, it is better
to begin with the executive branch.
The Presidency of Indonesia is the country's most powerful
political position by far. He (a female president is not in
the foreseeable future, though a relative of the first
president, Sukarno, is up and coming) is indirectly elected,
voted in not by the population but by members of the Majelis
Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR, People's Consultative Assembly)
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and serves a renewable term of five years. Considering that
the president selects over 50 percent of the MPR, under the
current system, the standing president serves at his leisure
despite the majority rule provision.
Similar to the American system, the president is the head
of state, head of government, and supreme commander of the
armed forces. As the head of state he travels abroad,
receives visiting foreign dignitaries, and presides over
national ceremonies the largest of which is the August 17
Independence Day celebration.
In this role the president ensures that the populace sees
him as the country's most important person, an identity he
shares with the kings and village chiefs of historical times.
While considered a secondary title in many western nations,
the Indonesian head of state garners the popularity of the
people he represents to the world. This role and the
popularity it brings facilitate the performance of the
president's other roles.
As head of government, the president has the power to
introduce legislation for ratification by the regular legis-
lature, the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR, People's
Representation Council) . In the event of a national
emergency, the president can single-handedly enact
legislation; his laws must be approved by the DPR at their
next meeting, which can be up to a year apart. The president
may also enact "...government regulations to expedite the
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enforcement of laws." 23 This power increases his legislative
authority in that these regulations may be offered as
presidential interpretations of the General Guidelines of
State Policy set down by the MPR.
Under the authority of the head of government, the
president holds the power to appoint ministers, ambassadors,
and other government officials. This political sword cuts
many ways. Most obvious is the president's ability to
surround himself with trusted advisors or like-minded
supporters. This increases his actual control over policy
formulation and implementation.
The president can also use this power to portray support
for various societal organizations (religious, military,
women's, students, etc) while simultaneously minimizing the
effect of these organizations on policy; much of the staffs
surrounding these appointments are also controlled by the
presidency or the standing bureaucracy, effectively limiting
the volume of one "squeaky wheel."
Finally, the president can appoint potential political
rivals to ambassadorships out of the country, thereby removing
his competition while preserving their dignity and status.
The president is the supreme commander of the Indonesian
armed forces. He can send troops overseas, as did Sukarno
against Malaysia, or he can withdraw them from overseas
23 The 1945 Constitution, art. 5, sec. 2
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entanglements, as did Suharto with Malaysia. Recalling the
military's dwi fungsi role, not only can the president
dispatch troops to quell domestic uprisings, he controls the
leaders of the public enterprises and so has a large say in
economic policy as well.
While the formal roles of the president are substantial,
his informal roles serve to consolidate his authority over all
other sections of government. In a government run by
consensus, the president holds the top bargaining position.
As the dominant political figure in a centrally controlled
system, the president can pick and choose coalition partners,
and use threats and rewards to build the consensus needed to
enact what is basically his policy. Other ministries need
support of the president to carry out their work. The state-
controlled industries need guaranteed resources to run. Most
of the government's highest officials need the president's
support in order to keep their jobs.
This position of chief consensus builder has been handled
skillfully by the current president, Suharto. Suharto has
courted the potentially disruptive Muslim factions by giving
them more attention on matters concerning the Middle East.
Suharto has also recently allowed them to flex their political
muscle vis a vis the ABRI , by showing up at the inaugural
meeting of the Association of Muslim Intellectuals in December
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of 1990, 24 a group over which the military has little
influence
.
Suharto has demonstrated his flexibility in consensus
building. The military, almost assuredly with the knowledge
if not the explicit consent of the president, has stepped up
its suppression of "radical" Muslim groups such as the Usroh
groups, or quasi-underground Muslim activist groups. The ABRI
justifies its actions by comparing these Usroh with communist
organi-zations
.
He has repeatedly kept political challenges to a minimum
by invoking the Pancasila and painting rival groups as threats
to its principle of national unity. In this vein Suharto
forced the nine existing political parties to merge into three
broad-based parties in 1973.
Policy by consensus under Suharto takes the following
form. Suharto's desire to maintain balance among the factions
competing below him cause his focus to be shifted away from
the substance and more toward the origin of policy
alternatives. The current president makes decisions which are
in line with his own convictions, leaving room for debate only
on the fringes of policy issues. Finally, Suharto will make
a decision which is reached by consensus providing that the
decision will not ignite further factional competition or
24Arthur J. Banks, ed., Political Handbook of the World, 1991:
Governments and Intergovernmental Organizations as of 1 July 1991
(Binghampton, N.Y. : CSA Publications, 1991), 311.
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worse. In the end, if that means no action is taken, that too
is policy. At any extent, the president is in the driver's
seat
.
Suharto's extra-constitutional powers are perhaps nowhere
more evident than in the economic realm. While Suharto
himself claims no business holdings, the economic undertakings
of his children have gained the president much unwanted
publicity and have caused top officials to decry what they
call corruption from the highest levels.
Suharto's three sons, one daughter, and a nephew all have
partnerships in the largest holding companies in Indonesia.
These companies control monopolies in every sector of the
economy, from clove and tobacco growing, to fertilizer
production and agribusiness, to construction and aircraft
manufacturing. Usually the Suharto family member is a silent
partner. That silence is golden, however, as few foreign
firms gain access to the Indonesian market or its resources
unless they enter into a joint contract with one of the
Suharto family's holding companies.
The monopolies induced by the economic undertakings of the
president's family have hurt Indonesia's image as a sound
place for foreign investment. These holding companies and the
firms under them manage to net nearly all government -awarded




While Suharto is the most powerful Indonesian in the
government, he does have help. The most important group of
formal presidential advisors is the cabinet. There are
seventeen ministries; their leaders meet at least once per
month--with the president in attendance— to discuss and submit
policy recommendations. Decisions of the cabinet are reached
by consensus, not vote. Accordingly, difficult policy
dilemmas circulate for long periods within the cabinet before
a consensus can be achieved. While this limits the ability of
the cabinet to react quickly, it ensures that whatever policy
recommendations emerge have been considered with regard to
their impact on and acceptance from various facets of the
Indonesian society.
The cabinet, acting as a whole, has the authority to
submit legislation to the DPR. Since the president attends
all cabinet meetings, such legislation can be considered to be
congruent with his own agenda. Most actions of the cabinet,
however, are taken by individual members rather than by the
group. Cabinet members serve at the discretion of the
president alone; they cannot be relieved by the DPR.
The seventeen ministries are grouped into three
encompassing categories and overseen by coordinating
ministers. The three coordinating ministries are: Political
and Security Affairs; Economic, Industrial, and Financial
Affairs; and People's Welfare. Even more so than the other
cabinet members, the coordinating ministers are cronies of the
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president and enjoy special access to him. Of course in
gotong-rojong fashion, that access comes with the price of
keeping the subordinate ministries in line with the president.
Foreign policy concerns occupy the agendas of many cabinet
ministries. The most obvious is the Foreign Ministry,
directly charged with managing state-to-state affairs. The
current minister, Ali Alatas, shares President Suharto's view
of an "independent but active" foreign policy. He is an
accomplished statesman who can add to his resume the
normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China
(PRO , co-chairman of the 1990 Paris conference on Cambodia,
and the election of Indonesia as the chair of the Non-Aligned
Movement for 1992-1995. Alatas has also ensured Indonesia a
prominent voice in transitioning ASEAN to a post-Cold War
body.
The preeminent position of the Foreign Ministry in the
conducting of foreign policy is largely due to Suharto's trust
in Alatas and does not represent a permanent functional role.
The Defense and Security Ministry, for example, has undercut
the Foreign Ministry on several occasions. One recent example
is the negotiations with Malaysia on joint cooperation for
eliminating communist rebels operating from the common border
separating Malaysia and Kalimantan. These negotiations were
conducted and concluded under the purview of the Defense and
Security Ministry, without involvement from the Foreign
Ministry.
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The foreign policy involvement of the Defense and Security
Affairs Ministry is due to the number of former military
members who now work in the Foreign Ministry, placed there by
Suharto as a reward, a way to maintain influence in the
ministry, or both. The other major reason is because of the
military's charter under "dwi fungsi" allows it to take
actions deemed necessary "for state security," as the
Malaysian example demonstrates.
Certainly other ministries play a role in determining
Indonesia's foreign policy. The Trade and Industrial Affairs
ministries both court foreign governments for capital and
expertise to help their concerns. Both the Forestry and Mines,
and Energy Ministries have had a say in determining
Indonesia's relations with export and development partners as
the country sought to balance preservation of resources with
national development.
Clearly the cabinet serves a considerable role in
conducting Indonesia's foreign policy. Whether taking actions
as individual and sometimes competing ministries, or whether
achieving a consensus opinion to present to the president, the
cabinet's role is an important one.
The Supreme Advisory Council (SAC) also serves the
president in an advisory capacity, though of lesser import.
Thirty-three members are selected by the president from
prominent figures on the political scene and serve for a five-
year term. While serving on the SAC, members are prohibited
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by law from holding other public office so as to prevent
parochialism. Appointment to the SAC then becomes a
convenient storage place for prominent presidential rivals
while on the surface apparently showing favor with them. The
SAC is tasked to render advisory opinions on national policy
issues, either at the president's request or upon independent
initiative. The former instance is the norm, although lately
the SAC has been more outspoken on the economic dealings of
certain national planning commissions.
As was stated earlier, the Presidency of Indonesia is the
chair of power. It is not, however, the country's highest
governmental organ, so says the constitution. That honor
belongs to the People's Consultative Assembly, MPR. The one-
thousand-person body has a complex membership scheme. One-
half of the MPR are members of the People's Representation
Council, or DPR. The remaining half is composed of regional
delegates, representatives of functional groups (such as
women's groups, cooperatives, and industries), members of the
military, and representatives from the officially recognized
political parties. Those party seats are apportioned
according to each party's percentages in the previous national
elections
.
Although the "highest organ of the state,
"
25 the MPR is
limited in the practice of power. To begin with, the MPR
25 [Guide To] The 1945 Constitution, 18
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meets only once every five years. During that time, the group
has two primary tasks: election of the country's president and
vice-president by majority vote, and formulation of the
Guidelines of State Policy of the Republic of Indonesia. Half
of that first task, election of the president, is a foregone
conclusion. The president selects over half of the MPR's
delegates, ensuring himself a majority of votes. As for
selection of the vice-president, one sees the Javanese
characteristic of consensus at its finest. With the growing
age of Suharto and recurring doubts over which five-year term
will be his last, the selection of the vice-president is of
major importance. Therefore any vice-presidential candidate
must be supported by both the Muslim and military elements of
the MPR, and by Suharto himself.
The second primary task of the MPR is formulation of the
state guidelines for the upcoming five-year period.
Considering that the body meets only once in five years, the
MPR does little policy formulation, and mainly serves to
legitimize what is basically the program of the president and
his advisors. Given the complexity of Indonesia's political
environment and the legacy of Sukarno's Guided Democracy (a
veil for what turned out to be increasing dictatorial style of
his leadership) , this legitimizing function is not to be
discarded as unimportant. Ratifying policy, however, is not
equal to making policy.
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The president is not the only state actor who can exercise
control of the MPR. All applicants for MPR seats must pass a
screening process by the Operational Command for the
Restoration of Security and Order, the Kopkamtib. The
Kopkamtib conducts domestic intelligence and serves as the
mechanism through which Suharto keeps a lid on rival political
groups. Officially, this organization of the ABRI screens
candidates for "security" reasons, to ensure that they have no
ties to illegal political groups (most notably the Communist
Party of Indonesia) . In practice, however, this group has
steered the make-up of the MPR to favor GOLKAR, 26 the
president's political support base.
In 1982 for instance, the Kopkamtib immediately accepted
the list of potential candidates from John Naro, then-leader
of the United Development Party(PPP). This was despite the
fact that Naro's list was drawn up entirely by Naro himself
and did not enjoy support of the Muslim Scholars, the NU, who
were protesting the central government's order forcing all
parties to accept Pancasila as their only political doctrine.
By accepting Naro's list, the Kopkamtib not only silenced
2eSekretariat Bersana Golongan Karya- -Joint Secretariat of
Functional Groups— technically not a political party, GOLKAR is an
association of functional groups and interests. It represents the
interests of women, farmers, industrial groups, veterans, youth,
and others, and is controlled by former ABRI members. Unlike PPP
and PDI, GOLKAR is touted as the official representative group of
all Indonesians.
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opposition to the executive order but forged the split which
resulted in NU's withdrawal from the PPP.
The People's Consultative Assembly is the sole keeper of
the Indonesian constitution and nominally has the power to
interpret the constitution. The MPR does not, however, have
the authority to initiate legislation, nor is it empowered to
consider specific policy actions beyond the broad Guideline
for State Policy. Those responsibilities are reserved for the
People's Representation Council. The DPR consists of five-
hundred members, four-hundred of whom are directly elected by
regional constituencies. Three-fourths of the remainder are
members of the ABRI (although active duty officers are
prohibited from holding elected office) , while twenty-five
representatives are nominated by Indonesia's provinces and
approved by the executive branch.
The DPR holds session at least once every year and
performs routine legislative functions. It is in the DPR that
legislation is acted upon, whether initiated by the DPR
members or by the executive branch. Even presidential decrees
must receive approval in the DPR to be enacted (or to remain
in effect if the decree was made while the DPR was not
convened) . Bills passed by the DPR are then submitted for
presidential approval. The DPR also has the authority to
determine the Indonesian government's budget and in fact must
enact a law sanctioning execution of the budget.
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The DPR is not to be construed as the president's rival
for political power. That is far from the case. In fact, the
DPR is expressly forbidden from impeaching the president or
any member of his cabinet. Moreover, the DPR does not have
the power to override a presidential veto. Once a bill passed
by the DPR is vetoed, that bill may not be resubmitted during
the same legislative session and therefore must wait at least
one year for resubmission. For its part, the DPR cannot be
dissolved by the president and so at least in its existence is
not dependent on the president.
Before leaving the specifics of the government structure,
the political parties deserve examination. There are three
officially sanctioned parties: GOLKAR (the composition and
scope of GOLKAR is explained in note 25) ; the United
Development Party (PPP), which represents the politically
active Muslim population; and the Democratic Party of
Indonesia (PDI) , representative of the former Nationalist Party
and other groups. The PPP and the PDI are conglomerations of
former parties. In 1973, the central government forced all
parties into the three groups existing today. The reason for
the consolidation was to promote unity among the people and
discourage devisiveness by political competition. In order to
preserve their existence, the three current parties must
publicly accept and adopt Pancasila as their official agenda.
Indonesia is only a nominal democracy. GOLKAR
traditionally receives two-thirds of the popular votes, and
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even its members must be screened and approved by the
executive branch. The president exercises authority over
security, political, and economic policies. Since he
exercises control over sixty percent of the MPR's membership,
the president serves as long as he wishes. Political
challengers are branded "threats to Indonesian unity" and kept
out of the public spotlight. Consensus is the policy, and the
president builds that consensus. No policy can be enacted
without his approval.
B. FOREIGN POLICY- -AN EXTENSION OF DOMESTIC POLICY
For most countries, and especially for developing
countries, foreign policy is merely an extension of domestic
policy. That is, their foreign relations are geared toward
achieving their domestic goals. This is certainly the case
with Indonesia. Therefore, this section will examine
Indonesia's major domestic policy concerns and how they
influence the foreign policy of Indonesia. The main goals of
Indonesia's policy are: 1) ensure survival of the state, 2)
continue to foster national unity, 3) maintain and preserve
territorial integrity against foreign threats, and 4) enhance
and promote the national welfare and development through
foreign aid and trade.
The most important category of Indonesian policy is that
of pursuing state survival and national development. While
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such a task is normally a difficult one for a homogeneous
country such as Germany, Indonesia's objective is compounded
in difficulty by the diversity of the population.
The most serious threat to the survival of the nation
comes from the devout Muslem population centered on northern
Sumatra. While an overwhelming percentage of the Indonesian
population professes to be Muslem, roughly ten percent belong
to the santri, or traditionalist category. These santri wish
to see the precepts of their faith incorporated into the
structure of the government. This includes the elimination of
government support for traditional (Javanese) shrines and
celebrations to village gods, and the inclusion of shariah in
the national law.
While many santri wish to see the "Islamization" of
Indonesia, separatist groups exist who wish to form
independent, Islamic states. The most serious separatist
movement comes from the northern tip of Sumatra, in Aceh.
This confrontation began shortly after the victory over the
Dutch and the recognition of independence in 1949. Much of
the Indonesian army fighting in the region of Aceh were pinned
down by Muslim-led forces intent on kicking the Indonesians
out and declaring their own independence. Fighting has
continued sporadically as has the call for independence. In
fact, 1992 marked the end of the latest round of fighting in
Aceh, which began nearly two years prior.
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Aceh has continued to establish itself as a Muslem
province. This is seen by the vast number of religious
schools, wide use of the Islamic courts in lieu of civil
courts, and the continued strong support for candidates of the
PPP.
In the 1987 elections after much politicking and courting
of Aceh in the five-year economic plan, GOLKAR found some
success by winning a majority of seats on the province for the
first time. This exchange of support for economic attention
may or may not be permanent. If permanent, the amount of money
spent on restoration of mosques, the economic programs for the
region, and the use of Islamic phrases and symbols by
political candidates indicates the high price the government
is willing to pay to ease tensions with traditional Muslims.
If in the future the Acehinese withdraw support for GOLKAR and
renew their call for independence, the growing santri
population throughout Indonesia may take up their cause, to
the detriment of the goal of national development.
Aside from the separatist groups on Sumatra, the religious
make-up of Indonesia affects foreign policy. The large Muslim
population and the increasingly vocal character of santri
Muslims directly affect Indonesia's policies toward Middle
East issues. The most prominent issue is Arab-Israeli
relations. Fundamentally, Indonesia supports the Palestinian
claim to the occupied territories. Indonesia also condemns
the U.S. relationship with Israel as both a strategic alliance
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against the Arab and Muslim worlds and as a colonial-style
relationship.
Indonesia is above all, however, pragmatic in its foreign
relations. The country did not join in the OPEC oil embargo
in the mid-1970's. Despite OPEC ' s call for solidarity,
Indonesia would not take any action which threatened the
income derived from its most lucrative export. Also,
Indonesia joined the community of non-Islamic nations in
strongly condemning the 1990 Iraqi invasion of neighboring
Kuwait and actually voted in favor of the use of force to
remove the Iraqis.
Returning to problems of separatist movements, survival of
an Indonesia intact is threatened not only on Sumatra, but on
its easternmost possession, Irian Jaya . Irian Jaya is the
western half of the island of New Guinea; the Dutch refused to
give up the possession with the rest of the East Indies in
1949, promising the land's inhabitants they could determine
for themselves whether or not to join the Republic of
Indonesia
.
After six years of tense negotiations between Sukarno and
the Dutch government --and under pressure from the United
States--both sides agreed to turn over control of the
territory first to a U.N. organization, and then to the
Indonesian government. After a questionable vote favoring
incorporation, Western New Guinea was renamed Irian Jaya and
became a province of the republic. Eastern, or Papua New
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Guinea, is home to a popularly elected government and is not
part of Indonesia.
The current relationship between Irian Jaya and the
Indonesian government is not necessarily a smooth one. There
are separatist movements and insurgent forces whose goal is to
break away from Indonesia proper, and this serves to increase
the tension in the area.
Looking first from west to east, there are few cultural
ties with Irian Jaya. A large mountain range effectively
prevents wide-scale communication between east and west.
Furthermore, Papua New Guinea was not considered by the
Indonesians as part of the former Dutch East Indies, all of
whose territory was to be incorporated into the new Republic
of Indonesia. Therefore the immediate threat of an Indonesian
invasion and annexation of Papua New Guinea is unlikely.
There does exist a threat of violence and intrusion into
Papua. The Indonesian government (i.e., Suharto) has
indicated it will take military action wherever necessary to
suppress the Free Papua Movement, a group pushing for
secession from the republic. If guerilla attacks on the ABRI
are organized and staged from within the borders of Papua New
Guinea, it is expected that the ABRI will take military action
across the border. That action would likely be limited to
search and destroy tactics carried out against Free Papua




Any hostile action by the Indonesians across the border in
New Guinea would provoke a strong diplomatic response from the
Dutch, who still follow events in the region closely, and the
Australians, who would view such an action as contrary to
regional peace. Given that New Guinea and Australia are
separated by only the narrow Torres Straits, it is reasonable
to assume that any Indonesian show of military strength so
close to Australian territory would provoke an excited
diplomatic exchange at the least. Indonesia must take this
into account before pursuing any military options on New
Guinea, so such action is doubtful.
Looking briefly from east to west, democratic Papua New
Guinea has little reason to provoke and even less to attack
Irian Jaya . In addition to the topographic obstacles, the
ethnic differences between Melanesian citizens of Papua New
Guinea and the Malay occupants of Irian Jaya serve to keep the
two halves of the island separate. Also, Papuans do not
voluntarily provide shelter to members of the Free Papua
Movement, nor do they subscribe to its philosophies. In 1987
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea agreed to exchange consular
offices as well as to cooperate in the control of border
crossings . 2?
Irian Jaya officially became Indonesia's twenty-sixth
province in 1969. Seven years later another province was
27Far East Economic Review, 1990 Asia Yearbook, (Hong Kong,
1990), 141.
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added to the republic, that of East Timor. Although the
western half of the island of Timor was part of the Dutch East
Indies, East Timor was a colony of the Portuguese and remained
so after the rest of Indonesia gained its independence. The
Indonesians did not fight for its incorporation because, never
being part of the Dutch East Indies, it was thought not to be
part of free Indonesia.
That changed in 1975 when, due to domestic political
turmoil, Portugal abruptly pulled out of East Timor and left
no government in its place to administer the area. The
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN)
gained the upper hand in the resulting scramble for power in
the region. Still displaying a fear of communist subversion
ten years after an attempted PKI-backed coup, the ABRI
convinced Suharto that the communist-inspired and supported
FRETILIN posed a threat to the free existence of Indonesia.
"Volunteer" troops landed on East Timor and gained control of
the region. Four years later, Indonesia annexed East Timor
based on the occupants' alleged popular support for
incorporation as the twenty-seventh province.
The annexation of East Timor and subsequent charges of
human rights abuses in the province have caused many headaches
for the Indonesian government. Primary among the troubles is
the United Nations' lack of recognition for the vote of self-
determination, by which East Timorese freely chose (so say the
Indonesians) to join Indonesia. The United Nations condemned
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the action of the so-called military volunteers. Led by
Portugal, the United Nations each year renews its demand for
an independently monitored vote of self-determination by East
Timorese.
Indonesia refuses to permit such a vote. It claims that
a twenty-eight member People's Council, composed of tribal
leaders and elected officials, agreed "by consensus" on East
Timor's incorporation into Indonesia. The Indonesian
government feels that a popular vote would only foment further
troubles
.
The Timor situation and other claims of widespread human
rights abuses by the Indonesian government continue to
frustrate Indonesia in its dealings with foreign countries.
The latest eruption came in November of 1991 when the
Indonesian army opened fire against a band of funeral mourners
in Dili, the capital of East Timor. Unbeknownst to Indonesian
officials, two Western reporters were in the crowd filming the
event and managed- -though cruelly beaten--to get their story
into the world press. Government reports of fifty deaths were
contradicted by the reporters' firsthand accounts, and Suharto
and the regional army commander were forced to reprimand
military personnel. Additionally, subsequent investigations
admitted that the attack was unprovoked and that the death
toll was three-hundred.
Outrage to the Indonesian actions on Timor poured in from
human rights groups such as Amnesty International and from
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countries around the world. Portugal and the Netherlands
teamed up to lead the European Community in a freeze of all
aid to Indonesia until a thorough investigation was made and
proper follow-up actions were taken. Acting unilaterally,
Holland permanently withdrew $91 million of 1992 aid promised
to Indonesia.
An outside observer might think that Indonesia would be
better off simply to loosen its grip in East Timor given the
economic costs of not doing so. To take that view, however,
is to ignore the government's priority of securing its own
borders. In as much as Timor, Irian Jaya, and Aceh continue
to harbor separatist groups, do not expect tensions in these
areas to decrease. The survival of the state as a united
element is paramount.
While Indonesia works to secure its borders from within,
it cannot ignore potential threats from without. Therefore
another major foreign policy goal of Indonesia is to maintain
and preserve its territorial integrity against perceived
threats. When discussing Indonesia's perceptions of threat
origins, it is quite necessary to recall their history; this
includes their hardships at the hands of European colonists
and the turmoil caused by Sukarno's shift toward Communist
China in the early 1960 's.
Given that background, it is easily understood that
Indonesia is very sensitive to any interference in Southeast
Asian affairs by former colonial powers, and especially inter-
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ference by those powers in Indonesian affairs. That
sensitivity is perhaps justified. In the 1958 Free Aceh
movement, separatist rebels were supplied and possibly trained
by United States agents (notably the CIA)
.
Similarly, Indonesia views any attempt by European powers
and others (such as Holland and the U.S.) to link economic aid
with human rights practices as an attempt to 1) meddle in the
affairs of Indonesia and thereby compromise its integrity as
a nation, and 2 ) force Indonesia to model its government after
a Western style democracy, which is not practical to
Indonesia's leaders.
This near-paranoia concerning outside interference has
provoked what seem to be irrational foreign policy decisions.
The Indonesian response to the Holland government's decision
to cancel aid for 1992 was to ban the meeting of the Inter-
Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI, a group of nations
which coordinates foreign aid pledged from its members) for
1992. This ban expanded into the dissolution of IGGI, because
of its Dutch representation. Jakarta's cancelling of the
IGGI's meeting was a knee-jerk response to what it viewed as
Holland's interventionist outlook. To other members of IGGI,
Suharto seemed to cut off the country's nose to spite its
face.
Indonesia's view of that decision is quite different. It
holds the philosophy that aid and domestic policies of
recipients should be separated. Furthermore, the country
67
believes that if IGGI will not lend support as a group, either
its members will act individually or another group will take
its place. This follows a cavalier attitude that Indonesia is
too promising in the future world marketplace for the
industrial powers to ignore. Indonesia's view was ratified in
1992 when the IGGI was replaced by another consortium of
donors (the Dutch excluded) named the Consultative Group on
Indonesia (CGI) and under the auspices of the World Bank.
As a way for Indonesia to ensure its territorial
integrity, it has backed the ASEAN declaration of Southeast
Asia as a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality (ZOPFAN)
,
"free of external power intervention and interference." 28
Although the ASEAN members agree to the legal precepts of a
ZOPFAN, the goal will not be considered achieved until
"...none of the major powers will have a dominant position in
the region and as such will remove from the major powers any
opportunity or justification to intervene." 29
In Indonesian thinking, achievement of a ZOPFAN means the
removal of major powers' permanent military bases in Southeast
Asia. The recent closure of Clark Air Base and Subic Naval
Station by the U.S., and the withdrawal of Soviet and Russian
forces from Da Nang Air Base and Cam Ranh Bay Naval Base have
28General Prem Tinsulanonda, "ASEAN: Meeting the
Challenges of Asia and the Pacific, " The ASEAN Success Story,
5.
29Jusef Wanandi, "Political Development and Regional
Order," The ASEAN Success Story, 148.
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been met with approval in Indonesia. Singapore's contract to
repair U.S. naval vessels is seen as an example for regional
countries to follow when pursuing future agreements with
outside powers.
The Indonesian view of China is somewhat more complex than
that of former colonial powers. First, Indonesia is fearful
of China's size and their demonstrated willingness to expand
territorially, as demonstrated by their invasions of Vietnam
and Tibet. Indonesia believes that with an improved military
China could sweep down along the Malay Peninsula and into
Indonesian territory.
The second reason for fear of China is more reasonable, if
not more probable. Indonesia is concerned that a popular
leader in mainland China could incite the ethnic Chinese
population living in Indonesia to rise in revolt. Although
only roughly two percent of the Indonesian population is
ethnic Chinese, they control a disproportionate amount of
wealth. Furthermore, through joint Chinese-Indonesian
business arrangements (usually the Indonesian is the nominal
owner, while the Chinese partner runs the business and enjoys
the lion's share of the profits), ethnic Chinese control over
one-third of the GNP. 30 This economic disparity has made
ethnic Chinese the traditional scapegoat of many Indonesian
30Steven Schlossstein, Asia's New Little Dragons: the
Dynamic Emergence of Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia,
(Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1991), 68.
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problems. Often riots against government policies have
instead turned toward a thrashing of the local Chinese
population, as was the case when Japanese Prime Minister
Tanaka visited the islands in 1974.
The "justification" for fear of PRC-led insurgency stems
from the 1965 coup attempt and counter coup. In 1965 Chou En
Lai promised Sukarno 100,000 small arms weapons with which to
arm the populace in formation of a "fifth force" of the
Indonesian military. This overt complicity of the PKI--the
main ingredient of the proposed peasant army--with the Chinese
communists resulted in a hostile backlash of the army against
both the PKI and the Chinese population in Indonesia.
Because of perceived threats from internal and external
Chinese, Indonesia cancelled relations with Beijing shortly
after the coup attempt in 1965. It was twenty years before
Suharto was convinced that the threat had subsided to the
degree that economic relations between the two countries could
be re-established. In 1989, full diplomatic relations were
restored, but not without the urging of caution from some of
Suharto's advisors.
The restoration of friendly relations was based on the Ten
Principles of the Bandung Conference, which can be summarized
in fewer words: mutual respect for the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of each nation, a pledge for non-
interference in the affairs of each nation, and a recognition
of the equality of each country. It is evidenced by the
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format used in the diplomatic restoration that Suharto and
other Indonesian leaders still view China as a potential
threat
.
If relations with the world's most populous country are
improving, the opposite can be said of relations with the
second most-populous nation, India. One cause of fear is the
Indian refusal to agree on the nuclear-free zone concept for
the Indian Ocean. Although Indonesia agrees with India that
all regional parties must sign the same accord, Indonesia is
distressed with India's continued pursuit and testing of
nuclear weapons. Indonesia is, after all, a signatory of the
nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
The major cause for consternation on the Indonesian side
is the growing power of the Indian armed forces, and
especially the Indian Navy. Since 1986, India has risen to
the top of the ranks of the world's leading military arms
importers 31 . What specifically bothers Indonesia are the
Navy's imports, which include nuclear-powered submarines as
well as large landing ships. While it can be argued that the
submarines are for defensive purposes, the landing ships
constitute an increase in India's amphibious assault
capability and therefore are clearly offensive weapons. At
any rate, the large military build-up, which includes a Marine
force, is meant to project Indian power at least throughout
31G.V.C. Naidu, "The Indian Navy and Southeast Asia,"
Contemporary Southeast Asia 13 (June 1991), 72.
71
the Indian Ocean region. One need only study a map to learn
that western Sumatra, southern Java, and many smaller islands
border the Indian Ocean; therefore any expression by India to
"fill the power vacuum" left by the super-powers is
interpreted in Indonesia as a potential threat to its
territories
.
The Indians may very well have as a goal of their build-up
the checking of the Indonesian military--itself equipped with
submarines and limited amphibious landing capabilities.
During the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 Indonesian President
Sukarno offered to "divert Indian attention from Pakistan by
seizing the Andaman and Nicobar Islands .... "-^ Since
Pakistan is a Muslim country, Indonesia can be expected to
side with it in a future war with India. Certainly seizure of
either Indian island chain, which sit a mere eighty miles off
the coast of Sumatra at their closest point, would divert
India's attention at least temporarily. It is understandable
that the Indian Navy seeks the ability to secure these islands
in time of conflict.
Examining the foreign threats as Indonesia perceives them,
it is unlikely that Indonesia has to guard its borders against
any Western power. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and
the American pull-out from the Philippines, the traditional
East-West cold war is over in Southeast Asia. Future presence
32G.V.C. Naidu, 76.
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will likely follow the U. S . -Singapore model, in which
temporary docking or storage rights are granted but permanent
bases are not
.
As long as China remains focused on improving its economy,
Indonesia need not fear them either. A hostile attack from
China would jeopardize many of its leading export markets.
This is something it can ill afford, since its current
domestic market could not absorb the country's growing output.
As far as China stirring up the ethnic Chinese population in
Indonesia, Indonesia has little to worry about. The ABRI has
repeatedly proven themselves capable of putting down riots of
varying scales; from a pragmatic business approach, the ethnic
Chinese have too much to lose and too little to gain by
causing any uprising in Indonesia.
India poses the most serious threat at this time, due
largely to its military build-up. The United States will most
likely have to reduce its presence in the Indian Ocean due to
budget considerations. If that happens, expect India to be the
self-appointed replacement to ensure "regional peace." While
India may have little to gain by an outright attack on
Indonesia, the former's goal of securing the Andaman and
Nicobar Islands— so close to Indonesia's own shoreline--may
cause confrontation and limited exchanges of hostilities.
While there is no argument that any country must place
among its political goals the security of its population and
protection of its territorial integrity, President Suharto
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from his first days as Indonesia's leader has made another
goal his first priority. His number one objective has been
and remains today the enhancement of the nation's economy in
order to improve the quality of life for Indonesians.
Although Indonesia is resource-rich, however, Suharto does not
believe his country has the capacity to turn its position
around without help from other countries. Suharto's plan to
reform Indonesia's economy is to attract foreign aid and
foster foreign trade.
Looking first at enhancing aid, Indonesia has sought loans
and grants from a variety of sources. The CGI can be counted
on for upwards of $4 billion each year, much of that in
outright grants. Of the members of the CGI, Japan recently
surpassed the United States as the largest donor, contributing
nearly half of the total amount. The United States is second
among CGI donors providing just under one-third of the total
amount
.
Indonesia, although the world's 14th largest oil
exporter 33
, is OPEC's largest debtor nation. Because of its
membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference, it
shares in the wealth of other OPEC members by receiving loans
from the Islamic Development Bank. Indonesia also benefits
from its position as an Asian power, and in 1990 was the
33Far East Economic Review, 1992 Asia Yearbook (Hong Kong
1992), 124.
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largest recipient of funds ($923 million) from the Asian
Development Bank 34 .
As a recipient country under the Colombo Plan for
Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asia and the
Pacific, known as the Colombo Plan, Indonesia partakes in
projects aimed at facilitating technology exchange and filling
gaps in a nation's resources.
The obvious question is, how is this money being spent?
One of Indonesia's top priorities is the development of its
infrastructure, which will in turn facilitate enhanced trade
and investment with other nations. To that end Indonesia has
contracted with both American Telephone and Telegraph and the
Nippon Electric Corporation for installation of a nation-wide
network of telephone lines and the associated equipment to run
the service. General Electric of America recently negotiated
to build new power stations, thereby reducing another obstacle
to doing business in Indonesia. Money spent for improved
agricultural methods continue to reap rewards, and in 1987
Indonesia became self-sufficient in rice production for the
first time.
While Indonesia has been widely supported in its pursuit
of foreign aid, the country makes clear certain preconditions
before it will accept the aid. First is that the aid must
come with no political strings attached. Indonesia makes no
34Political Handbook of the World, 19 91, 881
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promises of political alliance to potential donors and
maintains its rhetoric of an "active but independent" foreign
policy. Specifically what causes displeasure in Indonesia is
the linking of aid with either human rights practices or calls
for a more representative political system.
A second precondition is that the terms of any loan must
be "soft" and within the capabilities of Indonesia to repay.
While one might think that beggars should not be choosers,
Indonesia believes it has a lot to offer other countries, such
as resource access and potentially huge markets. Therefore
Indonesia is content to shop around for its aid. The policy
is successful; Indonesia has managed to secure long-term loans
with less than two-percent interest.
The final precondition is more for the recipients than for
the donors, as it states that all foreign loans must be used
for productive and useful purposes. This demand most likely
stems from the irresponsible borrowing practices of Pertamina,
the National Oil and Natural Gas Mining Company. Under
General Ibnu Sutowo in the mid 1970 's, Pertamina almost
declared bankruptcy and left the nation to pick up the bills.
To prevent a repeat of the Pertamina fiasco, President Suharto
placed a group of ten cabinet ministers in charge of reviewing
all state requests for foreign borrowing.
Indonesia's success at securing favorable grants and loans
is noteworthy, but other governmental policies serve to
inhibit further aid. Chief among these, especially to
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Europeans and Americans, is the demand for aid without
strings. Every time an incident like the November massacre in
Dili occurs, Western democracies are called by their own
populations to explain why they give money to such violators
of international standards. In some cases, such as the Dutch
and Portuguese responses to Dili, aid is either frozen or
withdrawn. As far as linking aid with political changes, no
country will enjoy success. President Suharto firmly believes
that he knows what is best for the country. He does not
believe that either the American federal or the English
parliamentary systems can be successfully adapted to
Indonesia, given its unique political culture.
Another Indonesian policy which limits its aid potential
is the transmigration program. Under transmigration,
inhabitants of the more populous regions of Indonesia, mainly
western and central Java, are moved by the government to other
regions such as the outer islands. This poses a couple of
problems. First, the destinations of transmigrants are
already populated, though comparatively sparsely. Few of
these indigenous societies welcome the Javanese "invasion".
Thus the transmigration policy probably fosters more civil
unrest than it relieves. Second, many of the destinations are
desolate and all but inhabitable (one need not wonder why
migration to these areas is forced) . This makes the program
expensive, as the government usually provides housing,
agricultural necessities, and water resources.
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It has been Indonesia's aim to encourage foreign investors
and donors to contribute to the development of these
destination areas. As can be imagined, it is difficult to
convince a potential investor to spend additional resources
developing a harsh region which has little infrastructure to
offer. Of course, the forced relocation of the Indonesians
does not sit well with potential donors, either. The net
result is that the transmigration policy serves to discourage
potential foreign assistance.
President Suharto readily accepts that Indonesia depends
on foreign loans and outright grants to boost the national
economy. His country's preference though is to enhance
national development through improving the country's trade
position in the world market. As with the acceptance of aid,
the government details preconditions to the approval of
foreign capital investment in Indonesia. The goal of all
foreign investment is to meet needs of the population which
cannot be met through current domestic production. This
protects Indonesia's developing industries from foreign
competition.
Foreign investment must also be made in those sectors of
the economy which further Indonesia's export businesses. A
clear example of this policy in action is the law forbidding
the export of raw timber from Indonesia's tropical forests.
Foreign companies who wish to use Indonesian lumber must
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establish factories on Indonesian soil and use the lumber for
export goods, mainly furniture.
While switching Indonesia from raw materials to value-
added exports, this program and similar ones accomplish
another investment goal: creation of jobs for Indonesians.
Given the large population of Indonesia, it is feared that
economic development in some sectors of the economy, or
concentration of that development in certain provinces, will
prove destabilizing to the country. The establishment of
factories rather than mines and mills creates additional
employment opportunities for the nation's city-dwellers.
Already mentioned was the ability of Indonesia to encourage
investors to set up factories in the less-populated regions of
the country. This combined with the transmigration policy
have lessened urban tensions in Java and other potential
hotbeds of civil strife.
Indonesia seeks foreign investment in industries which
will allow technical transfer in the shortest amount of time.
To that end, Indonesia favors coproduction contracts over
commission arrangements in industries from aircraft
manufacture to mineral extraction.
The Indonesian economy is looked at to follow in the
footsteps of Asia' Four Dragons (Singapore, Honk Kong, South
Korea, and Taiwan) . It is not yet ready to assume that
stature. Beside the problems of infrastructure already noted,
there is the problem of access to the country's financial
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bases and markets. This access is largely controlled by the
president's own family and is a growing bone of contention in
Indonesian society. Between Suharto's four children, cousin,
and nephew, a virtual lock exists on the raw materials
essential to any industrial production. For example, the auto
industry is hampered by the PT Giwang Selogam holding
company's virtual monopoly on sheet steel. The holding
company is under the executive direction of Sudwikatmono,
cousin to Suharto. 35 The president's own wife is nicknamed
"Madame Ten Percent" because of her usual cut in business
deals
.
The extensive holdings of the Suharto family were divulged
to the west in a front-page series of the Sydney Herald in
1986. This resulted in the expulsion of the Australian press
corps from Indonesia. As the constitution states, "Freedom of
. . . verbal and written expression and the like, shall be
prescribed by law. " 36
Despite, or perhaps because of, the growing criticism of
corruption among the president's family, improvements have
been made to facilitate and increase the Indonesian trade and
investment environment. In 1985 Indonesia contracted with the
Societe Generale de Surveillance, a Swiss firm, to take over
the role of the former customs service. This eliminates the
35Schlossstein, 91.
2e1945 Constitution of Indonesia, art. 28
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hassles foreigners encountered when clearing their goods
through customs.
Other major steps include the deregulation of the banking
industry, reduction of tariff rates, and the removal of non-
tariff barriers. In addition, the government has taken steps
to privatize some two-hundred state-owned businesses. The
results of these improvements can be seen in the 21 percent
increase in Indonesian exports between 1988-89.
While concerns over government favoritism (due largely to
the questionable financial practices of the president's
family) still exist, Indonesia is making the needed
improvements to its investment environment. Boasting upwards
of a seven-percent growth rate for its economy over much of
the 1980 's through today, Indonesia has attracted foreign
investment nearing $5 billion since 1989. 37 This economic
growth translates into money for social programs, such as the
transmigration program, Suharto's laudatory family planning
program, and the linking of the outer islands with Java
through communications and media operations. Through
Suharto's Repelitas, or five-year economic plans, Indonesia
has achieved many of its goals toward national development
through a better standard of living for Indonesian citizens.
37Pete Engardio and Sally Gelston, "Indonesia: the Hottest
Hot Spot in Asia," Business Week (27 August 1990), 44.
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C. THE ROLE OF MULTINATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Many of Indonesia's domestic and foreign policy goals
call for some degree of cooperation with other countries.
Feeling secure on their Indian Ocean coasts will largely be
determined by the extent of the Indian Navy's build-up.
With large demands on Jakarta to improve the Indonesian
standard of living, dependency on foreign donors is still
necessary. That sense of dependency combines with the
Javanese favoring of group action over individual action.
Add to that the very pragmatic view of Suharto that
Indonesia acting alone wields less influence over world
affairs than when it acts in concert with other nations.
The result is the favoring of multinational organizations as
a way for Indonesia to boost its own prominence and to
achieve its foreign policy goals.
Indonesia has placed its faith in the United Nations
since the country's inception as a republic. The successes
achieved have been mixed with failures and condemnations
from the world body. In the Indonesian struggle for
independence, the Dutch were finally persuaded by the United
Nations—urged on strongly by the United States--to return
sovereignty to the Republic of Indonesia. During the course
of that independence struggle Indonesian leaders were
divided over what course to pursue. Many of the nation's
leaders believed independence would only come after the
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Dutch were militarily thrown out. Sukarno's view, which was
to limit the military struggle and rely on the U.N. to
accept its request for self-determination, prevailed and
probably gained for Indonesia respect as a politically
mature rational actor.
Eight years later, in 1957, Holland and Indonesia again
saw the U.N. mediate a territorial concern: Irian Jaya
.
Stepping in as the situation was exploding, the U.N.
pressured Holland into turning over Irian Jaya to an
administrative body composed first of U.N. officials, and
later to the Indonesian government. In 1963 Irian Jaya
officially joined the Republic of indonesia.
The U.N. has not always guaranteed success for
Indonesia. The condemnation over the annexation of East
Timor was already explained. To this day the United Nations
refuses to recognize that a legitimate act of self-
determination ever took place in East Timor. The body
continues to condemn the Indonesian use of force in the
region. The Portugal-Indonesia dialogue on the Timor issue,
however, continues to be carried out under the auspices of
the U.N. Secretariat and not through bilateral talks. This
demonstrates Indonesia's continued reliance on the U.N. as
the only forum in which nations can address each other on
equal terms; Indonesia also holds the view of the U.N. as
the proper forum for discussing all matters of international
importance.
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There is little evidence to suggest that Indonesia's
dependence on the United Nations will decline. There is
some trepidation of the future of the Security Council,
given the rapprochement demonstrated by the Permanent
Members in the recent Gulf Crisis. According to Foreign
Minister Ali Alatas:
It was encouraging to see the strengthened multilateral
approach in solving global problems and thereby
enhancing the role and image of the U.N. However, there
remained the need to expand further the geographical
scope and depth of 'detente' if we want to make it a
basis for the realization of a more stable world
world peace and security. It is a fact that 'detente'
emerged in the European continent alone; where as in
Third World countries— in Asia, Africa and Latin
America— tension and conflict continued to rage. We
must be vigilant in seeing that the harmonious spirit of
cooperation between the Permanent Members of the U.N.
Security Council does not lead towards their regulating
the way international problems are solved at the
expense of the U.N. as well as the fundamental interests
of medium- and small-sized countries. 38
Although Indonesia relies on the United Nations, it does not see
itself as one of the body's dominant members. Those roles, it
believes, are reserved for countries of the North. Indonesia
does see itself as a dominant figure in another body, the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM) . Indonesia was a founding member of the
group along with Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia. It was at the
1955 Bandung Conference for African-Asian Unity that the Five
Principles (which later doubled in size) for mutual respect and
38Ali Alatas, "Year-End Press Statement 1990," speech
delivered at Gedung Caraloka, 3 January 1990.
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non-interference were laid out. These principles were later
adopted by the NAM as the basis for state-to-state relations.
Questions have arisen over the future of the NAM given the
collapse of the Soviet Union. From Indonesia's standpoint,
however, such questioning by the western powers only proves that
they do not understand the mission of the group. (Indonesia uses
the same answer for NAM members who question the group's future.)
The NAM is fundamentally against any nation's desire to exercise
undue influence over another nation or group of nations. This
historically pitted the group against the East's communist camp
as well as the West's colonial camp. Furthermore, although the
mercantilistic style of colonialism vanished years ago, the "neo-
colonial" domination of lesser developed countries and their use
as puppets by the industrialized countries continues today,
according to Indonesian leaders.
The world, goes the argument, has changed from a bipolar to a
multipolar one. Given this new environment, it is more important
than ever for Third World countries to belong to a group which
carries no ideological baggage. Indonesia believes that the
refuge provided by the NAM is still needed, as is the body's role
as a mediator in conflicts between developed and undeveloped
countries, between world powers and world players. The Movement
and its Bandung Principles are alive and well, say the
Indonesians. The low turnout of the 1992 NAM Conference (just
over 50 percent) begs to differ.
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Indonesia seeks another role for the NAM, and that is
increased South-South dialogue and solidarity. Given the
perception that much of the North-South aid also contributes to
the subordination of the South in world affairs, Indonesia seeks
to enhance the environment of developing nations helping each
other, free from reliance on the North.
It is through this role that Indonesia seeks to become a world
power. Of the 103 members of the NAM, few have the resources and
political and economic atmospheres to be on the giving side of
South-South relations. Indonesia is among them. Indonesia has
the experience to provide assistance for nation-wide family
planning programs, infrastructure development, and securing of
financing and investment on terms favorable to the receiving
country. Indonesia's achievement of rice self-sufficiency also
provides a model for agricultural development and food
distribution. Given the historical experience of Indonesia in
dealing with the East and West, the country is ready to assume a
leadership role in the NAM.
As if to demonstrate this more clearly, Indonesia took over
the role of Chairman for the NAM in 1992 and will hold that
position until 1995. As President Suharto assumed the title of
Chairman, he placed improving South-South cooperation at the top
of the Movement ' s agenda
.
While the future of the Non-Aligned Movement is temporarily
(at least) in question, Indonesia looks to another multinational
body whose future is perhaps brighter now than at any time in its
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history. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is
composed of six regular members: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Papua New Guinea is an
observer nation. Though not a military alliance, ASEAN seeks to
guard the security of the Southeast Asian region through
fostering "regional resilience." Resilience is to be achieved
through solidarity on the economic and political issues facing
the region. Indonesia seeks the leadership role in achieving
this solidarity.
On the political front, ASEAN has played a large part in
seeking to resolve the current Cambodian crisis, the region's
largest looming security concern. Led by Indonesia, ASEAN teamed
up with France to establish a dialogue including all four
factions of the Cambodian government. These efforts ultimately
culminated in the establishment of the United Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia, which is charged with
restoring some degree of peace in the country, and more
importantly, holding elections for the country's leadership.
The Cambodian crisis and China's subsequent invasion of
Vietnam produced another crisis: the Indochinese refugee problem.
After nearly a decade of war, refugees from Cambodia and Vietnam
sought asylum throughout ASEAN countries. Over 2,000,000
Indochinese refugees escaped to the nations of ASEAN, with
100,000 of that number reaching Indonesia. In an international
agreement prompted by ASEAN, its members agreed to be homes of
first asylum. This means that the ASEAN countries will receive
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the Indochinese refugees and process their claims as political
refugees. After those claims are processed, however, the
refugees must seek permanent asylum elsewhere, or they can
petition to be repatriated in their home of origin.
ASEAN has held dialogues on issues of political development
among its members. Main issues have included the role of the
military in politics, strength of the legislative branch relative
to the executive, and peaceful processes of succession. No
concrete agreements arise from these dialogues; they are not
meant to standardize the governmental practices of ASEAN members.
They are meant to highlight the importance each member feels
toward peaceful settlement of internal political conflicts.
Moreover, political stability of all members is accepted as the
first step toward regional resilience.
Some outspoken members of ASEAN countries, such as Malaysia's
Mahatir and Indonesia's Suharto, worry that ASEAN may be
suffering from inactivity. While political dialogue is
beneficial, firm results are needed as evidence of ASEAN' s future
worth. Statements of this sentiment usually lead toward the
discussion of the economic cooperation of ASEAN nations.
To begin with, the members of ASEAN are working more closely
toward the improvement of intraregional trade. In that vein they
have reduced tariffs on members' imports to lower levels than
non-members'. The group has also worked to promote industrial
development through cooperative arrangements. In 1991 Singapore
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agreed to purchase 60 million gallons of water from Indonesia; 39
more convincing is the development of industries on Indonesia's
Riau Islands, undertaken and staffed largely through Singaporean
efforts
.
The future of ASEAN' s economic cooperation hinges on whether
or not to form a regional trading bloc, and if so, who will be
allowed to join. Two proposals are the most likely to be
implemented, if any are. The first is an East Asian Economic
Caucus (EAEC)
,
proposed by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahatir. Its
membership consists solely of Asians, which places it in direct
competition with both the European Community and the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
.
A counter proposal is the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
agreement (APEC) . This group is favored by Indonesia for two
reasons. First, it includes Canada and the United States,
important trading partners and donor nations for Indonesia.
Second, it is less confrontational in its measures than the EAEC
and so has appeal to Suharto. It is believed that APEC enjoys
more support within ASEAN than does the EAEC.
Going back to Indonesia's reliance on multinational bodies,
the question begs, "is Indonesia a regional or world leader?"
The answer is a qualified yes to the former, but the jury is
still out on the latter. The United Nations is against
Indonesia's human rights and transmigration policies. The issues
™1992 Asia Yearbook, 123.
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are simultaneously brought up and frustrated by European powers.
It therefore seems that while the United Nations will remain the
preferred forum in which to address North-South issues and to
pursue solutions to trans-border problems, Indonesia does not
enjoy a leadership position in the United Nations, if one judges
success by influence over policy decisions.
Indonesia is currently the titular leader of the Non-Aligned
Movement, but it must also be considered one of the de facto
leaders as well. With control over the NAM'S agenda for the
next three years, Indonesia can steer the group away from notions
of Cold War relationships and concentrate instead on economic
development. If Suharto and Alatas can keep the group
functioning throughout their three-year chairmanship, Indonesia
will no doubt emerge as the movement's leader; it will have the
resources, knowledge, and experience which is sought by the NAM'S
lesser developed members.
The success of ASEAN is questionable in its own right. Twice
now it has not been able to ensure peace in its region,
especially in Indochina. As for one of its primary tenets, the
Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Cooperation (ZOPFAN) , it has largely
been ignored by the major powers since its inception in 1971.
The permanent superpower bases at Cam Ranh Bay, Subic Naval Base,
and the others kept large, powerful militaries of nonregional
residents inside the limits of the ZOPFAN. Even with the removal
of these permanent bases, ZOPFAN does not seem nearer to
realization. Australia has joint basing agreements with the
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United States, and Singapore, Indonesia, and others are seeking
temporary or limited agreements. Add to this the growing navies
of both China and India, and checking the map to see where the
two might collide, it is evident that the Southeast Asian region
is still a place where foreign militaries conduct business.
The future of ASEAN lies in its ability to increase economic
development. It is likely that the ratification of the NAFTA by
the signatories will provoke some retaliatory measures by ASEAN.
If Malaysia's Mahatir Mochtar prevails, the result will be a more
tightly knit, exclusionary group made up solely of Asians. If
Indonesia's Suharto prevails, the extended membership of APEC
will be the result. Given the dependence on the United States as
a market for ASEAN members (as a whole, ASEAN constitutes the
fifth-leading exporter of goods to the U.S., while the U.S.
market absorbs more ASEAN imports than any other) , an APEC-styled
bloc will present a compromise between the heavy rhetoric and
economic pragmatism.
As for Indonesia's particular role in ASEAN, much depends on
the future generation of leaders. A Suharto proves the match of
a Lee or a Mahatir; a Habibe, Murdani, or Sutrisno may not.
Before any member can be considered as a leader, the group must
demonstrate a greater degree of cohesiveness ; otherwise the point
is moot. Such cohesiveness could be brought about with the
emergence in the region of another superpower—of the economic,
not military strain. Likely candidates are China and Japan. If
either increases its political influence in the region to match
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its economic influence, ASEAN members could for perhaps the first
time agree on an external security threat. That would certainly
improve political cohesiveness and might even prompt talk of
military cooperation, something currently ignored by the
Association.
D. THE UNITED STATES IN INDONESIA'S INTERESTS
It is useful to summarize the main points of Indonesia's
foreign policy, stemming as they do from a carefully delineated
domestic policy, by examining where the United States fits in.
In short, the United States is running at half -speed, and often
in the wrong direction.
As for preserving Indonesia's national borders intact,
Indonesia need not fear from a U.S. invasion of its territory.
In fact, military cooperation and training have increased between
the two countries. Indonesia signed a deal in 1989 to purchase
eighteen F-16 fighters to upgrade its air force, in exchange for
a multitude of offsets. Small-scale exercises have been
conducted with Indonesia for years and are likely to continue.
The goal of national development, by which is meant fostering
unity among the nation's diverse population (diverse ethnically,
religiously, and culturally), is sometimes hindered by the U.S.
Throughout its diplomatic history with Indonesia, the United
States has periodically attempted to link development aid with
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government policy. In the early 1960 's the U.S. even withdrew
all but basic humanitarian aid (such as the anti-malaria
program) in response to the "Crush Malaysia" campaign of Sukarno.
These actions did not deter Sukarno from landing troops on
Malaysian territory, nor did they soften his rhetoric.
What did result was a tough anti-America campaign in which the
libraries of the U.S. Information Agency were burned and looted.
Relations with Indonesia remained strained until Sukarno was
forced to step down. Even then, Suharto's decision to end the
Malaysian conflict was not a response to U.S. requests as it was
a realization that his country could ill afford such a
questionable venture.
Attempts since then to link U.S. aid with Indonesia's human
rights policies have kept U. S . -Indonesian relations tepid at
best. Indonesia reacts to such attempts at linkage with anger and
accusations of neo-colonialism by America, as it did in the
November 1991 Dili incident by accusing the two American
journalists of violating the conditions of their visas. The
question for the U.S. then becomes, how to get Indonesia to alter
its policies without stepping on its very sensitive feelings.
There are basically two approaches to the problem. First, the
U.S. can use its aid and development capital as a carrot to
dangle in front of Indonesia. If Indonesia softens its treatment
of political dissidents, the development goes forward. If not,
the money is withdrawn. The second approach is to spend the
money no matter what Indonesia's policies are; that way, at
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least, the U.S. can maintain a dialogue with Indonesia in which
to address the issues. A similar puzzle exists in the treatment
of China's human rights policies.
The United States will enjoy more success, and perhaps more
influence, if it sticks with the second policy option. Indonesia
still feels that there are a number of countries willing to
invest there no matter what the internal policies are. Japan,
Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore have already proven they can
overlook incidents such as the November affair at Dili. Taking
the hardline approach would only serve to 1) garner a reaction
similar to the one taken toward the Dutch last year, and 2)
prevent U.S. companies from entering a competitive and
potentially lucrative market. At least the U.S. maintains
communications with the leaders of Indonesia by taking the softer
approach. Perhaps behind-the-scenes diplomacy will enable the
U.S. to influence Indonesia. It is clear that a withdrawal of
U.S. financial support would only serve to weaken relations, with
the result that Indonesia would turn a deaf ear to American
statements
.
In the areas of foreign aid and trade, U.S. policy seems
confused. First, America's role in the Consultative Group on
Indonesia is decreasing relative to that of Japan. Whereas the
United States used to be the number one contributor of funds
through the IGGI, Japan currently pledges more than half of CGI '
s
total. This money is not only good for Indonesia, it is good for
Japan. Japanese investment is everywhere throughout Jakarta.
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This translates into jobs for Japanese: in construction,
machinery, and industrial management. Short-term capital loss is
sacrificed to the goal of market share. The U.S. does not have
this presence; even some American companies who do find
Indonesia, such as Nike, Inc. of Oregon, contract to third
parties (South Korea in Nike's case) for the running of their
plants
.
What American investment does exist seems to be in the areas
of the economy that Indonesia is de- emphasizing . Steven
Schlossstein quotes an American businessman familiar with U.S.
investment patterns in Indonesia. "Ninety percent of U.S.
investment in Indonesia is underground, and if it's not in oil or
gas, it's in mining, in tin or copper." 40 While Indonesia still
receives a large portion of its revenue from these areas, it is
trying to diversify its revenue sources to the manufacturing
sectors—and is succeeding largely due to Japanese investment.
The money brought in from energy sources declined as a percentage
of total revenue, from 80 percent in 1981 to 36 percent in 1988.
While mining may bring in money, industry brings technology.
Technology has a more permanent nature than do the oil fields of
Sumatra. The United States is leaving itself behind.
In the final analysis, America just does not understand all
the details about Indonesia. While the United States wishes to
see Indonesia offer better treatment of dissidents, Indonesia
"Schlossstein, 119.
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wishes to silence them before their separatist movements gain
momentum and pull the country apart from four directions—with
results which would bear striking resemblance to Yugoslavia.
While the U.S. seeks to promote representative democracy
worldwide, it ignores the original reasons for its own electoral
college and assumes a degree of political maturity among the
Indonesian masses that does not yet exist. American models of




III. UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTERESTS AND INDONESIA
The United States, as does Indonesia, determines its foreign
policy based on its own national interests. While Indonesia's
primary goal is national development, the ultimate goal for the
United States is the preservation of the status which it has
already achieved in the world. In both cases, policies are
devised to protect and promote its own perceptions of its
national interests. These interests may be subdivided into
security, political, and economic classifications.
A. SECURITY NATIONAL INTERESTS
Of course the principal national interests of the United
States concern the preservation of the country and its
institutions intact. Since the decline and eventual fall of the
Soviet Union, many people in and out of government have tended to
relegate security concerns to the back burner, claiming that the
survival of the American nation-state and its institutions now
are determined by economic issues. While it is true that the
U.S. no longer faces nearly the same risk of nuclear devastation
it did during the Cold War, the end of that war has produced many
and more complicated challenges to the security of the United
States. That stated, U.S. national security interests in the
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Pacific remain fundamentally the same as during the Cold War:
preserve the current balance of power in the world, in which no
country can directly challenge the United States, and prevent
regional upsets to peace by countries or leaders seeking local
hegemony. The U.S. must, however, come up with post-Cold War
methods to satisfy these interests.
The first national security aim is to preserve the current
balance in the world. That balance has the United States as the
sole superpower, with a few major powers most of which are
friendly toward the U.S. During the Cold War that power balance
was achieved through alliances with Japan, South Korea, the
Republic of China, Australia, New Zealand and Philippines.
The passage of the Cold War did not remove all threats to the
Pacific, and so to preserve the regional balance of power the
United States should reassure both Japan and South Korea of
continued American involvement in Northeast Asia.
The major change to the U.S-Japan relationship—long touted as
the linchpin for U.S. policy in the Pacific— is the maturing of
that key relationship. Given the economic troubles on the
domestic scene, U.S. lawmakers have pushed Japan for a more equal
burden-sharing. Up to now that has translated into more money
paid by Japan for continued U.S. protection. Japan currently
pays for all the costs of the naval yard at Yokosuka except
American salaries, for example. A new, more mature relationship
would call for Japan to take on some of the military
responsibilities commensurate with its fiscal investment.
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A partnership among equals could have units of the Japanese
Self-Defense Forces perform rear echelon support roles currently
carried out by American forces. These include performing
command, control, and communications roles; a sharing of the
intelligence gathering and analysis functions; and using
Japanese-trained logistics personnel to perform repairs as well
as to move supplies. Special operations, such as
counterterrorist and counterespionage, can be placed under the
direction of joint task forces, composed of American and Japanese
forces. What would truly signal the maturity of the new
relationship would be Japanese command over American troops on
some of these units.
There have been many Japan critics who have called for the
Japanese to spend more money on their defense forces, increasing
the share of GNP dedicated to defense spending beyond the one-or
two-percentage point. This may or may not be necessary; any
additional expenditures should be determined by the military
material requirements commensurate with new defense roles. It is
irresponsible to ask the Japanese to spend more on their defense
just for the sake of spending more, and it is highly unlikely
that the Japanese Diet would approve such action. Also, an
unsubstantiated increase in Japanese defense spending might very
well send unpopular signals to already-anxious Asian governments.
United States military experts have already considered
expanding the zone of responsibility currently patrolled by
Japan's Maritime Self Defense Force, past its current periphery
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of 1000 miles. This should be approached cautiously. Such an
expanded presence of a Japanese navy into waters further south
brings quickly to mind the legacy of the Imperial Navy to many
Southeast Asian leaders.
While few believe that military domination is still on the
agenda of Japan, trepidation still exists. Southeast Asian
officials believe that for Japan to take on such expanded patrol
duties would require that they review their entire foreign
policy. Such a review could lead to greater Japanese "meddling"
in their geographic areas, at a period of history in which they
feel the region is coming in to its own.
To alleviate some of these fears, the new Japan-U.S. security
agreement should make use of joint surface task forces. This
would reduce some of the costs and burdens of deploying U.S.
ships so far from American shores; it would also offer the
appearance of a Japan voluntarily checking its military power.
This might be more palpable to the Southeast Asian nations as
well, who (for the most part) do not wish to see a complete
American withdrawal or a freely patrolling Japanese Navy.
The hottest hot spot in Northeast Asia is the Korean
Peninsula. Despite the recent move toward serious unification
talks, North Korea refuses to remove all doubt about nuclear
weapons on its territory. Added to this is the penchant of North
Korea to supply sophisticated missile technology and hardware to
the equally volatile Middle East. Unless and until North Korea
chooses to abide by international calls for compliance with
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nonproliferation agreements, the United States should keep its
troops on South Korean soil as a clear sign that any expansionist
ideas from the North will be repelled.
The calls for burden sharing should not be applied to South
Korea to the same degree they are with Japan. It is in the U.S.
interest to forward station the troops necessary to repel any
attack. Given the uncertainty of the North Korean foreign
policy, maintaining troops on the peninsula remains cheaper than
trying to redeploy such troops in case of invasion. Furthermore,
having such powerful troops mere miles from North Korean
territory serves as a reminder to Pyongyang of potential
punishments for rash behavior. These American forces preserve a
flexibility of response options Washington can consider when
faced with North Korean irrationality.
Many defense analysts believe that a North Korean attack would
be a desperation act rather than something currently on their
planning boards, lest unification in any form be postponed
indefinitely. That realized, the United States--both for
external appearances as well as for smoother South Korean
consumption- -should continue to carry out joint U.S. -R. O.K.
exercises, emphasizing the defensive purpose of the alliance.
The reader quickly notices a marked difference in the attitude
of the security relationships between Japan and Korea. That is
intentional. In the case of Japan, the principal threat— the
Soviet Union--no longer exists. As for potential threats from
Russia or China, Japan's economic and technical might combined
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with its sought-after involvement in restoring the economies of
those two nations make Japan quite capable of defending itself;
its long policy of collective security has placed it in this
advantageous position. Both Japan and the United States can
afford to let their security roles evolve.
This is not the case on the Korean Peninsula. The Cold War
division is still present, even though the economic and technical
bases in North and South Korea are at vastly different levels.
The North Korean military still trains with the Seoul government
as its potential adversary; the Pyongyang government still boasts
of nuclear capability. Until there is a firmer relationship
between North and South Korea, the Cold War will continue.
Therefore while the armed forces of the Republic of Korea might
be up to any challenge presented by an advancing North, the
United States' continued presence serves as a reminder for North
Korea to act rationally in its foreign policy.
To preserve the present balance of power in the Pacific it is
not sufficient to look only at Northeast Asia. America must pay
attention to the development and national maturity occurring
throughout Southeast Asia, from close allies such as Australia to
the more unpredictable governments of Malaysia and Indonesia.
Here too, the end of the Cold War forces the United States to
rethink its security strategy for the region, but the key is to
demonstrate American interest in the events of Southeast Asia.
Prior to 1992, U.S. interest was shown through the bases in
the Philippines, mainly Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base.
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Situated 1500 miles from Guam and 4800 miles from Hawaii, those
Philippine bases served as an airlift link between the U.S. and
the Indian Ocean (and therefore the Middle East and Africa) and a
support structure for U.S. operations anywhere in the Pacific.
Perhaps most importantly in the 1970 's and 1980 's, those bases
served to check the Soviet Union's movement in Southeast Asia
obtained through its own bases in Vietnam.
Now that the former Soviet Union has withdrawn from Vietnam,
and natural and national events have caused the U.S. to withdraw
from the Philippines, American strategic planners must examine
what real purposes were served by Clark, Subic, and the other
bases. According to Gregory P. Corning, the Philippine bases
served five major functions: logistics support, enabling America
to fight so far from its shores; repair and maintenance
facilities; training; command, control, communications, and
intelligence support; and personnel services. 41
While each of those functions is vital to a competent fighting
force, each can be accomplished elsewhere. The key is
adaptability on the part of the United States to different types
of military arrangements. The logistics support mentioned above
includes mainly the storage of warfighting materials and the
prepositioning of ammunition, weapons, and the like. While such
a function reduces the reaction time of U.S. contingency
operations, the Philippines is not the only country which can
41Gregory P. Corning, "The Philippine Bases and U.S
Pacific Strategy," Pacific Affairs 63 (Spring 1990), 11.
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offer this function. Bilateral storage agreements could be
negotiated with other friendly countries in the region, such as
Thailand and Singapore. Indeed, the required protection for
these storage facilities can be provided by the home government,
making the entire agreement barely visible; that would satisfy
other governments who worry about American interventionism.
Aside from the prepositioning rights, the most important
function of Subic Naval Base was the repair facilities it
offered. Already, the U.S. has demonstrated how to make up for
the loss of Subic. An agreement has been negotiated with
Singapore offering the U.S. Navy use of Singapore's limited
shipyards. This use is on a non-discriminatory nature, i.e.,
other navies have similar agreements.
This fits right in to America's new security strategy. That
strategy requires a presence, enough to demonstrate America's
continued interest in the Pacific. That strategy does not
require American presence to the exclusion of all others. With
that in mind, the United States should push for similar
agreements with Indonesia. Development of port facilities in
Eastern Indonesia would bring repairs closer than they were with
Subic. Also, with major U.S. facilities at both Guam and Japan,
the U.S. need not match the capabilities provided by Subic, if it
is not technically feasible. The U.S. need only guaranteed
access for minor repairs and emergency berthing.
As far as the training and personnel functions formerly
performed in the Philippines, these can be accomplished elsewhere
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with little heartburn. The U.S. Air Force transferred the entire
Thirteenth Air Force Headquarters to Guam, with little disruption
to the Pacific Air Forces. Both training and administrative
duties can be performed at Guam, Hawaii, or in Alaska without
leaving the Pacific. This is especially true given the
automation of most administrative duties. As for the benefits
from area-specific training, those can be achieved through
bilateral or multilateral exercises, which will be discussed
below.
That leaves the command, control, communications, and
intelligence (C3I) functions. As noted above with the Thirteenth
Air Force, command and control can be exercised from wherever the
U.S. forces relocate to. The communications and intelligence
facilities existing in the Philippines could still be leased by
the United States, providing the Philippines offers that use for
a reasonable cost. Otherwise, both functions can be relocated to
a number of sites throughout the region. Singapore, Thailand,
and Australia come quickly to mind, and the trade-off might be
transfer of certain technologies (which could prove beneficial to
U.S. communications firms) . The United States already shares
intelligence facilities with Australia; these facilities could be
upgraded if needed to recover the same information gathered in
the Philippine.
For what the Philippine bases provided, the United States is
better off without them. Officially ending its colonial legacy,
the United States is in a better negotiating position with other
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Southeast Asian nations. The Soviets are gone; the Chinese and
Japanese are not. Neither one Southeast Asian nation's military
nor a combination of many could long defend against an incursion
from either of those Northeast Asian powers. Maintaining the
United States in Southeast Asia is more of a mutual interest,
despite the talk of neutral zones. Future military agreements
can be smaller scale and thus less obtrusive while still meeting
the security needs of all parties involved.
The Persian Gulf War demonstrated that preserving current
balances of power is easier said than done. While the U.S.
struggles to achieve that goal, however, it will be pursuing
another major national security interest: preventing regional
upsets to peace by stopping the emergence of regional hegemons
.
The actions necessary and available to accomplish this goal short
of military activity are provided by Michael Vlahos and include:
adroit diplomacy, prompt military sales, and the use of available
surrogates. 42 Each option needs explanation.
Adroit diplomacy is a useful way to deter nations from seeking
to expand their relative strength. Military threats from the
United States only enhance a confrontation, economic threats--of
boycotts, removal of special tariff consideration, or
42Michael Vlahos, "The Third World in U.S. Naval
Planning," Orbis (Spring 1986), 16. Vlahos simply provides a
list of policy choices short of military confrontation;
explanation of the items in that list are the work of this
author. Also, Vlahos includes covert operations as an option.
This author chooses to exclude covert operations as a policy
choice, because of their high risk-to-benefit ratio.
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postponement of development programs- -carry more weight. The
pressure can be multiplied by convincing other economic powers to
join in any action. Other diplomatic methods include use of the
United Nations to resolve disputes short of military action. The
most successful type of diplomacy--and the most adroit--is that
which presents to the opposition a collective adversary. When
faced with the prospect of regional exclusion—given the
interlocking nature of Pacific economies— any opponent should
retreat
.
Military sales immediately upgrade the capabilities of the
buyer. Therefore such sales should be made quickly when a buyer
is faced with a potential aggressor. This may head off a
military confrontation. Opponents will argue that military sales
increase the volatility of a situation. Examine the recent sale
of F-16's to both Taiwan and Singapore. Given the defensive and
offensive capabilities of the F-16, any nation thinking of
involvement with either country has a serious, immediate
deterrent . Mainland China certainly cannot ignore the
consequences of provoking Taiwan once that nation takes delivery
of all 150 fighters. Singapore's agreement, which also involves
training in the United States, gives it a modern air force with a
very capable craft. That must be factored into any aggressor's
planning.
Prompt sales do not mean irresponsible sales. In no way
should United States policy be to quicken arms proliferation.
Rather, U.S. policy should be reactionary, responding with
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capabilities commensurate with foreseeable threats. Here again,
Taiwan is a good example of proper U.S. policy. The People's
Republic of China claims that the F-16 sale violates the Reagan
agreement not to increase Taiwan's military capabilities and thus
start an arms race. The U.S. rightly noted, however, that the
mainland already possessed fourth generation Soviet fighters
(MiG-29's); by selling the F-16's to Taiwan, the U.S. was merely
allowing its ally to "catch up." The U.S. should consider the
existing regional balances of power before proceeding with arms
sales
.
The last method available short of military action is the use
of regional surrogates to achieve U.S. goals. This is vital if
the U.S. is to avoid charges of meddling, which quickly
deteriorate its negotiating position. The prevention of regional
hegemons is certainly to the benefit of more than the United
States; therefore, the United States should let other regional
actors or international organizations address the shared
concerns. That way the U.S. can be seen as supporting regional
interests, rather than dominating them. This increases the
likelihood of support for U.S. involvement in the region.
Now that the available methods have been addressed, it is time
to look at the potential threats to regional peace and stability,
with the goal of applying the methods to the situations. The
first threat comes from an economically empowered China seeking
to expand its presence southward. China's economy under the
leadership of the moderates has obviously expanded. Some of that
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money has gone to update the weapons of its arsenal. This
includes the aforementioned Soviet fighters, but it also includes
the purchase of a Ukranian aircraft carrier. 43 A carrier and
associated aircraft give the Chinese power projection
capabilities they do not currently enjoy. This is a source of
consternation for many Asian powers.
The most likely use of a Chinese carrier is for defense of the
Spratly and Paracel Island chains, both in the South China Sea.
China claims sovereignty over both chains, but five other nations
dispute China's exclusive rights to these mineral-rich (expected)
islands and their surrounding waters. The most serious
counterclaim is made by the Vietnamese, and in 1988 the two
navies exchanged gunfire in the region. In explaining the
security of a recent joint drilling and development agreement
signed by Denver-based Crestone Energy Corporation, Crestone's
president stated that "China has promised the full support of its
navy to protect Crestone's investment." 44 The joint Chinese-
Crestone project area is directly east of Spratly Island.
To keep China in check, the U.S. sent a clear signal with the
F-16 sale to Taiwan. The resolution of the Spratly dispute is
perhaps better left to regional surrogates Taiwan and the
43The Chinese purchase of the Ukranian aircraft carrier
has yet to be finalized. It is believed, however, that the
Chinese government has the upper hand in the negotiations,
given the ukranian government's need for foreign currency. It
is likely that the Chinese are now haggling over price.
44Interview with Randall C. Thompson, President of
Crestone Energy Corporation, by author, 21 October 1992.
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Philippines, while negotiations for peaceful resolution of the
dispute are being headed by Indonesia, a regional actor which
does not have claims to either island chain. The best diplomatic
path for the U.S. is to support fully Indonesia's negotiations.
The threats to the Pacific countries come not only from the
north. India has been expanding its military with an idea on
patrolling the entire Indian Ocean. Indian officials have
already expressed their desire to be able to secure the Andaman
and Nicobar Islands from external threat. With recent purchase
and production of amphibious ships, intermediate range missiles,
and submarines, the country is close to its goal. That rightly
sends a shiver down the backs of Singapore, Malaysia, and
Indonesia. By controlling those island chains, India can
position itself to control (or deny) access to the Sunda and
Malacca Straits, which could cripple Southeast Asian economies
dependent on exports.
The United States cannot and certainly would not allow any
nation to block access to such strategically vital straits.
Military action would definitely be the American reaction to such
Indian aggression. But the U.S. can take other steps to prevent
any showdown. First, joint U.S. -Indian exercises would enable
the U.S. to determine Indian capabilities firsthand. Next,
should the Indian submarine fleet gain the adequate proficiency,
the U.S. should think about selling anti-submarine P-3 Orion
aircraft to Singapore, Malaysia, or Indonesia. This is a good
example of where prompt military sales can head off a growing
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hegemon . The P-3 gives a force the ability to track and destroy
enemy submarines. Given the large financial investment of a
submarine, such sales would increase India's costs in a cost-to-
benefit analysis.
Iraq's actions in 1990/1991 demonstrated that the next threat
one must plan for is the threat of the unexpected. Both Iran and
Vietnam are capable of carrying out an unexpected attack in their
regions. A successful Pan-Islam movement could isolate Singapore
or Australia.
It is possible, however contradictory it sounds, to counter
the unexpected. This is most effectively done through the
development of relationships with a variety of countries. These
relationships need not be America's friendliest; they need only
be strong enough to provide the U.S. with the building blocks of
a regional coalition in case of crisis. Relationships as simple
as occasional conferences on regional issues are enough to
demonstrate U.S. interest while committing nothing. That way
when a crisis arises, the United States will have a foot in the
door.
Only two, albeit inclusive, U.S. national interests in the
Pacific have been presented within the security realm:
preservation of the current global balance of power, and
prevention of regional upsets to that balance. The next question
to be addressed is how these interests will be protected by the
national military strategy presented by President George Bush in
his 1991/1992 National Security Strategy. That national military
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strategy is basic and encompassing enough that future
administrations should leave it fundamentally intact. Of special
interest here is how to establish where U.S. strategies for the
Pacific fit in to the overall U.S. strategy. President Bush's
four pillars are: strategic deterrence and defense,
reconstitution, forward presence, and crisis response. 45
In a very real sense, strategic deterrence can be fulfilled by
ensuring regional deterrence. Regional deterrence in the Pacific
can be demonstrated by maintaining the defensive capabilities of
various Pacific actors. The Taiwanese have a very real defensive
capability against an amphibious attack, given the air-to-ground
performance of the F-16. Because of its fighter purchase,
Singapore has a platform for air-to-ship missiles. The radar
configuration on Australia coupled with that nation's desire to
find a suitable airborne early warning platform (most likely the
Boeing E-3 Sentry) remove most hope for a surprise attack in that
region of the world. All of these forces have the United States
somewhere in the background.
Other efforts which would boost regional deterrence are joint
exercises. These do not have to be on a large scale, and they
can be either bilateral or multilateral, for instance a U.S.
exercise with ASEAN navies. Even a small-scale exercise allows
the U.S. to size up its opponents, while demonstrating that the
U.S. has potential allies in the Pacific. Also, what's small
45George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United
States, The White House, August 1991.
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scale to the U.S. Navy may go a long way toward increasing the
credibility of a regional navy. Shared intelligence can serve
the same role. This particularly would benefit the U.S., whose
intelligence community can fill in gaps due to sensor
limitations
.
Reconstitution calls for the ability of America to convert its
industrial sector to a wartime posture. This task is not as easy
as it was in 1941, when it was still a monumentous effort.
Today, a lot of systems and parts critical to a successful U.S.
warfighting effort are produced offshore, either by U.S. -based
internationals, or by foreign-owned companies. Successful
reconstitution now calls for guarantees that the sea lanes will
remain open to allow transport of the needed goods, and that the
producers will supply American needs. Those guarantees can best
be obtained through the cultivation of friendly relations with
the nations of the region.
Many printed circuit boards are made in Japan, South Korea,
and Singapore. Longstanding close ties exist with each of those
nations. The Malacca and Sunda Straits are essential to the
transport of material to the United States, so they must remain
open. Of course, those straits are also vital to Malaysia and
Indonesia, so a basis exists for civil dealings with those two
nations as well.
Maintaining a U.S. forward presence has been discussed
throughout this section as a premier way for the United States to
prove its continued engagement in the Pacific. Joint exercises,
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numerous and variously-scaled basing agreements, and shared
communications and intelligence nets make it clear that the U.S.
is actively involved in the Pacific region.
The ability to respond to a crisis is the last pillar of the
national military strategy, and it is the linchpin of U.S.
security in any region. Given the speed of modern combat and the
number of directions from which a crisis could develop, the
United States must maintain its flexibility. The pre-positioning
of troops in Japan and Korea gives the U.S. access to forces
already in Asia. A vast storage network encompassing many
countries decreases the strains of mobilizing from the homeland
and decreases the likelihood of having access to stores denied.
Area training and familiarity once provided by Clark and Subic
can be replaced by exercises in the region, and deficiencies in
familiarity with the adversary (or potential adversary) can be
overcome through intelligence sharing.
Overall, the post-Cold War security national interests of the
United States can be achieved with some post-Cold War thinking.
New agreements must reflect the growing stature of regional
actors such as Indonesia as well as the strategic might of
economic powers like Japan. The end of the Cold War has
presented a new strategic picture in the Pacific, with only the
Korean Peninsula offering any familiarity. The U.S. cannot
afford to withdraw from the Pacific and leave the region up to
regional actors--its free market economy (if nothing else) calls
for increased presence. Yet that presence can be maintained
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through a variety of ways, if United States policy makers
exercise flexibility and freshness. Through new relationships
the U.S. can preserve the current strategic picture and prevent
regional upsets to that picture.
B. POLITICAL NATIONAL INTERESTS
Itself one of the oldest continuous democracies, the United
States seeks to expand the spread of democratic government
throughout the world. Part of the motivation behind such a goal
is the enlightened nature with which Americans generally regard
the concepts of democracy. Indeed the very epoch which produced
the modern democratic theories is referred to as the
Enlightenment. There is a very real sense among American leaders
that democracy is the highest form of government currently in
practice. America has fought wars to "make the world safe for
democracy; " it still advocates a new world order based on self-
rule.
Coming back from the esoteric world of political theory,
however, the United States has very tangible reasons for
promoting democratic government in other nations. First, a
democratically minded world would tend to preserve the United
States' position of leadership (or at least a member of an
oligarchy) . This is because despite the faults, America still
looks upon itself as a model for democracy and free enterprise.
115
The United States has been governed by its citizens from its
very birth, and the strength of its institutions has propelled
the country to superpower and now unipower status. Such a success
story--albeit disputed by opponents, many of whom America has
outlasted--is still accepted as an example for nations which seek
advancement. As these nations choose democracy, they will be
welcomed into the "club," that family of powerful, representative
governments --with the United States at the front. Promoting
democracy advances America's own stature in the world.
Clearly, if the number of democratically-controlled nations
increases, the number of potential military adversaries of the
U.S. decreases. Certainly there is a great deal of evidence to
back the adage that democracies do not wage war on other
democracies. As the United States has practiced from the
Spanish-American War through the Persian Gulf conflict of
1990/91, the first step to prosecuting a successful conflict in a
democracy is to mobilize the sentiment of the populace before
mobilizing the troops. There is less likelihood of resorting to
war if a preliminary requirement is the mobilization of public
opinion. The desire to preserve the democratic "family" intact
has forced democratic nations to address their grievances through
other, less-bellicose methods.
The respect for democratic institutions tends to limit the
unpredictability of a nation's foreign policy actions. Leaders
of one-party systems or dictatorships are free to rule by whim,
usually protected against public backlash by an internal security
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force. Democratic leaders, on the contrary, have no such
protection from their citizenry and in fact depend on that
citizenry for their legitimacy. Therefore, democratic nations
are more likely to honor their obligations from international
treaties and negotiations. The transparency which accompanies
democratic governance makes it difficult to cheat on such
agreements for fear of discovery.
The best interests of the U.S. are served, then, when its
negotiating partners are more open and more predictable. Even
before New Zealand decided to place limits on the ANZUS treaty,
the potential for difficulty could be seen by American analysts
ten years prior to the policy decision, due to the open nature of
the New Zealand debates.
The free market system of the United States demands
unrestricted access to the inputs of its industries as well as
access to markets for its outputs. Such access can better be
guaranteed by democratic nations, whose open economies share the
same dependence on open access, than by tyrants. This
rationality gives more assurance to the United States that
critical lines of communication will not be arbitrarily disrupted
by some despot or some hegemonistic political entity.
The argument that promoting democracy is a valid American
interest does not mean that all democracies behave predictably
and rationally at all times. It does mean to suggest that with
more of America's counterparts (in negotiations, disagreements,
etc) sharing similar beliefs in the rule of law, representative
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government, and free market theory, the United States will have
an easier time achieving its other national interests.
Having stated that the U.S. is justified in promoting
democratic ideals, the next questions are obvious. Which ideals
should the U.S. promote, and how can those ideals best be
fostered abroad? The former question is easier than the latter.
One fundamental ingredient of a democratic government is a
popularly elected legislature capable of enacting meaningful
laws. Many countries have legislative bodies at various levels
of government. However, a body that is so poorly funded that its
members hold additional employment is doomed to incompetence and
conflict of interest. Furthermore, a functional legislature
needs a talented staff capable of researching a variety of issues
and keeping the representative in touch with his/her
constituency. Some newly emerging democratic legislatures need
training in the basics of law-making and its procedure.
These are all areas in which the United States can help,
although perhaps in unconventional ways. If the U.S. accepts
that democratic governments are more likely to become long-term
friends (or at least they are less likely to become enemies) , it
should also accept that any progress along the democratic road is
a plus for America. There are a variety of democratic forms of
government, each with characteristics better suited to particular
cultures. The United States should not try to export its
particular institutions. To do so would not only be
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interventionist but also detract from true government "of the
people.
"
Therefore the United States should contribute the resources
that are needed- -mainly credit--but should attach few strings.
Contributions are better channelled through nongovernmental
organizations whose very missions are examples of democracy in
action, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross.
The United States Congress should appropriate its contributions
on an ad hoc basis. That is the extent of the control. The
nongovernmental organization is then free to carry out its
mission according to its own procedures, not those of its donor.
This accomplishes two functions. First, it removes the
specter of the United States from the promotion of a specific
administration or institution. This alleviates the charges of
"American puppet" and fosters the legitimacy of the home grown
move for democracy. Second, this gives the nongovernmental
organization the funding and freedom it needs to carry on its
work according to its own established procedures.
Another fundamental component of democracy is a legal system
based on the rule of law. This prevents the central government
from arbitrarily arresting its citizenry, and it gives that
citizenry equality before the law, which is vital if they are to
seek redress for government abuses of power. A true justice
system permits citizens to address grievances against the state.
Such a system also relies on judges who decide cases based on
legal precedent and applicability of coded law. Finally, a
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meaningful justice system calls on the central government and its
local representatives to refrain from pressuring judge or jury to
reach a certain verdict
.
The United States certainly can pride itself on its
subscription to the rule of law, where even the President is
responsible to the courts. Therefore, the United States can
offer its legal system to be studied by foreign lawyers, judges,
and others involved in legal workings. International workshops
and lawyer or judge exchange programs can demonstrate to foreign
attorneys the workings of America's legal system. These programs
are less intrusive, and therefore more likely to gain the desired
outcomes, than a program of sending U.S. Justice Department
representatives overseas for example. And international
workshops have another plus: they illustrate a number of legal
systems, so that the intended reformers can pick and choose those
aspects best suited to their culture and country.
Perhaps the most necessary trait for a democracy is openness
or transparency, and that is brought about with freedom of the
press. Restating from above, one of the reasons America should
promote democracy is to gain some predictability in the foreign
policy of its counterpart nations. A free press reveals the
policy discussions and debates occurring in a nation, as well as
the popular sentiment which may ultimately sway the final policy
decision. A free press also makes it more difficult for a
government to abrogate its own laws and treaties, as doing so
bears unfavorably on the regime. Finally, an open press gives
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all that information to American policy makers who are then
prepared to present the arguments which can favorably (in the
U.S. opinion) influence the policy outcome. At a minimum, an
open press hopefully limits the surprises faced by U.S.
officials. That in itself can add to America's security.
No country can be convinced by another to open itself to
greater scrutiny; the push must come from within. Accordingly,
the best path the United States can pursue is to offer itself as
an example of a truly free press. As with the legal system, the
American media should invite foreign media personnel to work on
the U.S. staff for periods of at least six months. It can be
safely predicted that within that time frame, some world or
national event would arise which would demonstrate the paucity of
restrictions placed on U.S. news reporters. Again, international
media workshops and seminars have a role in demonstrating the
freedoms and limits endured by various national news agencies.
Certainly any nation which examines the U.S. legislative,
legal, and press systems will find shortcomings with each.
Abuses often occur precisely because of the freedom of action
each institution enjoys. But America can survive the scrutiny of
its institutions, especially if such scrutiny allows another
country to open its own institutions more than it had. The
United States can afford the criticism in exchange for the
progress of democratic ideals.
While promoting democracy abroad has both selfless and selfish
motivations, another U.S. stated and practiced national interest
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has mostly unselfish reasons. That is the promoting of human
rights
.
Although President Jimmy Carter is usually credited with
placing human rights issues on the American agenda, the leaders
of the post -World War II era considered human rights in such a
state of international decay that they sought to restore them
through the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. That document contains forty-seven international
standards of human rights, ranging from the freedom from slavery
to the guarantee of leisure time. 46
The promotion of human rights may not gain many tangible
benefits for the United States. However, the U.S. is justified
in seeking to raise the level of nations' behavior toward their
citizenry above some minimum standards set forth in international
agreements. A country or government which holds no respect for
its own citizenry can hold little respect for any agreements it
negotiates, nor deserves any trust in international dealings.
(Before casting off the last statement as opinion, one should
think of the United States' opponents and their human rights
records.) It is simply in the U.S. national interest to raise
the standard of international behavior to one of mutual respect,
and that can best be demonstrated by a country who demonstrates
respect for its own citizens.
46United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
General Assembly Resolution 217 A(III), 10 December 1948.
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There is one selfish motivation in promoting human rights
standards internationally. Given the complexity of the
international business environment, it is much more likely for
U.S. citizens to travel abroad to a variety of foreign
destinations. Their own safety and security cannot be guaranteed
once they leave the confines of the United States. Rather the
U.S. Consular Office abroad must negotiate with the home
government if any problem develops. The U.S. can feel a greater
assurance of the safety for its citizens travelling in those
countries who do implement positive human rights standards.
Certain provisions of the Universal Declaration are beyond the
scope of legitimate interference by outside nations, but the
United States has set its own minimum human rights standards
which it expects every nation to meet. These include: 1)
prohibition of torture and cruel and unusual punishment for
detainees; 2) no arbitrary arrests, detentions, or exiles, nor
clandestine arrests; 3) equality before the law, including the
right of each citizen to take the State to court to redress
wrongful imprisonment or the abatement of citizen's rights; 4) a
prohibition on convicting someone ex post facto.
It can be argued that dictating behavior to other countries is
interventionist. It is not interventionist to alter America's
behavior in reaction to countries with questionable human rights
records. That is how the U.S. has approached the promotion of
human rights. Many of the current U.S. aid and assistance laws
contain provisions for their alteration when the intended
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recipient has a full slate of rights abuses. The Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 states that:
No assistance may be provided under this part to the
government of any country which engages in a consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention
without charges, causing the disappearance of persons by the
abduction and clandestine detention of those persons, or
other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the
security of person, unless such assistance will directly
benefit the needy people in such country. 47
A similar clause is found in the Agricultural Trade Development
and Assistance Act of 1954. While these acts deny foreign
assistance to countries with poor human rights records, they in
essence control the spending of U.S. money and so are not in any
way interventionist. The United States, once it has established
that promoting human rights is a national interest, is free to
control its own laws toward achieving that interest.
Other U.S. policies are flawed, however, because they take
away the very type of assistance which is most likely to achieve
the U.S. goal. The first of these is the Arms Export and Control
Act. That it denies the sale and export of weapons to nations
with a history of using those weapons against their own citizenry
is understandable. The Act also, however, cancels all programs
under the International Military and Education Training (IMET)
purview. The IMET brings foreign military members in direct
contact with U.S. servicepeople through sending the foreign
47Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human
Rights Documents : Compilation of Documents Pertaining to Human
Rights, 1983, Committee Print, p. 27.
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members to U.S. military schools, and through military-to-
military exchanges.
Those exchanges are the most effective and least intrusive way
to alter the character of a nation's military. Those
participating in IMET are usually up-and-coming members of the
foreign military. These are the people who will later rise in
the ranks and fill the command positions. IMET offers an
opportunity to see the role of the military in American society,
and its limitations. IMET participants then return to their
native country with a fresh notion of a professional military
force. Those are lasting impressions that should not be
underestimated nor denied. By cancelling IMET, the U.S. removes
an example of how a military should interact with its society.
That example, especially when fostered and propagated from
within, can effect the long-term changes the U.S. seeks.
The United States directs its governors of international
banking commissions (such as the International Bank for
Reconstruction and its regional counterparts) to vote on
directing funding away from those countries who engage in human
rights violations. By contrast, the Foreign Assistance Act
serves to withhold preferential treatment from human rights
violators. That is a better reaction, and the difference is this:
voting against funding for particular countries actually takes
money out of their coffers. Withholding preferential treatment
means not rewarding a country because it is felt their behavior
warrants no rewards.
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The International Financial Institutions Act of 1977 may be
prolonging the problem, rather than solving it. Withholding
money for development projects increases or prolongs the poverty
of the target country. Long-term poverty itself decreases the
worth of those it affects, so prolonging it can only worsen the
lot of the poor. On the contrary, development programs such as
dams, agricultural aids, and factories increase the wealth of the
population. They also develop the target economy and bring it
closer to integration with the world economy. Once on the world
stage, the government's actions toward its own population come
under greater international scrutiny. At that point, the
improvement of human rights practices can be expected.
As the violating country's economy develops and it becomes
more dependent on foreign trade, the U.S. can exercise more
meaningfully its leverage with the Foreign Assistance Act
provisions. Once the economy is more developed, continued human
rights violations which lead to an end to American preferential
treatment will be seen as regressive. An early end to American
development is seen as maintaining the status quo. The former is
politically more costly.
There are nongovernmental organizations which promote human
rights, and these deserve the financial support of the United
States. Amnesty International and Asia Watch are two which
research charges of human rights abuses. Other organizations
such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and
the Catholic Relief Foundation also report on abuses they
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discover when working in various countries. As with support for
democracy-seeking groups, U.S. support should come with as few
strings as possible.
Finally, the human rights clauses in the various American
statutes make provisions for progress achieved. The U.S. should
consider early lifting of its bans on support if the target
country has made tangible improvements in its human rights
practices. The U.S. should move especially quickly in cases
where there has been a turnover in government and the new regime
has sought to correct past abuses. That positive support for
progress made is a clear motivation for further progress.
The last national interest to be discussed under this
political category could just as sensibly fit under either the
security or the economic categories, because in its
implementation it will affect both the security and the economy
of the United States. That national interest is the preservation
and restoration of the environment. It is discussed as a
political goal because the U.S. will have to interact with
virtually every country to achieve this goal.
There are a variety of issues grouped under the broad heading
of the environment, but three are selected here because of their
urgency and because each holds great potential for both progress
and conflict. The three are: preservation of the rainforests and
the biodiversity issue, global warming, and clean-up efforts
aimed at restoration.
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The issue of biodiversity brings the United States and its
partners of "the North" in direct conflict with "the South",
which possesses most of the remaining rainforests in the modern
world. Environmental researchers predict that up to fifty-
percent of remaining species are to be found in tropical
rainforests. The underlying issue for both sides is how to
proceed with development without sacrificing the environment.
The developed nations of the North are concerned about
biodiversity for more than lofty environmental idealism. The
world's pharmaceutical companies believe that species yet
undiscovered hold the ingredients for new medicines, and new
cures to old diseases. To validate their expectations, these
researchers need guarantees that those species will remain in
existence long enough to be discovered. That will not be the
case if the destruction of the remaining rainforests continues at
present levels.
The South does not have a diabolical plot to exterminate
species, but protecting their rainforests simply so the
industries of the North can seek profit is not enough motivation.
For one thing, the forests are a major source of income to
countries such as Brazil and Indonesia (holders of the two
largest remaining rainforests) . Their timber is in great demand
--mainly by the industrialized countries! For another thing,
much of the current destruction of forests is due to slash-and-
burn agricultural techniques still practiced by indigenous tribes
who live on the fringes of the rainforests. When one has a low
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standard of living, one tends to view trees as cooking wood, not
as things of nature to be preserved. The way to preserve the
forests--and the species they protect--is to raise the standard
of living of the indigenous people, and to encourage careful
development of any timber plots with an aim at replenishment.
Unfortunately, the North and South clash on this issue. It is
an issue which offers similar interests to both sides, but the
North does not see it that way. The opposing arguments' main
points were demonstrated clearly at the United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development in June of 1992, in Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil. The South wants the North to pay for either the
economic costs of preserving the rainforests, i.e., the profits
that would have been generated by the timber industry, or the
royalties from medicine sales if the key ingredients are based on
species found in the rainforest countries. The North, in this
case led by the United States, sees the issue as just another
ploy by the South to get development money out of the
industrialized world.
American President Bush refused to sign the biodiversity
agreement at Rio. The U.S. felt that signing such an agreement
would needlessly raise the development and production costs of
new materials, many of which would be synthetically reproduced in
labs north of the equator. This was a public relations blunder
in Rio, but it continues to be a fundamentally flawed policy.
First of all, no one told the industrialized nations to preserve
their natural resources while they were developing; exploiting
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those resources is what fueled the industrial fires. It is
therefore quite hypocritical for the nations who have "made it"
to tell the rest of the world not to follow their proven paths to
economic success. No underdeveloped or lesser developed country
wants to stay that way, and the fiscal resources have to be
generated somehow. The hypocrisy is magnified when the United
States continues to support its own timber industry, as it did in
May 19 92 (one month before the Rio Conference) by opening up
another 1700 acres of ancient Northwest forest to logging
companies
.
Another reason the American position deserves criticism is
that it seeks something for nothing. Neither Brazil nor
Indonesia--nor few of the other countries who still have a
sizable rainforest--have the scientific means to study and
exploit the species of the forests for profit. Therefore, if the
industrialized countries need to preserve the rainforests for
exploration, they had better be willing to pay for the
priviledged. The alternatives— complete management by the
countries where the forests are located, or destruction of the
forests in toto--eliminate any chance for profit by the North.
Call it a research cost, but if the potential is so great, it
should be worth the money for the chance. The American policy
seems to seek something for nothing. A more sensible policy, and
perhaps ultimately the only one offered, is to negotiate with the
rainforest countries for the guaranteed preservation of their
resource.
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The second problem in the environmental realm also exposed
itself at the 1992 Rio Conference, and again the United States
placed itself in the minority. The problem of global warming--an
unnatural rise in the temperature of the earth--is routinely
blamed on the noxious gases spewed out by automobiles and
factories. The United Nations Conference sought an international
agreement to lower the levels of pollutants produced by
industrialization. The United States sought to weaken the
agreement by lowering its target pollutant levels.
The main reason for the United States position is that its
scientists cannot offer substantial proof that global warming is
occurring at all. Not substantial enough for the Vice-
President's Council on Competitiveness, which argues that the
expenditures necessary to meet the targets far exceed the
expected benefits of doing so.
Many of the apocalyptic conclusions based on global warming-
left-unchecked depend on computer-generated models of the future
earth's atmosphere. Not one of these models, however, can
successfully predict the present condition of the atmosphere
given the proper inputs. 48 That constitutes a failure of one of
modelling's most basic tests. Also, global warming has occurred
on a more-or-less cyclic basis throughout the short history of
such recorded such data. Indeed, the winter of 1991/92 was one
of the coldest for much of the world. For every bit of evidence
A6Time Magazine, 15 June 1992, 35
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supporting the global warming argument, there is another bit
refuting the argument. Until the evidence mounts to prove that
global warming is occurring, the United States position will
remain unchanged. Domestic clean air laws will gradually reduce
levels of pollution, but not at such costs as will ruin America's
economic competitiveness.
This position transitions to the last point under
environmental interests of the United States. Where are
environmental resources better spent? Since 1970, the United
States has repeatedly enacted legislation to lower pollution
levels between its own borders. In the American opinion, the
situation has reached the point of diminishing returns. The
costs of further reducing pollution levels in the U.S. --from
relatively low levels by world standards to even lower levels-
exceed the costs of achieving greater amounts of progress outside
of the United States. Wouldn't American money be better spent by
reducing the pollution levels of other countries, bringing their
factories up near American standards?
While this was not addressed in June at Rio, this is a policy
the United States should consider. The current Clean Air Act
allows over-polluting countries to "purchase" credits offered by
under-polluting companies. This premise could be expanded
internationally. Pollution credits can be earned when an
American company takes measurable steps to reduce the pollution
levels overseas. An example can be found in the auto industry.
Rather than raising the CAFE standards for fuel economy, which
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increases redesign, retooling, and a variety of engineering costs
for the auto manufacturers, offer pollution credits if these
companies lower the pollution output at one of their overseas
factories
.
This particular example would certainly clean the air near the
maquiladora zone 49 in northern Mexico, which would also help the
people on the U.S. side of the border breath easier. By offering
the auto manufacturers the choice of meeting new CAFE standards
or earning credits, they can determine which costs can best be
afforded; either way, the earth's atmosphere is the benefactor.
Other industries offer their own alternatives.
Few in the American government argue that preserving and
restoring the environment is detrimental to the nation. America
must and does understand that it is only one passenger on the
Goodship Earth. The climatic changes brought about by
deforestation half a world away influence the wind patterns that
affect Americans. That increased environmental awareness is a
national interest is best proven by picturing the state of the
United States in a period of continued (or more rapid)
environmental decline. The United States needs to accept that
what it can do to improve the current situation it should do;
49The maquiladora zone is located on the Mexican side of
the U.S. -Mexican border and is home to several industrial
plants belonging to American-owned corporations. The Zone was
established in 1965 as a conscious effort of the Mexican
government to stimulate employment and development while
curbing illegal emigration to the United States.
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given its resource and technology base compared to much of the
world, the U.S. can do quite a lot.
What it must first do is lead by example where it can, as by
ending the deforestation of its ancient forests. Next, it must
offer assistance and development alternatives to developing
countries; hungry people care little about long-term
environmental impact. American bioresearchers should not seek
something for nothing, lest they be subject to environmental
blackmail. Finally, given the global scale of the problem
America should accept progress anywhere as progress everywhere
and support creative methods of reducing pollution levels. There
are certain things the United States can't afford not to do.
C. ECONOMIC NATIONAL INTERESTS
Even before the Soviet Union collapsed, many strategic
planners and political analysts were pointing out that a shift
was on from a world dominated by the political and military
competition of two superpowers to a world dominated by economic
relationships. This new world has similar characteristics to the
old one: weaker and stronger competitors, blocs of nations with
shared interests and needs, and the potential for wars. But the
differences between the old world and the new are noteworthy.
Whereas the Cold War centered around two military superpowers--
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the post-Cold War world currently
centers on three economic superpowers. They are the United
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States, the European Community, and Japan. The East /West blocs
have disintegrated, replaced by more natural regional groupings
such as NAFTA, APEC, and an EC which includes many Eastern
European countries. Finally, whereas the Cold War confrontation
revolved around different political ideologies, its winners were
capitalists. Now each nation competes for the primacy of its
particular capitalist system.
The United States has long championed the capitalist
system characterized by laissez-faire, free markets, and
competitive advantage. It is challenged by managed trade, closed
markets, and unrestricted marketing practices. To prosper in
this new age of economic primacy, the United States has the
following national interests: reduction of its massive deficits
in both long-term debt and current account, promotion of free and
fair trade, and improving U.S. competitiveness internationally
including capitalization of U.S. competitive advantage.
Having a current account deficit or a long-term debt is
not unusual nor is it economically unhealthy; anyone who has
financed a home or car knows that. However, the United States is
predicting a $290 billion current account deficit for 1993, and
that is a modest prediction. That means that in 1993, U.S.
expenditures will exceed revenues by at least $290 billion. Even
more astronomical, the long-term debt of the U.S. --which includes
the cost of short, medium, and long-duration government bonds--is
fast approaching $4 trillion!
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The real problem is the percentage of the U.S. budget
which has to be allocated to servicing the nation's debt. Since
1980, that percentage has grown from $53 billion and nine percent
to $199 billion and fourteen percent of government
expenditures! 50 That high debt-service ratio removes a great
deal of flexibility from U.S. policy makers, and that is where
the trouble of budget deficits lies.
That loss of flexibility forced former Secretary of State
James Baker to "pass the hat" to pay for Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm. The United States simply could not afford
to bear that entire burden. That looming deficit causes policy
makers to act or refrain from action based on fiscal, not
strategic concerns. More support is needed, for example, to
realize success in United Nations peacekeeping operations in
Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Cambodia. The United States, however,
can afford to pledge no more than it has. Granted in each case
there are deep problems that money will not solve, but the United
States has not conferred its dominant backing which becomes quite
evident when big dollar amounts are committed. That has forced
other actors to come to the front (such as Japan in the Cambodian
dispute) ; in some cases, no nation has stepped forward.
The limitations to American domestic policy are more
apparent. Given the current deficit, the United States cannot
50Warren Rudman, "The Federal Budget Deficit: It's Time
to Do Something for America, " Vital Speeches of the Day 58 (15
April 1992) , 388.
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follow its tried and true formula- -priming the pump--for
stimulating the sagging American economy. The tax cuts and
research grants which offer promise to many stalled industries
are simply too costly to tack on to current levels of debt.
Without those methods the U.S. must exercise patience and ride
out this cyclical downturn. That strategy has already cost one
American president his job.
It is not the purpose of this paper to formulate economic
policy; it is the purpose to explain that the U.S. must lower its
levels of debt if it is to regain the flexibility needed to
tackle the problems facing a superpower. Any successful
reduction of the deficit will have to come about from a
combination of increased revenues— through more efficient
corporate tax collection and less talk of tax cuts--and decreased
spending
.
The largest gains in the latter can be made by slowing the
planned rise in expenditures --Social Security, Medicare, federal
retirement programs. The 1992-1997 Congressional budget forecast
places the entitlement growth rate at over eight percent, for a
total cost of $800 billion to $1 trillion! 51 That amount saps
the potential gain from any peace dividend and certainly rules
out all tax cuts for any class. Without a quick return to fiscal
responsibility, the U.S. economy will remain stagnant for a long
time.
SIWarren Rudman, 3 89
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The introduction to this section mentioned the competition
of differing capitalist systems, characterized by more or less
government involvement in the business sector. The United
States' system is based on the notion of laissez-faire, roughly
translated into the less government involvement, the better.
Therefore, in the post-Cold War economic competition, the United
States must promote free trade and the international free market.
The advantages of truly free markets include increased
competitiveness, higher efficiency brought on by that
competition, and lower prices for the consumer. These are also
the goals and purposes behind the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) . An agreement between Mexico, Canada, and the
U.S., NAFTA offers duty-free passage of goods produced mostly
within North America. It encourages the free flow of investment,
technology, and labor across borders.
NAFTA has great potential for the U.S. economy. As
investment is attracted to Mexico because of lower wages, fewer
union problems, and less government restrictions, the Mexican
standard of living will rise. This in turn will increase the
area of overlapping demands between Mexico and its northern
neighbor. Also, over the fifteen-year implementation period for
NAFTA, tariffs on American goods flowing southward will be
reduced to zero. Both of these facts are very good for American
businesses. The overlapping demand curves increase the marketing
potential for higher-priced American goods and services; the
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lower tariffs increase the price competitiveness of American
products against their once-protected Mexican counterparts.
Critics argue that U.S. manufacturing jobs will go to
Mexico on the fast train because of lower wages and looser
restrictions. The counter is that these conditions already exist
in Mexico and already suck manufacturing jobs from America.
NAFTA is a way to turn the situation into a mutually beneficial
one. The reduction of tariffs means that those Mexican
manufacturers will now have to match or nearly match the output
of American workers before labor savings can be realized.
The best evidence that NAFTA will benefit America is its
predecessor, a free trade agreement between the U.S. and Canada
begun in 1988. As compared to pre-agreement levels,
intraregional exports between Canada and the U.S. increased by
one percent of the region's total exports, and external trade
increased by nearly two percent for both countries. 5/ While
these numbers are modest, numbers for other free trade agreements
have shown more positive growth over the ten-to fifteen-year
implementation periods; such information is obviously not
available for North America yet.
52Augusto de la Torre and Margaret R. Kelly, Regional
Trade Arrangements (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary
Fund, 1992), 20-21.
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Given that open-ended free trade arrangements 53 are
valuable to the U.S. economy, it is in America's interest to
widen the scope of NAFTA, either expanding its membership to
include other Western Hemisphere countries or linking it to
existing regional free trade areas. Such efforts should have the
following preconditions if they are to take advantage of
America's economic strong points.
First, any agreement must include the free flow of
services as well as products. The advertising,
telecommunications, legal, insurance, and airlift industries are
many of the areas in which U.S. firms enjoy a competitive
advantage. If left to market forces (unhindered by tariffs or
non-tariff restrictions), the United States should earn a large
market share due to relatively lower unit costs of these
services
.
Next, intellectual property rights must be given some
protection. This allows high technology firms to enjoy the full
returns on their research and development investments, rather
than having such rewards reduced through copyright infringement
or bootlegging. Again, this will help U.S. firms, especially in
the computer and biomedical fields. The profits lost to pirated
computer software and copied pharmaceutical drugs alone are
staggering--and largely affect U.S. companies.
"An open-ended free trade arrangement is one that imposes
no additional tariffs on non-members. It merely lowers the
existing tariffs between members.
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Finally, further U. S . -sponsored free trade arrangements
must work to reduce subsidies and state-sponsored trading in all
but the most critical (economically or politically) fields, as
determined through compromise. It is the habit of developing
countries to subsidize farmers of cultural staples, to keep the
agricultural sector gainfully employed, while simultaneously
discounting the price of those staples so that the country's
poorer citizens can afford them. This is not competitive
advantage at work. The United States has some of the lowest
production costs of grains in the world but often finds
restrictions placed on its exports. If potential trade partners
are eager to accept the manufacturing jobs, they must compromise
and let market forces dictate nearly all production flows.
Other free trade areas have been proposed, and it is in
the interest of the United States to push for their realization.
One in particular is the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation
council (APEC) . This grouping would combine the economies and
markets of much of Northeast and Southeast Asia with Canada and
the U.S. Competing for attention is the East Asian Economic
Caucus (EAEC)
,
proposed by Malaysia's prime minister, Mohammed
Mahatir. The EAEC excludes North America and Australia, and
therein lies its faults. Any preferential treatment offered
between the Southeast Asian nations ought not to ignore the
United States, because the American market absorbs more ASEAN
exports than any other.
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One further step could be taken by the U.S. in the
interest of promoting free trade, and that is to back off from
the current positions which threaten to render the Uruguay Round
of GATT negotiations useless. Progress has been made in the
round (which began in 1986) on reduction of non-tariff barriers
and acceptance of international copyright protection. The
current resolve demonstrated by European leaders to stand by
their agricultural subsidy programs is based more on domestic
politics than on international economics. With the added
pressures of the fluctuating European financial market and the
vote on the Mastracht Treaty for more formal European unity,
parliamentary leaders have to preserve current coalitions to make
progress on any front. The subsidy issue is perhaps best left
for another session. The progress made by this session of GATT
negotiations should not go unfulfilled.
For the U.S. to boost its economic output, more is needed
than free markets. The United States must increase its
competitiveness in the existing and future global markets. The
large trade surpluses enjoyed by Japan for so many years can be
attributed to two main reasons, both of which need to be
addressed by American policy makers and industry captains. Those
reasons are the superior quality of the Japanese (and now Korean,
Taiwanese, and others) industrial processes and unfair trading
practices by competitors. The latter includes subsidy programs
and non-tariff barriers (such as unnecessary inspections and
standards and horizontally-organized economic groupings called
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keiretsu) . These non-tariff barriers add costs to foreign goods
and/or prohibit foreign companies from gaining market access.
The former, increasing U.S. competitiveness, can be
accomplished a couple of ways. First, U.S. firms may
advantageously adopt "Japanese" 54 management practices aimed at
increasing quality and efficiency. Techniques such as
statistical control of production processes aim not at meeting
specifications, but at making each subsequent product an exact
copy of the preceding one. There is more than a subtle
difference. Just-in-time inventory techniques cut down on
capital expenses largely through the elimination of space wasted
by stock-piled inventory.
Total Quality Management and its derivatives are finding
favor with American firms, and they are producing very favorable
results. In the mid-1980' s the Xerox Corporation went on the
selling block because of its prolonged poor sales; no offers were
made. Within ten years of changing its management and production
philosophies the company has regained a respectable share of the
industrial copier market and again competes internationally.
Motorolla and IBM offer similar success stories. The rest of
America needs to learn from their own examples of how to compete
in the modern world.
54The Quotations appear because many of the so-called
Japanese management techniques were introduced in Japan by
Americans after World War Two. W. Edwards Deming and Joseph
Juran are two originators of these management techniques.
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The United States government has a role, too. Taking
advantage of the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Department of
Defense (mainly) needs to reexamine its restrictions on export of
high technology goods. This has hampered the marketing of high-
speed computer processors, optical equipment, and a host of other
military technologies with significant spin-off potentials.
While it is still dangerous to allow advanced technologies to
fall into the wrong hands, the U.S. should accept its Cold War
victory and the resulting security in the world as a whole. If
other U.S. policies are carried out, i.e., achieving regional
stability and stemming arms proliferation, the United States can
afford to assist its leading edge industries by removing barriers
to competitiveness.
These, then, are the economic interests of the United
States. It must be a priority to substantially reduce the
current level of debt in the U.S. economy. Until that happens--
and it will take years before a significant reduction is noticed
--the U.S. will be operating with one arm tied behind its back;
otherwise-sound policy decisions on the domestic and foreign
fronts will have to be foregone because of impossibility of
funding.
While the budget reductions are occurring, the U.S. cannot
ignore the fact that its economy is linked with the international
community; therefore it is a U.S. interest to promote the free
trade system on a world-wide basis, through the development and
expansion of regional free trade areas. As the economic system
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most -favorable to America is being put in place, U.S. companies
must increase their competitiveness on the world scene, through
both improved management practices and an easing of current
export restrictions.
D. INDONESIA'S PLACE IN U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS
In order to summarize this view of U.S. national
interests, this section will examine the place of Indonesia in
each of those interests. At times, Indonesia's policies and
desires mesh with U.S. objectives and strategies; at other times,
the two countries seem to move along different paths. Given the
U.S. position in the world and Indonesia's position in Southeast
Asia, it is likely that the two paths will cross.
Looking first to the security front, Indonesia possesses
no nuclear weapons nor large expeditionary forces, so the country
does not directly threaten the United States. The subject must
then turn to Indonesia's role in regional security issues, as it
is a U.S. interest to prevent regional upsets to peace. Here,
the U.S. and Indonesia seek many similar goals.
Two Southeast Asian locations are among the world's
hotspots: Cambodia and the Spratly Islands. In Cambodia, both
Indonesian and U.S. forces are on the ground as part of the
United Nations peacekeeping operation. Beyond that, Indonesia
has held numerous conferences throughout the Cambodian conflict
in an effort to reach a peaceful solution acceptable to all four
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warring factions. These efforts culminated in the 1992 Paris
Conference which defined the U.N. efforts. Peace on the
Indochinese Peninsula is in the interest of both Indonesia and
the United States.
Indonesia has also sponsored discussions to settle the
Spratly Island disputes. As a Southeast Asian country with no
claims to the disputed territory, Indonesia enjoys a special role
as intermediary. As with Cambodia, Indonesia does not want to
see war in its part of the world. War in Southeast Asia--no
matter what scale— lowers the world's opinion of the region's
stability. That in turn could mean fewer investment dollars from
Europe and North America, which is definitely not in the best
interests of Indonesia.
It is in reviewing U.S. political interests that Indonesia
and the U.S. seem bound to clash. As for the U.S. desire for the
spread of democratic nations, Indonesia claims that it is a
democracy- -one better suited to Indonesian culture than those
offered by the West. As for increasing the popular selection of
government, one recalls the Indonesian expression that voting
only starts trouble; it does not stop it. Given the diversity of
the Indonesian population, a truly representative government
might not be able to muster a majority of votes on any issue,
leading to political stagnation.
Promoting the rule of law is closely related to the desire
to improve human rights, because rule of law would limit the
arbitrary judicial decisions which in fact serve purposes other
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than the attainment of "justice". Furthermore, the human rights
issue opens up a sizable can of worms. The most basic problem is
that Indonesia holds a different view of human right standards
than the United States. Indonesians are not free to gather
publically, speak their minds, or write what they wish. Such
public "clamor" is likely to stir up animosity among different
factions of the population and ultimately disrupt national unity.
That will not be allowed to happen by the Suharto government.
Arbitrary detentions of dissident groups are enacted based on
similar arguments.
It may not be too much for the U.S. to ask the Indonesian
government to take measures to prevent a repetition of the Dili
massacre, in the minds of Americans. Even that, however, is
deemed interventionist by Indonesia, and the accusation of
meddling will come swiftly. To summarize the Indonesian view of
U.S. political interests, Indonesian domestic politics are none
of America's business.
As far as the environment is concerned, Indonesia is quick
to point out that no one told the West how to develop, and no
international conscience appeared to prevent the developed
countries from exploiting the earth for their own economic
betterment. That said, it is not the place of the developed
nations to tell the developing world that care should be taken.
Sustainable development, if it is to be realized in Indonesia,
will come about only if Indonesia perceives such a strategy to be
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in its own best interest. Little thought will be given to the
desires of the developed world.
Luckily for the United States, Indonesia does view
sustainable development as beneficial. That immediately brings
up the issue of cost and the question of who will pay for
environmental improvements. The Indonesian government believes
that each nation of the world should contribute based on its
ability to pay. This makes the U.S. bill considerably higher
than the Indonesian contribution, unless some new thinking
emerges
.
If Indonesia and the U.S. converge on security issues and
diverge on political issues, they waffle over economic matters.
Some U.S. companies have discovered that Indonesia is a source
for cheap and abundant labor. While this lowers production costs
for American goods, it also helps to open up a potentially
lucrative market of 180 million consumers.
Unfortunately, that market is not easy to break into. The
monopolies controlled by the Suharto children force entrepreneurs
to enter into joint contracts with specific holding companies, no
matter what better offers are available. In Indonesia, access is
everything, and access is gained through the Suharto clan.
Additionally, Indonesia does not believe in free market
economics to the extent the U.S. does. Oil, natural gas, and
other natural resources are controlled by the central government,
on the belief that these belong to no person or group of persons
but to all Indonesians. Also, Indonesian tariffs average above
148
thirty-percent to raise government revenue and to protect
Indonesian industries. Neither of these practices is consistent
with the U.S. belief in laissez-faire economics.
In sum, Indonesia understands the U.S. about as well as
the U.S. understands Indonesia. The United States' interests
demand that it promote itself worldwide to achieve those
interests. What constitutes meddling in Indonesian opinion is
translated as concern for fellow men and women in American minds.
Finally, the thought of economic matters determined solely by
market forces is not accepted by the Indonesian government who
holds the view that only the developed nations are ready for such
a state of affairs. Where U.S. interests involve Indonesia,
American diplomats will have to walk quietly on rice paper;
otherwise, Indonesian desires for nonintervention into Indonesian
affairs will stop the U.S. in its tracks.
E. U.S. PRIORITIES IN THE PACIFIC
This chapter has outlined the fundamental national
interests of the United States everywhere, including the Pacific
region. On the political front, some of the world's most-
repressive governments are in Asia: China, Burma, and Indonesia
to name a few. Environmental concerns usually pit the United
States and its Western partners against the Third World; indeed
any talk of rainforest policy forces interaction with Thailand,
Indonesia, and Malaysia.
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The security interests of the United States in the post-
Cold War world center on regional strategies, such as maintaining
a regional presence and preventing the emergence of regional
hegemons
. The Spratly Islands dispute, if it turns hostile,
could involve military forces from six Pacific countries. The
Cambodian peace efforts appear stalled over Khmer Rouge refusal
to abide by United Nations resolutions; that country is still a
tinderbox. Finally, China and India have revealed expansionist
strategies in their military planning and procurement. All of
these are direct challenges to American security interests.
As for economies, the economic future of the United States
rests in some part with the countries of the Pacific. Certainly
Japan receives the lion's share of the attention, but America's
second-largest trade deficit is with mainland China. As the
region moves toward some sort of economic grouping, the United
States needs to involve itself in the resulting entity. Finally,
the U.S. requires the markets of the Pacific, with their large
populations and maturing tastes. To establish itself in these
markets will take effort from both sides of the Pacific.
Given the potential for involvement with numerous Pacific
nations having many diverse factors in conflict, the United
States must establish its priorities for the region in
determining its policies. In achieving its own objectives,
United States policy must take into consideration the current
U.S. priorities for the region. With U.S. Pacific priorities as
a topic, Japan quickly comes to mind. The relationship with
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Japan must be repaired after the bilateral bashing of the past
few years. Given the changing strategic picture, ie the collapse
of the Soviet Union, the U.S. -Japan relationship is seeing
economics shift to the fore, edging out traditional security
concerns. The U.S. must pursue the Strategic Impediments
Initiative so that the two powerful economies can compete
peacefully, lest the entire relationship turn bitter.
The primacy of economics does not sanction the avoidance
of security concerns. U.S. bases in Japan allow the United
States to operate freely through the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
Those operations must continue if the United States is to
demonstrate its interest in regional affairs; therefore, the
bases should stay. Any talk of reducing the U.S. military
presence in Japan calls for some nation to assume the duties left
unfulfilled. No matter which nation is mentioned for such a
role, other Asian countries shudder, recalling history. To
believe that the region can truly be demilitarized is to ignore
the current realities of the Chinese and Indian weapons programs.
Traditional sparks have also been generated by various Southeast
Asian nations. The presence of the United States military serves
to prevent those sparks from igniting flames; it convinces
regional players to seek non-military options as much as any
other factor does
.
The United States and Japan are more closely linked--
politically, as Japan assumes a world role commensurate with its
economic power, economically, with each nation dependent on the
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other's markets for sustained growth, and in the security realm,
as both nations formulate their New World Order Pacific
postures --than either cares to admit. That relationship has
brought and continues to bring a variety of resources to the rest
of Asia. Therefore, the U.S. -Japan relationship must be
strengthened anew.
America's next priority in the Pacific is to finish the
Cold War, which means dealing with China and Korea. "Socialism
with Chinese characteristics" is resembling capitalism more and
more closely. With each step, strategists wonder how long free
world economic ideas can be imported without importing democratic
ideals. One might say, as long as the money flows. Yet the 1989
demonstrations at Tiananmen Square stirred more than just the
students; one can argue that the spread of support to the
laborers told Communist hardliners that it was time to halt the
affair.
In either case, America must decide how to interact with
the world's most-populous nation. Economic opening brings China
into the "family of nations" and decreases the risks of
irrational behavior such as selling nuclear technology, so such
opening should be encouraged. It cannot be encouraged at the
expense of all else, however. Human rights violations on the
scale of Tiananmen cannot be tolerated by a leader in the free
world. Any future violations should not be allowed to pass over
so quickly.
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Instead the United States should use every international
fora available to force China to abandon such practices or risk a
return to isolation. To do this the U.S. will have to convince
its principal allies that some things are more important than
economics. A concerted effort by China's main export markets can
alter the country's behavior without forcing it to take the wild
steps feared by opponents of such a policy. Whatever the final
policy (if policy is ever final), China is clearly the most
important Asian country to U.S. planners, after Japan.
Next are the two Koreas. While there are two Koreas, and
while one of them refuses to abide by internationally accepted
norms of behavior, U.S. resolve on the peninsula must remain
clear and clearly stated. That resolve is best demonstrated by
the continued presence of U.S. forces on South Korean soil. It
is easy to pull forces back; it is very difficult to redeploy
them should the need arise. When the issue of reunification is
ready to be addressed with genuineness and without the political
maneuvering of the past, then and only then can the U.S. reassess
the need for its forces. Before this happens, North Korea must
open itself to international nuclear arms inspectors. That is
the best indicator of Pyongyang's seriousness.
Turning to Southeast Asia, America's closest ally in the
region is Australia. The two nations share similar political and
economic ideologies, and they share security concerns. The next
priority for the U.S. is assessing the status of the ANZUS
Treaty. True the New Zealand government has not changed its
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policy regarding nuclear-armed or -powered vessels in its ports.
The U.S. has, however, altered its policies. U.S. navy ships no
longer carry nuclear weapons. If they decide to do so in the
future, it will almost assuredly be in response to a specific
threat, one most likely felt simultaneously by New Zealand.
Since the U.S. has gone halfway, perhaps the Wellington
government can be convinced to come the other half. It was the
weapons which caused the larger stir in the population. With
their removal, perhaps calmer heads can prevail.
Close relations with either Australia or New Zealand,
unfortunately, do not give the United States an inroad to the
rest of Southeast Asia. The two Anglo countries are considered
outsiders in the Chinese-Indian-Malay world of Southeast Asia.
Nevertheless, the United States must involve itself with
Southeast Asia. Currently it does so through bilateral relations
with the member states of ASEAN. The U.S. feels it has an
advantage in dealing with each country separately, where
decisions and agreements can be approved/disapproved based on
their own merits, unincumbered by regional rhetoric so readily
forthcoming from ASEAN, regional representative of the South in
North-South relations.
Right or wrong, those are the U.S. priorities in the
Pacific. Certainly no shortage of policy speeches has labelled
the U.S. -Japan relationship the most important one in the
Pacific. That attitude will not subside quickly. After Japan,
China must be considered if only because it is home to one-fourth
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of the world's population. There are better reasons than that of
course, as China is undergoing fundamental economic changes; the
world wonders if political changes will follow. Next, progress
is being made on Korean unification, and the U.S. is ready to
close that last remnant of the Cold War. North Korea is still
suspicious, however, so the U.S. must remain on the ground to
keep the situation rational.
After all that, the United States looks toward Southeast
Asia. Because of familiarity rather than sound policy,
Washington chooses to emphasize its regional involvement through
the Canberra and Wellington governments. To be taken seriously
in its expressed desire to preserve peace and stability, the
United States must tackle head-on the rest of Southeast Asia.
What will the new relationship be with the Philippines now that
the bases are gone? Does the removal of those bases give the
U.S. a better position to negotiate with Indonesia or Malaysia?
Is the visitation agreement with Singapore a workable model for
future agreements in the Pacific?
These questions are the U.S. concerns in Southeast Asia in
the next decade. These are the considerations under which the
United States will seek to further its national interests.
Nowhere does the promotion of democracy face greater challenges
than in Indonesia, Burma, and even Singapore (with its strict
controls over the population) . The security picture of the
modern Pacific forces the United States to reconsider each of its
current bilateral relationships, with an effort to catching up
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those relations to match the post-Cold War world. Finally,
development of closer Pacific economic relationships through
open-ended free trade agreements such as APEC is vital for the
U.S. economy to expand its export base and fuel other sectors of
its slow economy.
The United States certainly has a future in the Pacific.
To achieve its national goals in this arena, however, the U.S.
may have to break with traditional strategies. The Pacific is a
vibrant region, its countries are on the upswing. The United
States must show some forward thinking to maintain its place on
the region's front pages.
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IV. FORGING THE NEW RELATIONSHIP
The interests of Indonesia and the United States have their
areas of compatibility and difference. The goals of Indonesian
policy stem from the concepts contained in Pancasila and are: 1)
ensure the survival of the state by fostering national unity, 2)
maintain and preserve territorial integrity against all threats,
and 3) enhance and promote national development by capitalizing
on foreign aid and investment. The goals of American policy are
delineated in the Preamble to the Constitution: 1) form a more
perfect union, 2) establish justice, 3) ensure domestic
tranquility, 4) provide for the common defense, promote the
general welfare, and 5) secure the blessings of liberty.
The objective of this thesis is not simply to define the
interests of the two countries, but to re-examine the current
U.S . -Indonesian relationship to the purpose of concluding if --and
if so, how--that relationship can be improved upon, given the
policies each nation has pursued to protect and promote its own
interests
.
The Javanese characteristic of seeking compromise over
conflict will be used. The first step is to determine where the
two countries have mutual interests. Naturally, these shared
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interests are the likely areas through which closer ties can be
fostered.
There are areas, of course, in which Indonesian and American
policy concerns seem to diverge. In some instances, however,
these differences can be at least partially overcome so that the
relationship as a whole can continue to progress. What is needed
in these areas are new approaches to old impasses.
It can be expected that subjects will arise on which
reasonable governments can disagree, and Indonesia and the United
States are no different than any two countries. The areas of
disagreement will be reassessed in order to find a path to
improved relations.
A. COMMON INTERESTS
It is probably in the area of security where an improved
bilateral relationship would reap the most rewards. American
security interests include the prevention of regional disruptions
to peace. One of the potential hotspots is in Southeast Asia,
and that is the Spratly Islands dispute. Six countries claim all
or part of the Spratly Island chain; China and Vietnam exchanged
gunfire in the region in 1988. Now with the belief that there
are vast oil deposits under the islands, the stakes for claim
resolution are higher.
A battle over the Spratly Islands serves neither the U.S.
nor Indonesia. Such a battle would threaten the strategic
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Malacca and Sunda Straits, which the U.S. depends on for free
passage in the Indian Ocean. A battle in the South China Sea
would paint Southeast Asia as unstable and thus turn away
potential investors. Indonesia and the other ASEAN nations have
been fighting against such imagery for years; a Spratly conflict
would undermine their efforts.
It is clearly a mutual interest of the U.S. and Indonesia
to seek a peaceful settlement to the Spratly dispute, and both
countries have a role. Already Indonesia has hosted negotiations
with all Spratly claimants to seek a peaceful resolution. The
negotiations were somewhat successful, as all Southeast Asian
parties signed a pledge not to use force to resolve the issue.
Continued negotiations hosted by Indonesia as an interested but
uninvolved observer are vital to keeping regional peace.
China did not sign the use-of-force prohibition, however,
and prefers to pursue its objectives through bilateral talks.
This is where the United States comes in. The United States can
use whatever influence it has with Chinese leaders, which is
increasing due to the growing economic relationship between the
two countries, to bring China to the international negotiating
table. Given China's size and comparative military might in the
region, China will not lose its favorable bargaining position by
switching from a bilateral to a multilateral format.
There are potential solutions which enjoy appeal by most
parties. One is the joint development concept, in which
sovereignty is undisputedly reserved for China but all nations
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jointly develop whatever resources the territories possess.
Another idea is similar to the agreement reached by Australia and
Indonesia over the Timor Gap. This concept reserves sections of
territory for each country, over which it holds sole development
rights. In between these exclusive areas are regions reserved
for joint development, with profits being equally shared among
participants. Starting with these proposals and getting all
concerned parties to the same negotiating table, the Spratly
issue can be resolved peacefully, with some assistance from
Indonesia and the United States.
The Spratly Islands are the current hotspot, but Indonesia
shares with the United States the desire to maintain a secure
Southeast Asia. This can be done with America's "new" tactics
for security negotiations: diplomacy, counterbalancing military
sales, and use of regional surrogates.
One of Indonesia's growing security concerns is the Indian
Navy, given its submarine procurement strategy and its desire to
secure the Andaman and Nicobar Islands as necessary. While
Indonesia does have submarines of its own as well as air and
naval vessels capable of defending against an amphibious attack,
Indonesia lacks ample antisubmarine (ASW) assets to counter the
Indian threat
.
The United States could sell Indonesia P-3 Orions, which
have the ability to locate and destroy enemy submarines. The
U.S. could also sell sonobuoys, which could be dangled from
Indonesia's own helicopters. As in the current deal which
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provides American F-16 fighters to Indonesia, some of the
production for the ASW equipment and platforms could be done in
Indonesia. This would add jobs and technology to Indonesia,
sweetening the deal
.
The security of the region can be maintained through
continued U.S. presence, and members of both governments have
stated that opinion publicly. Permanent American bases on
Indonesian soil are not the way to maintain that presence,
however. More progressive alternatives are available. One is
the reciprocating use of each other's military facilities. The
United States, for instance, could use the Indonesian navy's
repair facilities at Surabaya (on Java) as well as the air force
practice ranges at Siabu, Kiau. This would provide access to
facilities near critical straits as well as area familiarity for
U.S. fighting forces.
On the other side of the agreement, the U.S. could offer
Indonesia use of its air training ranges in Alaska, which would
give the Indonesian Air Force a place to train during the monsoon
season. Additionally, use of P-3 simulators could provide the
Indonesian Navy realistic ASW training in a peaceful environment.
The United States could also maintain its Southeast Asian
presence by conducting multilateral exercises, including
Indonesia. While the two countries currently carry out joint
exercises, these could be expanded to include other countries,
such as Singapore, Thailand, or Australia. This would
demonstrate that the U.S. is interested in working with all non-
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hostile governments toward the attainment of regional peace.
This would also increase the interoperability of the region's
military forces and perhaps alleviate mutual fears.
Many Southeast Asian nations have a latent fear of the
military picture in Southeast Asia should U.S. presence decline.
Given American budget woes, that presence is likely to decline,
but it need not be feared. The United States could limit its own
presence by patrolling with other regional powers, especially
India and Japan. Those two powers instill anxiety in many
Southeast Asian leaders; such anxiety would surely increase if
either nation expanded its military presence. If that presence
were checked by American forces working at their side, however,
the anxiety level could be reduced.
This co-patrolling serves the needs of the U.S. and
Indonesia. The idea allows the United States to patrol the same
areas it has in the past while committing a reduced level of
resources to meet budget constraints. For Indonesians who
generally view the U.S. as non-expansionist, the U.S. forces
would provide a check on the growth of Indonesia's potential
adversaries. As a Malaysian official once said, "It is futile to
depend on the United States to maintain [Southeast Asian]
security, but folly to depend on Japan."
One contemporary security issue unites U.S. and Indonesian
interests of regional stability, and that is the restoration of
peace to Cambodia. Both countries were encouraged by the
decisions of the Peoples Republic of China and the government of
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Vietnam to curtail financial and military backing to their
respective Cambodian factions (the Khmer Rouge and the Cambodian
Peoples Revolutionary Party, respectively) . Also, both countries
have peacekeeping troops on Cambodian soil as part of the U.N.
effort
.
For Indonesia, peace in Cambodia will bring peace to the
Indochinese Peninsula, an area Indonesia is eager to invest in.
That regional peace will also make Southeast Asia a more sound
place for foreign investment, something desired and needed by
Indonesia. For the U.S., a peaceful end to fighting in Cambodia
will hopefully displace once and for all the Khmer Rouge,
tyrannical by American standards.
As for how to achieve that peace, the U.N.'s three-phased
plan is a good beginning. That plan calls for 1) an end to
hostilities, 2) the disarmament of the three rival factions and
U.N. oversight keeping the government's army in check, and 3)
national elections in May 1992. Unfortunately, phase two is a
sticking point, because the Khmer Rouge has thus far refused to
turn in their weapons.
Indonesia, as a regional actor and member of the U.N.
force, may be able to keep all factions talking, as the Jakarta
government has sponsored dialogues on Cambodia in the past and
was co-chair for the Paris Conference in 1992, which formulated
the U.N. plan. The United States may also work with the PRC to
convince the Khmer Rouge to disarm and let the U.N. plan
continue. This is a possibility because of China's own desire
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for peace in Indochina, for its own security and economic
interests. There is room for Indonesia and the U.S. to work
together toward peace for Cambodia.
All of these security concepts serve to promote a better
relationship between Indonesia and the U.S. These concepts treat
Indonesia as a regional power and an equal member of the
community of nations. They also merge some of the security
strategies of the two countries, which may provide the United
States with a regional partner through which it can address
shared concerns in other issue areas.
Leaving security issues for economic matters, one area is
of equal concern to nations of the North and the South, so the
U.S. and Indonesia are no exceptions. That area is debt
reduction. Indonesia's total foreign debt is $66 billion, with
one-tenth of that coming from the current account deficit. That
places Indonesia with a debt-service ratio exceeding thirty-five
percent! 55 Certainly, such a situation is not good for any
country
.
From Indonesia's standpoint, one-third of all revenues
must go to service debt. That pulls money directly out of the
coffers for agricultural projects, transmigration strategies, and
military expenditures. Also, such outstanding foreign debt
limits the true independence of the Indonesian government, no
matter how reluctantly they admit it.
ss1992 Asia Yearbook, 124.
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If the worst case were to come true--that Indonesia had to
reschedule its debt or default altogether— shock waves would
begin in Jakarta and reverberate throughout banks in Asia,
Europe, and North America. That in turn would make it very
difficult for Indonesia to raise future funds for continued
development; it would certainly decrease the attractiveness of
Indonesia as a target for investment dollars (or yen)
.
The current debt-service ratio is dangerously high, and
Indonesia has taken steps to lower it in the next five-to-ten
years. The United States shares the world's interest in seeing
Indonesia achieve that goal. More money in Indonesia's cash
reserves means more money for exports --American exports included.
That is combined with the fact that the United States could
achieve some of its other goals while cementing relations with a
regional power, itself a strategy on the U.S. agenda, by
assisting the Indonesians.
The key is creativity. For example, the U.S. could work
with Indonesia to "swap" external debt for internal debt. In
this concept, debts owed to the United States could be converted
into debts owed to the Indonesian government. Those debts are
then repaid by investing the money in specified projects, to be
jointly agreed upon by the governments concerned. In one sense,
it is forgiveness of debt; in another sense it is the dedication
of funds to projects aimed at national development. The hope is
that with national development will come long-term economic
165
stability, which is good for American companies looking for sound
foreign investments.
Another method would link retirement of debt with
preservation of the environment, two mutual interests. In these
so-called "debt-for-nature swaps, " championed by German
Chancellor Helmut Kohl 56 and other eco-policy makers, money
earmarked for debt repayment can be used by the debtor nation for
the development of ecological tourism spots (such as Indonesia's
vast rainforests), conservation preserves for plants and
wildlife, and other environmentally-based projects. Whereas the
debt swap is more of a "gracious" effort extended by the loaning
country, these debt-for-nature projects convey the acceptance
that improvements in the environment are capital themselves which
(if one agrees with that precept) can certainly be accepted as
repayment for monetary debt.
The United States can use debt relief to achieve interests
regarding Indonesia in other than the economic or environmental
purviews. As the U.S. wants to stop human rights abuses abroad,
and as the November Massacre in Dili, East Timor brought
Indonesia to the temporary forefront of human rights violators,
debt relief can be--dare it be said and not immediately
discarded—linked to human rights practices in Indonesia with a
different approach than that usually taken by the U.S. Congress.
56Janet Walsh Brown, ed., In the U.S. Interest: Resources,
Growth, and Security in the Developing World, (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1992), 50.
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If the U.S. insists on considering Indonesian human
rights, why not link partial cancellation of debt with
improvements in human rights practices, the carrot approach? For
example, the allowing by Indonesia of open and unrestricted
inspections by the United Nations Human Rights Commission--of
which Indonesia is a member—would remove a real barrier to
examining Indonesia's human rights policies in action and should
be good for, say, $10 million in U.S. -owed debt. By using the
reward approach, the debt relief is there for the taking.
Indonesia must decide its priorities. There is no punishment for
inaction, however, which never brings two countries closer.
In each of these debt relief methods, the underlying
principle is the same. For something Indonesia wants (debt
relief) , the United States is setting the price at something it
wants. The theory of supply and demand will dictate the success
of these program options.
Handling Indonesia's debt is not the only shared interest
of Indonesia and the United States. The former seeks to fund its
national development through foreign investment as much as
possible. Indonesia views foreign investment as the most
efficient way to provide capital, technology, and employment for
its population. American corporations wish to reduce operating
costs where possible to maintain competitiveness in the world
market; often this means setting up industrial plants overseas.
These corporations also seek to establish themselves in the
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emerging markets of Southeast Asia. Both countries, then, seek
to expand U.S. investment in Indonesia.
Both parties have precursors to increased American
investment, but therein lie the bases for compromise. Indonesian
prerequisites for accepting foreign aid (in theory at least)
exist to further those programs aimed mainly at increasing the
export base, quicken the transfer of technology, and add jobs for
Indonesians. American corporations looking at Indonesia's
investment potential require the supporting infrastructure
(roads, power, communications), streamlined bureaucratic
procedures with limited hold-ups, and freedom to operate with
minimum interference from the existence monopolies, which raise
their costs and make Indonesia less attractive.
The two sets of prerequisites can be met through the
widespread use of build-operate-transf er (BOT) contracts. In
BOTs, an American firm would contract to build a new power plant,
highway, communication network, etc. in Indonesia. That firm
would operate the project for a period of ten years or more,
during which time rates would be charged to the government. At
the end of the operating stage, the project would then either be
sold or turned over to the Indonesian government.
Such BOTs have been used in China and the Philippines with
success. The advantages to participating parties are apparent.
Indonesia would get its infrastructure developed without a cash
outlay. During the operating stage Indonesians would be taught
how to run the project as part of the agreement. Finally, the
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plant would be operated solely by Indonesians. The government
and the contractor would negotiate the price including
depreciation, which would result in a bargain price for
Indonesians and a profit margin for the American corporation.
Furthermore, by contracting with the Indonesian government
directly, the permit process as well as the other bureaucratic
procedures should be facilitated.
BOTs can go hand-in-hand with Indonesia's transmigration
project, whereby Indonesian citizens are relocated at government
expense to lesser populated regions. By using BOTs to develop
potential transmigration destinations (which are normally on the
smaller, malaria-infested islands which have little arable land)
to the point of decent habitability
,
perhaps the Indonesian
government could attract more prospects to the program and
alleviate U.S. concerns about the program. At these
transmigration destinations, most-needed are utility provisions
such as water and power, and opportunities for meaningful
employment. Little of this land is arable, but it could support
agricultural processing and refining plants. The crucial factor
is that someone has to pay the bill for these undertakings.
Therefore, enter the BOT concept.
The BOT idea has an additional incentive for American
companies. It would open up Indonesia's service sector to
competition from American firms. Sophisticated operations rely
on sophisticated communications, marketing, and insurance
support, for example. The BOT contract could include provisions
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for American service companies to enter Indonesia, if only for
the BOT builder at first. That would at least get the foot in
the door, and it is not too much to ask in return for reduced-
rate infrastructure.
Whether the method is BOT or traditional investment
contract, Indonesia holds investment potential in areas other
than water plants and bridges. It is estimated by the World Bank
that Indonesia will become a net importer of petroleum by the
early 21st Century; that certainly does not bode well for a
member of OPEC! In seeking alternate sources of fuel, to include
coal and nuclear, Indonesia is looking for help wherever help can
be found.
While the United States would not offer the technology for
nuclear plants, American coalmining companies and refiners for
clean-burning coal would welcome the chance to operate in
Indonesia. As of July 1992, they have that chance, because
Indonesia's Department of Mines opened the coal mining sector to
foreign investors. 57 Thus far bidding is only available for
contracts in eastern Indonesia, to meet the country's goal of
diversifying from Java and Sumatra. This should not turn Western
mining companies away. The risks of mining the lesser developed
east could be offset by rewards for early project success.
There is plenty of room for American firms in Indonesia,
as evidenced by the successes enjoyed by Nike, Inc., Hewlett-
57
"Jakarta Re-opening Coal Mining to Foreign Investors,"
Far East Economic Review, 16 July 1992, 59.
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Packard, and others. Indonesia's cheap labor supply lends itself
to labor-intensive manufacturing jobs, while the government's
desire for technology transfer can be accomplished through joint
ownership of the factories.
One word of caution is necessary. Potential U.S.
investors should not tie all of their investments to monopolies
controlled by President Suharto's family. Suharto is seventy-
years-old and although in good health is not expected to remain
in office past 1998. Given the increasingly open criticism of
his family's business practices, including remarks made by the
leader of the People's Consultative Assembly, their current
favored status cannot be guaranteed after Suharto is gone.
Already the awarding of two recent power plant contracts to a
holding company not controlled by Suharto kin- -which competed
with Bimantara, controlled by Suharto's son Bambang 58 --is a sign
that some members of the government view the monopolies as
detrimental to Indonesia's development.
Continuing on the shared economic interests of Indonesia
and the United States, both countries would be better served by
the implementation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
council (APEC) than by the exclusive East Asia Economic
Caucus (EAEC) . APEC is composed of representatives from both
sides of the Pacific; unlike EAEC, APEC admits the United States,
58
"Mission Accomplished, " Far East Economic Review, 11
June 1992, 6.
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Canada, and Australia. Its working groups address trade, energy-
development, technology, and investment issues.
While not as formal as the European Community, APEC does
provide a forum in which the major Pacific economic powers can
address issues vital to the region. Certainly the EAEC would
also do this, but the fact is that America is a Pacific economic
power and cannot be ignored. America absorbs more Indonesian
exports than any other country but Japan. 59 ASEAN countries are
the fifth-leading destination for American exports. It would
make no sense whatever to keep America out of the ASEAN region or
even to reduce its involvement.
The EAEC is backed primarily by Malaysian Prime Minister
Mahatir Mohammed for nationalistic reasons. Mahatir desires a
forum in which Asian powers (most notably Japan) determine their
own economic paths unencumbered by the intrusions of the West.
While his position is partially valid, his results could be
achieved through greater cohesiveness among the Asian economies.
Until that is evidenced, Mahatir 's goal will not be reached by
any exclusionary economic grouping.
The United States has received help from Indonesia in
blocking the EAEC. In keeping with their Javanese tradition of
accommodating all parties, Indonesia said that the exclusive
nature of the EAEC was not in the region's best interests. Given
S9
" Trade Surplus Plunges 33.8 Percent in 1990," The
Jakarta Post, 5 April 1991, p. 4, as translated in Foreign
Broadcast Information Service--East Asia, 19 April 1991, p.
56.
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that Indonesia cannot support its development goals with Asian
aid and investment alone, Indonesia's accommodation is assuredly
self-serving
.
B. WHERE DIFFERENCES MAY BE RECONCILED
If improving the U. S . -Indonesian relationship were as
simple as following the formulae above, it probably would have
been done by now. Naturally the two countries have concerns on
which they disagree. Some of these problem areas, however, see
both countries trying to achieve similar goals, but through
different strategies. In these cases, a fresh approach with an
eye on compromise and consensus, can reduce these obstacles so
that they do not impair the overall relationship.
One such area concerns environmental preservation and
restoration. At the June 1992 Rio Summit, Indonesia signed many
of the agreements the U.S. either balked at or tried to water
down. On the other hand, Indonesia did not sign a treaty calling
for a move away from petroleum-based industry. America,
meanwhile, attempted to paint the summit as another forum in
which the South tried to get money from the North.
Both countries clearly have a stake in protecting the
earth's environment. Indonesia with its vast rainforests must
find ways to protect them from slash-and-burn agriculture and
lumber poaching. The United States' own wind and moisture
patterns are affected by the worldwide decrease in vegetation.
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In these forests lies the common interest on which progress can
be made
.
Indonesia depends on lumber products for income, so it
needs to ensure the sustainable development of its forests. A
major threat to those forests is fire, which claimed one million
hectacres in 1991. 60 Some of those forests could be saved by
early spotting and response, and the United States can help. The
Landsat earth monitoring satellite has the capability to spot
flare-ups and relay the information to its earth stations in the
U.S. That information could be quickly retransmitted to
officials in Indonesia, giving them an early warning.
There is more the U.S. can do, because early warning of a
fire does not extinguish it. The U.S. could sell (at a reduced
rate) older C-130 aircraft re-fitted for dropping fire retardant
.
The C-130s could easily make the trip from Java to Kalimantan in
little time. In addition to dropping fire retardant, the C-130s
could be used to air-drop fire fighters onto the scene.
The United States wishes to preserve Indonesia's
rainforests for reasons other than their effect on the climate.
It is estimated that over fifty-percent of the remaining species
inhabit the world's rainforests. This biodiversity, it is
believed by American scientists and other researchers, could hold
the key for new foods, pharmaceutical cures, and who knows what.
Despite that potential, the United States government shied away
60World Bank Figure.
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from any agreements regarding tactics to preserve biodiversity at
the Rio Summit. This contrasted with Indonesia, who sought
methods and funding to preserve the habitats of so many species.
As in other problems, Indonesia and the U.S. share a goal:
preservation of habitats to maintain biodiversity. What is
needed is a shared method to achieve that goal. This is not
impossible, but it may not sit well with American companies or
the Council on Competitiveness.
It appears that the American research industries want
something for nothing. They want to have access to the
rainforests, so they may study the plants and animals. Once
substances are found that have marketing potential, such as new
medicines, these researchers want to reproduce the compounds back
in America. Their feeling is that they should not have to pay
any royalties to the host government, since only enough of a
substance will be removed to allow synthesis elsewhere. That is,
something for nothing.
These companies should realize the vulnerability of their
position. If Indonesia and other rainforest countries deny
access altogether--as is their sovereign right--or if the forests
are depleted before new finds can be made, there will be no new
medicines or anything else. Of course, if Indonesia allows its
forests to be depleted, it will lose arable land as well as a
source of export material. There is a shared interest, then, to
develop the rainforests in a responsible, sustainable manner.
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One way is through research contracts between American
firms and the Indonesian government. In such contracts,
interested companies would pay to have guaranteed access rights
to a large plot of rainforest (implying a guarantee that the plot
will be protected from lumber companies and other users) for a
period of five to ten years. During that time the American
research firm would enjoy free reign to carry out its search for
new materials, to be synthesized elsewhere.
The money from the contracts would be designated by
Indonesia for forest conservation projects, such as plantations
of faster-growing trees to meet the demands of the timber
industry. Money could also go toward agricultural instruction
and fertilizer to allow native tribes to switch from slash-and-
burn techniques to more efficient methods.
While the linking of research access with forest
preservation would increase American costs, it would guarantee
access to new materials. The alternative— ecological blackmail-
would be even more costly.
Another area where Indonesia and the United States have
tremendous differences is in the protection of human rights.
Indonesia believes that its citizens have certain obligations
toward the state, such as preserving its unity rather than trying
to divide it into several smaller countries. The United States,
joined and usually led by the European Community (at the urging
of Portugal and Holland), decry the Indonesian government's
handling of those seeking to air an opinion toward greater
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representation. Indonesia calls such action by foreigners
meddling.
The latest example of the differing human rights attitudes
came in response to the November 1991 massacre in Dili, East
Timor. Two soldiers convicted of violating orders by firing on
the crowd received sentences of three years or less. Meanwhile,
two protesters who survived the attack were sentenced to at least
nine years. Following Indonesia's thinking, the more serious
violations were committed by those who sought to stir up anti-
government and/or separatist sentiment, because such sentiment
makes it more difficult for the Indonesian government to improve
the lot of all Indonesians. American thinking found it
incredible that the two murderers could be all but pardoned
because they were in the security forces, while peaceful
protestors were locked in prison for a decade.
Such divergent attitudes will not converge in the near
future. Perhaps some changes can be effected on the fringes,
though, without compromising either side's principles. First of
all, Indonesia should allow investigations of human rights
violations to be carried out by the United Nations Human Rights
Commission, of which Indonesia is a member. Unrestricted access
to this world body would perhaps be viewed as less intrusive and
therefore more acceptable to the Indonesian government.
The United States should rely solely on the reports of the
U.N. commission, rather than try to obtain its own information
(clandestinely) . These reports can then be used to determine
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American reactions to confirmed abuses, but those actions should
change from their present form.
Because of the Dili affair, the U.S. Congress cut off aid
to Indonesia for 1992. The affected aid included military
education and training (IMET) , special grants under the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) , and contributions made
through the Consultative Group on Indonesia (formally the
Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia, IGGI). As Representative
Anthony P. Hall said to the Congress, "The Congress can both save
money and stand for principle in terminating aid to
Indonesia . " 61
If those are the two U.S. concerns, here is another
solution. Cut the GSP, as a way to signal to Indonesia that
continued human rights abuses will affect their relations with
other countries. There is no reason why the U.S. should exchange
preferential tariff privileges with a country which abuses its
citizens. This also signals a link between democratic principles
and unrestricted trade. But that should be the extent of the aid
curtailment. Any other cuts serve to exacerbate the long term
problem.
Cutting IMET funds, for example, limits contact between
the Indonesian military and the American military. This contact
allows the Indonesians to see firsthand the restricted role of
the military in America and provides a positive example for up-
61Congressional Record, 14 May 1992
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and-coming Indonesian military professionals. Cutting grants for
development projects simply stagnates the low standard of living
of Indonesian citizens. People who are worried about their next
meal have little spare time to challenge their government's
practices. The U.S. should be promoting the development of
Indonesia's economy; once developed, that economy will be forced
to interact with all outside governments to prosper. That in
turn may increase the leverage of the U.S. to seek human rights
improvements
.
Current human rights provisions within U.S. aid laws
permit the U.S. to restore aid if human rights practices show
progress. This tool is more effective than cutting aid. Partial
restoration of GSP, or entirely new funding for development
projects could be offered as incentives for the Indonesian
government to alter its policies. The reward approach is less
controversial: the rewards are there for Indonesia's taking. If
the government values them, it will change its policies. If it
does not, the overall relationship remains the same.
In short, cutting all aid limits contact, and decreased
contact limits influence. It is only through increased contact
that America can hope to persuade Indonesia to change its
policies. Cutting money for development slows such change, as
neither the government nor its citizens have the resources to
allocate for change.
Certainly Indonesia and the United States have different
opinions on such problems as rainforests, biodiversity, and
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treatment of their citizens. Even so, there is still common
ground on which to base continued dialogue. Both countries
should take advantage of that common ground to maintain contact
.
Without that contact, and without periodic agreement, the
relationship will flounder. If that happens, the interests of
both countries will suffer.
C. KNOCKING HEADS
No matter how many approaches the governments of Indonesia
and the United States take toward addressing their bilateral
relationship, some areas exist in which the countries hold
opposing views. These areas will not go away in the near future,
so policy makers on both sides must decide what emphasis to place
on these differences, given their view of the importance of the
U. S . -Indonesian relationship.
One of these areas is the Indonesian notion that aid can
come without strings. Indonesia has refused aid even for
projects it truly needed, simply because the lending country made
a few demands to accompany the aid. Often these demands
concerned democratic practices. One example is the dissolution
of the IGGI by Indonesia after member nation Holland condemned
the 1991 Dili massacre. In addition, Indonesia prohibited all
nongovernmental organizations from operating in Indonesia if they
received financial support from the Netherlands.
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Concisely stated, no aid comes without strings. No nation
gives up any of its hard-earned resources unless such aid serves
some mutually beneficial purpose. Indonesia might attract more
assistance if it did not hold to its "no aid with strings"
pledge. It is true that IGGI's successor, the Consultative Group
on Indonesia, still pledged as much support for 1992 as was
promised by the IGGI, but the simple fact is that Indonesia would
have received even more assistance if the Dutch were included.
The United States' policy on foreign aid needs some
revamping. As evident from Rep. Hall's remarks, the Congress
believes that cutting aid is a way to stand on principle. True
or not, cutting aid is no way to effect change in Indonesia or
anywhere else. Any action which prolongs poverty or slows
development prevents the graduation of countries into the
community of nations, where disreputable despots are held fully
accountable for their internal actions. Slowing of Indonesia's
development only fosters the reclusion which allows the Suharto
regime to continue its actions'.
The removal of funding for IMET and the Peace Corps
likewise have negative consequences. All remove the positive
example which U.S. military and civilian citizens can provide.
What will change the Indonesian military is an internal movement
toward increased professionalism and a view of their role as
peacekeepers and protectors of the Indonesian society, rather
than violators of that society. Those internal changes will come
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about more quickly if Indonesia's military leaders have examples
to emulate.
Another roadblock to improved relations is the call for
increased democracy along Western lines. Indonesian culture has
little background or experience for such practices. Indeed,
during the 1992 election season, numerous acts of violence were
recorded during political rallies. Indonesian democracy must
progress according to Indonesian culture. That means building
real consensus among competing views, as did the tribal leaders
in historical Java. That also means increasing actual political
competitiveness among existing parties before introducing new
parties
.
Finally, the relationship must be fostered on foundations
other than just aid from America. Given the U.S. budget deficit,
such money will be harder to come by in the next decade. Any
strong relationship must have firmer roots than charity, or the
relationship will stagnate when the aid well runs dry.
D. THE FINAL ANALYSIS
An improved relationship between the United States and
Indonesia is beneficial to both sides. Together, the nations can
meet each other's concerns in such divergent areas as economic
development, American investment opportunities, security of the
Indian Ocean and South China Sea, and preservation of the world's
environment. Apart, this world power and this regional power
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will cancel each other's influence in world and regional affairs.
The relationship cannot be one of a developed nation
lowering itself graciously to help a poorer nation. Indonesia
has made a great deal of progress since its independence in 1945.
Due largely to President Suharto's austere programs to control
spending while fostering development, Indonesia is widely thought
of as on the verge of a Taiwan-like economic breakthrough.
Certainly the nation has much to be proud of and the United
States should acknowledge this in its dialogues with Indonesia.
The new relationship, if one is to develop, must be one of
unconventional approaches, of compromise and consensus. Often
what are surface differences between the two powers are actually
differences only in strategies toward similar goals. This is the
case in the areas of investment, biodiversity, and military
presence. With more emphasis on overcoming these obstacles and a
new look at conventional practices, such differences can surely
be overcome
.
Finally, as with any two nations, sometimes Indonesia and
the United States simply do not see eye to eye. That need not
prevent the countries from achieving what progress can be made
and overcoming what problems can be overcome. Sometimes, the two
countries will need to agree to disagree, in order to preserve a
relationship which is beneficial to both parties.
An improved relationship with Indonesia is both attainable
and desirable. The national interests of the two countries have
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more in common than not. As soon as the respective governments
accept this fact, they can implement the new opportunities
presented in the post-Cold War world. The key will be compromise





Asia Yearbook, 1987-1992 . Far Eastern Economic Review. Hong
Kong: Review Publishing Company, Ltd.
Guidelines of State Policy of the Republic of Indonesia : a
Decree of the People's Consultative Assembly. Number IV
MPR/1978. Jakarta: Department of Information, 1978.
"Jakarta Re-opening Coal Mining to Foreign Investors." Far
Eastern Economic Review, 16 July 1992. HongKong : Review
Publishing Company, Ltd., 1992.
"Mission Accomplished." Far East Economic Review. Hongkong:
1992
The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. Jakarta:
Department of Information, 1989.
"Trade Surplus Plunges 33.8 Percent in 1990. "The Jakarta
Post," 5 April 1991. Translation in Foreign Broadcast
Information Service--East Asia. New Canaan, CT: Newsbank, Inc.,
1991.
United Nations Secretariat. U.N. Disarmament Handbook Volume
15:1990. Published in 1991 in the United States of America.
U.S. Congress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Human
Rights Documents : Compilation of Documents Pertaining to Human
Rights. 1983. Committee Print.
U.S. Department of State Bulletins--Official Weekly Record of
U.S. Foreign Policy. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1962-1989.
Economic Intelligence Unit. World Outlook 1992: Forecasts of
Political and Economic Trends for 1992 in over 165 Countries
.
London: Business International Limited, 1992.
Adler, Jerry, and Mary Hager. "Earth at the Summit,"
Newsweek, 1 June 1992, 20-22.
Address given by Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Ali Alatas.
"Year-End Press Statement 1990." Jakarta: Department of Foreign
Information, 1990.
185
Allison, Graham T. , Jr., and Robert P. Beschel, Jr. "Can the
United States Promote Democracy?" Political Science Quarterly,
107 (1992) : 81-98.
Almond, Gabriel A. "Capitalism and Democracy, " PS: Political
Science and Politics 24 (Sep 1991): 467-473.
Banks, Arthur J., ed. Political Handbook of the World, 1991:
Governments and Intergovernmental Organizations as of 1 July
1991. Binghampton, NY: CSA Publications, 1991.
Bergsten, C. Fred. "The Primacy of Economics," Foreign
Policy, Fall 1992, 3-24.
Brown, Janet Welsh, ed. In the U.S. Interest : Resources,
Growth, and Security in the Developing World. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1990.
Brown, Noel J. "Managing the Global Environment: a Challenge
in Search of a Strategy, " keynote address at the thirty-second
Air Force Academy Assembly, 12-18 Mar 1990.
Frederica M. Bunge, ed. Indonesia : a Country Study. Foreign
Area Studies of the American University. Washington, DC:
Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1983.
Caldwell, Malcolm. The Modern World: Indonesia. London:
Oxford University Press, 1968.
Colbert, Evelyn. "United States Policy in Southeast Asia,"
Current History 86 (April 1987): 145-147.
Coll, Alberto R. "America as the Grand Facilitator," Foreign
Policy, Fall 1992, 47-65.
Commoner, Barry. "The Failure of the Environmental Effort,"
Current History 91 (April 1992): 176-181.
Corning, Gregory P. "The Philippine Bases and U.S. Pacific
Strategy," Pacific Affairs 63 (Spring 1990): 6-23.
Crouch, Harold. The Army and Politics in Indonesia. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1978.
Diamond, Larry. "Promoting Democracy," Foreign Policy, Fall
1992, 25-45.
Elliot, Kimberly Ann. "United States Trade Policy After the
Cold War," Current History 91 (April 1992): 163-167.
186
Emmerson, Donald K. "Invisible Indonesia." Foreign Affairs
66. NY: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1987.
Fukuyama, Francis. "Liberal Democracy as a Global
Phenomenon, " 1991 Annual Meeting of PS: Political Science and
Politics
.
Goodheart, Adam. "Aftermath of a Massacre." Harvard
Magazine, March-April 1992. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Green, Marshall. Indonesia: Crisis and Transformation, 1965-
1968. Washington, DC: The Compass Press, 1990.
Hefner, Robert W. "Islamizing Java? Religion and Politics in
Rural East Java." Journal of Asian Affairs vol 46 (August 1987).
Jones, Howard Palfrey. Indonesia : the Possible Dream. New
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971.
Kimmitt, Robert. "U.S. -ASEAN Relations." U.S. Department of
State Dispatch (July 1991) .
King, David. "Indonesia's Foreign Policy." The Political
Economy of Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia. NY: St. Martin's
Press, 1990.
King, Dwight Y. and M. Ryaas Rasjid. "The GOLKAR Landslide in
the 1987 Indonesian Elections: the Case of Aceh." Asian Survey
vol 28 (September 1988)
.
Kroef, Justus. "The United States and Southeast Asia: Some
Future Strategic Realities," Pacific Focus 4 (Spring 1989): 23-
46.
Leifer, Michael. Indonesia' s Foreign Policy. London: George
Allen and Unwin, 1983.
"The Role and Paradox of ASEAN." The Balance of Power in
East Asia. NY: St. Martin's Press, 1986.
Liem Soei Liong. "Indonesian Muslims and the State:
Accommodation or Revolt?" Third World Quarterly vol 10 (April
1988) .
Martin, Linda G, ed. The ASEAN Success Story: Social,
Economic, and Political Dimensions . Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press, 1987.
McMahon, Robert J. Colonialism and Cold War: The United
States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945-49.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981.
187
Naidu, G.V.C. "The Indian Navy and Southeast Asia."
Contemporary Southeast Asia vol 13 (June 1991)
.
Pringle, Robert. Indonesia and the Philippines: American
Interests in Southeast Asia. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1980.
Richardson, Michael. "Indonesia: What Role for Islam?" Asia-
Pacific Defence Reporter vol 29 (August /September 1992).
Rudman, Warren. "The Federal Budget Deficit: It's Time to Do
Something For America, " Vital Speeches of the Day 58 (15 April
1992) : 386-390.
Schlossstein, Steven. Asia's New Little Dragons: the Dynamic
Emergence of Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia . Chicago:
Contemporary Books, 1991.
Scwartz, Adam and Peter Wise. "Maddening Silence." Far
Eastern Economic Review vol 155 (30 January 1992).
Simon, Sharon. "United Statets Security Policy and ASEAN,"
Current History 89 (March 1990): 97-100.
Steinberg, David Joel, ed. In Search of Southeast Asia: a
Modern History. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971.
Suwando, Purbo S. "Geopolitics in Southeast Asia: an
Indonesian View." Geopolitics of Security in the Greater Pacific
Basin. Causa International Seminar Series, vol 25.
International Security Council, 1988.
Thomas, R. Murray. "The Islamic Revival and Indonesian
Education." Asian Survey vol 28 (September 1988).
de la Torre, Augusto, and Margaret R. Kelly. Regional Trade
Arrangements . Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund,
1992.
Vlahos, Michael. "The Third World in U.S. Naval Planning,"




1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria VA 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 052
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey CA 93943-5002
3. N511 The Pentagon
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, D.C. 20350
4. Air Force Institute of Technology/CIRK
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433-6583
5. Karl Jackson
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20506
6. Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Southeast Asia Division
Department of State
2201 C Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20520
7. Professor Sheldon Simon















University of the Philippines





Center for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta
Jalah Tanah Abang 111/27
Jakarta, Indonesia 10160
12. Professor Claude Buss, Code NS/Bu
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
13 Professor Rodney Kennedy-Minott Code NS/Rm
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
14. Captain Anthony M. Packard
1184 Spruance Road
Monterey, CA 93940
190




DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY CA 93S43-51C
GAYLORD S

